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BOOK
REVIEWS_
THE STATE OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES LITERATURE
Global Warming, the Regulations Ahead, and the Oil and Gas Industry*
A Review Essay by John Burritt McArthur- & Rick Harper
ABSTRACT
The world has been aware of global warming as a significant threat
for several decades. The legal framework needed to secure the
cooperation of all major countries that emit greenhouse gases was
initiated in Stockholm in 1972. In subsequent meetings in Rio de
Janeiro,Kyoto, and elsewhere, the world community has developed
a structurethat includes specific capsfor developed countries - with
limits on developing countries to follow in time-and large
reductions to levels far below 1990 emissions. Almost all countries
except the United States have endorsed this "Kyoto" framework.
But the world thus far has been starkly unsuccessful in taking even
thefirst steps toward real reductions. Much of the blame lies at the
feet of large corporations,including oil and gas companies.
For there to be a chance of meeting this unique challenge, not
only will the oil andgas industry have to comply with the inevitable
regulations, but it also must transform its approach. Companies
must begin viewing emissions reduction and control as a new profit
opportunity, part of a new playingfield. They must aggressively
seek out technologies that will help the world sharply reduce
emissions even as growth continues. American companies have
lagged behind their competitors because resistance to Kyoto has
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I. ENVIRONMENTAL SCARCITY AND THE COLLAPSE OF
CIVILIZATIONS
In his recent bestseller, Collapse:How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed,'
University of California geographer Jared Diamond describes one
established civilization after another that developed large, successful

1. JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SociEIEs CHOOsE TO FAL OR SuccEED (2005).
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empires only to disappear in a very short period of time due to
environmental collapse. Diamond argues that in the years before they failed
these civilizations devised highly sophisticated techniques to overcome
their severe environmental challenges. They seem to have understood the
pressures posed by their environment and had overcome them for many
years. Yet in spite of understanding the threat to their survival, they could
not devise a lasting solution. Ultimately, they could not break their fatal
patterns of growth and resource consumption. The inability to change their
way of life led to their destruction.
Diamond's examples range from the clans on Easter Island to the
Mayan civilization that ranged from the Yucatan Peninsula down into
Central America and to the Anasazi civilization that sprawled across parts
of what are today New Mexico, Colorado, Arizona, and Utah; as well as
from the various Norse settlements in the North Atlantic to tribes in New
Guinea. His larger point is that this very wide range of societies with quite
different social structures and cultures all fell afoul of the same inability to
cope with environmental disaster.
To Diamond, the question of why societies "end up destroying
themselves" through environmental degradation "astonishes not only my
UCLA undergraduates but also professional historians and
archaeologists." 2 He concedes that at least some of the societies he describes
may have failed to accurately perceive the threat they faced, but the more
troubling cases are societies that understood the looming disaster but
"fail[ed] even to try to solve it," or tried but failed to find a cure.3 Diamond
calls the situation in which a society understands the environmental threat
it faces but fails to try to solve it the "most frequent" situation, even though
it is also the "most surprising."4 He includes among possible explanations
for this seemingly irrational behavior situations in which self-interested
individual behavior propels parties to consume resources necessary for
collective survival, perhaps because individually they face competitors who
will consume the resource even if they do not (the tragedy of the commons),
or perhaps because these were societies dominated by elites who believed
that their power would insulate them from the damage suffered by those
below them.'
The tragedy of the commons sounds uncomfortably close to the
situation of energy companies developing and consuming resources in
today's competitive marketplace, for instance oil and gas or coal companies
developing reserves in competition with each other. The metaphor also

2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 420.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 428-30.
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describes the situation of the largest industrial nations (developed and
developing nations) striving to increase their productivity and standard of
living even though achieving these goals increases resource consumption
and greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions. The expanding output of large
industrial countries is at odds with the world's common interest in reducing
GHG emissions, the topic of this book review. Both polluting companies
and polluting countries would prefer that no one else pollute, but they have
proven unable to resist activities that increase their GHG emissions in the
absence of a credible mechanism to fairly allocate emission limitations.
Twenty or 30 years ago, Diamond's book might have seemed to present
an abstract academic topic, interesting fodder for dinner-party discussion.
But he presents a compelling case that his examples remain relevant today
by including chapters on contemporary environmental degradation in
Montana, a bucolic state that one would not expect to be in severe
environmental crisis, as well as in China, Australia, the Dominican
Republic, Haiti, and Rwanda.
Diamond's topic is of central relevance to most readers of this journal
because the environmental problem that is unfolding with the greatest
urgency, global warming, is substantially linked to the production and
consumption of oil and gas, as well as coal production and electricity
generation. The rapid increase in GHG emissions, with its measurable effect
on warming the earth, oceans, and atmosphere, suggests that for the first
time in recorded history the entire world is facing a crisis similar to those
that destroyed the vanished civilizations chronicled by Diamond.
For countries to respond to global warming successfully, they need to
begin with a realistic understanding of the dramatic ongoing increase in
temperature and the climate changes likely to occur as a result. They will
have to adopt rules that limit GHG emissions and develop tests to
determine whether the new regulations have been effective. They will need
enough information to adjust regulations over time to keep emissions
within reasonable limits. Each step will require new learning and modified
behavior. This book review discusses a series of books that are part of world
civilization's response to this environmental threat and that will help
determine whether the world system has enough cohesion to make these
changes and meet this unique challenge.
Part II describes the basic challenge by sketching the scientific
consensus on global warming. Part III uses two books on the emerging
international legal standards to describe the world's current framework for
dealing with climate change. To inject a dose of realism into the discussion,
Part IV reviews the unfortunate evidence indicating that the world as a
whole is badly failing to meet even the limited reduction requirements to
which most nations have committed. Part V moves on to consider
arguments for more flexible, market-based regulations that actively involve
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business in seeking new means of reducing emissions and the related need
to measure program effectiveness.
Parts I through V address the challenge of global warming generally.
Part VI discusses the general role of industry in resisting early GHG
regulations in the United States; Part VII discusses the oil and gas industry's
role to date and its potential contributions. Perhaps surprisingly, many
within the industry have shifted from simply opposing GHG regulation to
viewing the crisis as a profound opportunity. Natural-gas companies
believe that they have a cleaner fuel that should replace coal and even oil
in heating and electricity generation; oil companies believe that oil is cleaner
than coal; and both see new opportunities for carbon capture, carbon
storage, and trading emissions permits. Any shift in which energy
companies begin to devote their advanced technological capability to
finding solutions to global warming, rather than devoting their resources
to opposing regulation, will signify a major advance in this struggle.
The other significant change, however, one also discussed in Part VII,
is that oil and gas companies will have to find ways to restrict emissions or
buy cap-and-trade credits. Within the United States, emissions in the field
by long-line transportation, by local distribution companies, and by
processing and refining facilities, currently are regulated by a combination
of federal and state statutes governing air and water quality. There is no
overall GHG regulation at either level. General tort standards can also
apply to damage caused directly by GHG releases. The United States,
however, does not yet have a federal framework that limits GHG emissions
as such. Global warming will force the country to adopt firm reduction
requirements in the next few years. The Obama administration has signaled
that it will move in this direction. New regulations are certain to have a
strong and direct impact on the oil and gas industry, as well as on the coal
and electricity industries. Industry participants tend to assume that the
demand for their products is sufficiently inelastic that they will be able to
pass the cost of reductions on to their customers.
Finally, Part VIII discusses the underlying issue of scarcity that remains
the elephant in the room for global warming discussions. The far too limited
steps that the world community has taken to date have been designed as if
we have the option of buying relief from climate change without radically
adjusting lifestyles, and as if we can allow billions of citizens in developing
countries to raise their standard of living without imposing additional
damage on the environment. The review ends in Part IX by placing the
discussion within the somewhat older debate over the limits of growth that
began in the late 1960s, and with a sobering reminder that the optimism that
overtook that debate may now be proving to have been a most costly
mistake.
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II. THE SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS ON GLOBAL WARMING
Climate Change: What It Meansfor Us, Our Children, and Our Grandchildren.
Edited by Joseph F.C. DiMento & Pamela Doughman. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 2007. Pp. 232. $19.95 paperback.
It is ironic that in spite of the seeming dawn of a new environmental age
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the world remains unprepared for the
crisis posed by global warming. That early period of relatively aggressive
American environmental regulation saw passage of the Clear Air Act of
7
1963,6 the Air Quality Act of 1967, and the Clean Air Act Extension of 19708
(which included provisions establishing the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)); the Water Quality Act of 1965, 9 the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969,10 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments
of 1972 (commonly known as the Clean Water Act)"- the core of current
domestic pollution regulation. The young movement celebrated its
emerging consciousness when it staged the first Earth Day on April 22,
1970. Yet global warming, the most significant environmental threat by far,
was treated as a debatable proposition by large parts of the U.S. population
for decades thereafter, all while the threat to mankind was rising rapidly.
GHG emissions in the United States have increased rapidly since 1970, as
they have in the world at large.
In recent years, the evidence that human activity is causing rapid
increases in world temperature has become so overwhelming that national
action to address climate change has become inevitable now that the Bush
administration is out of office. One of the most graphic illustrations of an
ongoing shift in the climate-change debate within this country - beyond the
obvious, the election of Barack Obama on a platform that includes
aggressive action on global warming-came recently from the oil and gas
industry when Exxon abandoned its longstanding, adamant public stance
that fears of global warming are unfounded and shifted to what seems to
be acceptance of the reality of manmade global warming. The company still
argues for a significant dose of business-as-usual on the basis that the world
will need a heavy diet of fossil fuels for decades to come. 2 Even this limited

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (2000).
Air Quality Act of 1967,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (2000).
Clean Air Act Extension of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (2000).
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376

(2000).
12. At the Feb. 15, 2007, International Energy Law Conference in Houston, Exxon Vice
President Keith Cohen presented Exxon's new position during a discussion of "Energy
Outlook and Trends: Technologies for the Future." Cohen denied neither the problem of
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move, however, suggests that discussion in the United States has shifted
from whether global warming is a problem to debating the scope of the very
real problem and the feasible remedies. A brief survey of the scientific
evidence indicates that the existence of a very serious worldwide problem
should no longer be in dispute.
In 1988, the United Nations Environment Program and the World
Meteorological Organization created the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) in order to empanel a body of scientists who could
identify the areas of international consensus on the issue of climate
change. 3 The IPCC is an unusual and vitally important agency. It is the
closest thing the world has to a body representing the international
community in a collective effort to develop reliable knowledge about
climate change. Effective action to reduce GHG emissions will require
worldwide cooperation, and the development of an accepted baseline is a
prerequisite for any collective measures. The American experience shows
how business interests can successfully delay action by claiming
"uncertainty" over the exact contours of global warming if policymakers
lack a common understanding of the problem. 4 The IPCC is the world
community's attempt to move past the stage at which denial or excessive
demands for total certainty hamper effective response.
The IPCC has had a very focused role from the beginning. Its job is to
determine whether a sufficient consensus exists to justify immediate
emissions reductions. To undertake this responsibility, the Panel assembled
a massive international network of scientists who were to base their work
on published, peer-reviewed data." The Kyoto Protocol that took effect in
2005 further enshrined the IPCC's unique position by providing that the

global warming nor that alternative fuels have to play a bigger part in the future. Instead, he
claimed that even with large increases in alternative sources of energy, fossil fuels will
continue to be the dominant energy source for years to come and discussed some options for
reducing carbon-dioxide emissions within this setting. Kenneth Cole, Energy Outlook and
Trends: Technologies for the Future,58TH ANNUAL OIL &GAS LAW CONFERENCE, INSTrrUTE FOR
ENERGY LAw (2007).
13. For background on the IPCC and its formation, see RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE
CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY

18-20 (2005).

14. See infra Part VI.
15. See VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 18-21. The IPCC is unusual in being broadly
representative of the world scientific community, but one author has criticized its working
groups as being unrepresentative because they are "almost completely composed of American
and European scientists." Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further
Reflections on Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1600 (2007). This imbalance reflects
a larger access problem for the poorest countries. Id. at 1618-22.
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methods for
estimating most GHG emissions would be "those accepted" by
16
the IPCC.
The IPCC has issued four reports, beginning with its First Assessment
Report in 1990 and running up to a Fourth Assessment Report issued in
2007. The Third Assessment report, issued in 2001, was the first to assign
specific confidence ranges to findings concerning the effects of global
warming;1 7 the Fourth Assessment Report contains its most recent
summary. In 2007, the Panel found that 11 of the last 12 years were the
warmest on record since 1850.8 The atmospheric level of carbon dioxide
(C02), the most pervasive GHG, was 379 parts per million (ppm), the
highest level in the last 650,000 years, and the IPCC found that the increase
is very likely caused by agriculture and the production and consumption
of fossil fuels. 9 The Panel determined with high confidence that regional
climate changes include increased melting in mountain, permafrost, and
Arctic/Antarctic areas and rising ocean levels. 2°
The 2007 Report projected large additional temperature increases with
the likely increase ranging from between 2.4 to 6.4' Celsius (C) by the end
of the 21st century, although the impact of this finding is muted in the
report because it contains probability ranges for various increase scenarios
instead of a single prediction. 21 (Many scientists treat a 20C increase as the

16. Kyoto Protocol on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
art. 5.2, Dec. 11, 1997,37 I.L.M. 1997 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
17. For the first two IPCC reports, see VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 24-26. The Third
Assessment Report, issued in 2001, was the first IPCC report to assign specific confidence
intervals to various predicted effects of climate change. Id. at 26. Among other things, the
Report found it very likely that the global surface temperatures had increased by 0.60 C, and
that ocean levels had risen from 10 to 20 centimeters in the twentieth century. Id. at 27. As
Judith Layzer notes, by the time the IPCC issued this report, "the scientific consensus on the
existence of, human contribution to, and threats posed by climate change was becoming
unassailable." Judith Layzer, Deep Freeze:How Business Has Shaped the Global Warming Debate
in Congress, in BUSINESSANDENVIRONMENTALPOLICY: CORPORATE INTERESTS IN THE AMERICAN

POLMCAL SYSTEM 108 (Michael Kraft & Sheldon Kanieniekci eds., 2007). The Third
Assessment was the "most unequivocal" of the reports to that time and "emphatically rejected
skeptics' primary counterargument- that solar activity, not human activities, was responsible
for the earth's increasing temperature." Id. See also Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensuson
Climate Change;How Do We Know We're Not Wrong?, in CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT ITMEANS FOR
US, OUR CHILDREN, AND OuR GRANDCHILDREN 67-68 (Joseph DiMento & Pamela Doughman

eds., 2007).
18. IPCC, 2007: Summaryfor Policymakers, in THE PHYSICALSCIENCE BASIS.

CONTRIBUTION
OF WORIONGGROuP I TOTHE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORTOF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (2007).

19.

Id. at 2-3.

20. Id. at 5-9.
21. Id. at 13.
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outer limit of manageable increases.2) The 2007/2008 United Nations
Human Development Report has cited the Fourth Assessment Report as
"establish[ing] an overwhelming scientific consensus that climate change
is both real and man-made. " 23
The IPCC noted that, because of the long life of energy infrastructure,
capital investments made today will have long-term impacts. Keeping
global carbon emissions down to 2005 levels will require "a large shift in
investment parameters," even though the additional spending, if begun
now, would range from "negligible to 5-10%" of world gross domestic
product (GDP).24 It is good news that the crisis may remain an affordable
one ifaction is taken now, but the cost of steps to prevent climate change are
"very likely" to increase over time as temperatures increase. 25 In other
words, the later the United States and the world begin serious investments
to counter global warming, the more expensive the cure, if a cure remains
possible at all. Short-sighted avoidance of change now because of concerns
over cost are condemning future generations to much more drastic,
expensive measures. The costs of U.S. reluctance to support the legal
framework developed for international efforts over the last 16 years and the
refusal of the United States to adopt firm emission caps under its own law
are likely to be very high.
The IPCC's findings are even worse than they seem, because GHGs can
stay in the atmosphere for hundreds and even thousands of years.26 Thus,
a mere reduction in emissions at some future date will not return the world
to its status quo ante.
The IPCC's blunt message accords with the even more sobering 2006
Stem Report, a report commissioned by Prime Minister Gordon Brown
when he was serving as Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer. The author,
economist Sir Nicholas Stern, studied the likely economic effects of global
warming. Stem found the evidence "overwhelming" that climate change is
"a serious global threat" that "demands an urgent response." 27 Rising
GHGs, a result of human activities, are "the only plausible explanation" for

22. See, e.g., U.N. HUMAN DEv. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008:
FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 7 (2007) [hereinafter

2007/2008 HDR].
23. Id. at 12.
24.

IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE

25.

Id. at 69.

2007: SYNTHESIS

REPORT

58 (2007).

26. The most recent U.N. Human Development Report estimates that "[h]alf of every
tonne emitted remains in the atmosphere for a period of between several centuries and several
thousand years." 2007/2008 HDR, supranote 22, at 36.
27.

SIR NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE EcoNoMIcs OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at vi,

Summary of Conclusions (2006).
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the increasing temperatures of the last 50 years.78 Increasing temperatures
"will" affect access to water, food, health, and the environment worldwide. 29 Stern estimated that failing to act could cost the world 5 percent of
GDP each year "now and forever," with some higher-range estimates rising
to as much as 20 percent of GDP, while the cost of taking corrective action,
though great, could be limited to one percent of GDP if undertaken now.3
The next 10 to 20 years will have "a profound effect" on climate in the rest
of the century and thereafter.31
According to Stem, global temperatures have been rising "rapidly and
continuously" for the last three decades (ironically, roughly the same period
since the U.S. environmental movement seemed to have gotten off the
ground).32 Without new action, and assuming current rates of emissions
increase continue, the level of GHGs could double their "pre-industrial"
level by hitting 550 ppm by 2035, barely 25 years from now. Such an
increase would cause an at-least 2°C rise in temperature and perhaps as
much as 5C -the latter being as great an increase in temperature above
today's levels as today's temperatures are above the Ice Age. 3
One sign of the staggering increase in GHGs is that, while the
concentration of C02 increased from 280 ppm in 1750, a benchmark for the
preindustrial environment, to 380 ppm today, a substantial increase of 100
ppm in roughly 250 years, the concentration of C02 is expected to increase
another 170 ppm in just the next 30 to 45 years. 34 Even if the world can
prevent emission levels from rising beyond today's levels, but does not
decrease them, GHGs will rise to 550 ppm by 2050 (just 15 years later than
the time they will reach 550 ppm if there is no effective action).' And these
dire figures understate the risk. They are based on averages that conceal the
"risk of outcomes much worse than expected," risks that "are very real and
could be catastrophic."' 6 The estimates also are highly dependent upon the
rate of industrial growth in China and India and the extent to which other
developing nations successfully copy these nations and achieve rapid
economic growth. A greater spread of prosperity, the goal of purposive

28. Id. pt. I, at 6.

29. Id.
30.

Id. Writing earlier in 2000, Yale economist William Nordhaus and a colleague

estimated that global warming would reduce global GDP by three percent. WILLIAM
NORDHAUS &JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: EcONOMIC MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING

96 (2000).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

STERN REVIEW, supra note 27, pt. I, at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id. Summary, at vi; Executive Summary, at iv; pt. I, at 2.
Id. pt. I, at 3.
Id. Executive Summary, at iii.

36.

Id. at ix.
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action all across the world, a goal made more likely by the spread of
markets, will produce even higher emissions.
Stem believes that the rise in temperature is likely to lead to disastrous
problems. For instance, it will release large volumes of stored methane and
C02 from thawing permafrost and peat bogs.37 Warming will reduce the
oceans' ability to continue absorbing carbon dioxide and, because oceans
absorb the great majority of warming's direct effects, will create a
cumulative increase in heat released back into the atmosphere even if
emissions stop rising today.38 Climate change may weaken the Atlantic
temperature circulation in a way that significantly cools both Europe and
the east coast of North America. World sea levels will continue to rise, with
substantial pressure from the melting Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets.39
In language that may sound unfamiliar in a country like the United
States, comfortable as it has been for many years with the idea that
unregulated markets automatically produce the best outcomes, Stem
describes global warming as a classic market failure.' The atmosphere is a
public good because those who damage it cannot easily be excluded from
using it and one person's use does not exclude another's. Producers of
GHGs impose severe costs on the rest of the world, but they do not pay for
the negative externalities of their actions.4 In an unregulated market,
polluters damage this public good without paying compensation.
Some may think that if reform is needed, some set of painless marketbased remedies surely will become available (that industry will devise
costless technological solutions once incentives are created under a cap-andtrade system of market exchange, without any diminution in lifestyle).
Stem, however, argues that the key to effective reform is caps that are
"stringent and in line with goals." 42 He projects a necessary required
reduction in carbon emissions of 60 percent to 75 percent by 2050. 43 In his
calculations, the true social cost of carbon is $85 per ton,44 a price far higher
than reflected in current pricing proposals.

37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 11-12.
39. Id. at 15-16.
40. Id. Summary, at viii. Stem's framework grows out of a discipline in welfare
economics that has deep roots, having developed almost a century ago. See, e.g., A.C. PIGUO,
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1923).
41. STERN REvIEw, supra note 27, p. I, at 24-25.

42. Id. pt. VI, International Collective Action, at 481.
43. Id. Executive Summary, at xii.
44. Id. at xvi. The 2007/2008 HDR estimates the necessary C02 price at between $60 and
$100 per ton. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 17, 127. The International Energy Agency
(TEA) has recently warned that emissions will increase 130 percent by 2050 if the world stays
on the current track. Press Release, Int'l Energy Agency, Now or Never-EA Energy
Technology Perspectives 2008 Shows Pathways to Sustained Economic Growth Based on
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According to Stem, one of the most destabilizing features of global
warming is that the world's poorest countries will suffer most. Not only are
these countries "geographically disadvantaged" by being on average in
warming regions with higher rain variability, but they are heavily
dependent upon agriculture-the industry likely to be most affected by
climate change - and are least equipped to pay for remedies. 45 Added
pressure on the economies of the world's poorest countries can only
increase their instability. These are all reasons why the Rio Conference on
Environment and Development in 1992 and the Conference of the Parties
in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 adopted the principle discussed below that the
developed countries that have caused (and benefited most from) past
pollution, and that enjoy the most wealth, should help fund emissions
reductions in developing nations.'
For those wanting a clear introduction to the science behind global
warming, the MIT Press has published an accessible set of essays in Climate
47
Two
Change: What It Means for Us, Our Children, and Our Grandchildren.
introductory chapters, co-written by editors Joseph DiMento, a Professor at
the University of California-Irvine, and Pamela Doughman, an energy
specialist for the California Energy Commission, along with co-authors John
Abatzoglou and Stefano Nespor, offer an ideal entree into the science
behind global warming and the evidence of accumulating GHGs. Chapter
two explains the role GHGs play in trapping long-wave earth radiation and
the major elements (primarily carbon dioxide, but also methane, nitrous
oxide, halocarbons, ozone, and water vapor) that trap thermal radiation in
the atmosphere.4' The authors remind readers that melting polar icecaps
will remove one of the world's most efficient reflectors of solar radiation.4 9
They discuss the possibility of rapid, nonlinear change if climate change
disrupts traditional ocean circulation5 Relying heavily on the IPCC's
consensus findings, they point out that the IPCC has projected an increase
in carbon far above today's 385 ppm, a level at which we are already seeing

Clean and Affordable Energy Technology (June 6, 2008), availableat http://www.iea.org/
Textbase/press/pressdetail.asp?PRESSRELID=263. The lEA estimates that effective
remediation would cost 100 to 200 billion dollars a year in the coming decade and would rise
to 102 trillion dollars "in coming decades." Id. The world is nowhere near close to making this
kind of investment.
45. STERN REvIEW, supra note 27, at vii; pt. I at 28. The United Nations featured climate
change as the central topic of its annual Human Development Report for 2007/2008 because
of the disastrous effect that increasing temperatures are likely to have on the poorest
developing nations. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
46. See infra pts. IlI.B-C.
47. CLIMATE CHANGE, supranote 17.
48. See id. at 11-26.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id. at 38-40.

Summer 2008]

GLOBAL WARMING & THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY

757

major effects of global warming, to between 600 and 1,000 ppm by 2100.51
The IPCC's conversion of this emissions increase into temperature ranges
projects a rise from 3.20 to 70 Fahrenheit (F) by 2100, the latter a greater
increase
than the difference between today's temperatures and the Ice
52
Age.
Because progress on climate change within the United States has been
hampered by arguments that the science of global warming is not yet
"certain," ClimateChange includes a useful chapter addressing the extent of
scientific consensus by Naomi Oreskes, an associate professor at the
University of California-San Diego.53 Noting that the IPCC first stated
unequivocally that there is a consensus that human activities are increasing
average temperatures in its Third Assessment Report in 2001 (the year
President Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol) and citing other consensus
findings that accumulating GHGs are increasing temperature from the
National Academy of Sciences, American Meteorological Society, American
Geophysical Union, and the American Academy of Sciences,' Oreskes
conducted her own survey of peer-reviewed papers on climate change
published between 1993 and 2003 using a database maintained by the
Institute for Scientific Information that incorporates articles from 8,500 peerreviewed scientific journals worldwide.55 Oreskes identified 928 papers
discussing climate change. Of these, she could find none that fell into her
category of "those explicitly refuting the consensus position" that human
activity is causing increasing temperatures. 6
Oreskes argues that the American media has distorted perceptions
about climate change by paying too much attention to an unrepresentative
group of dissenters (for instance, author Michael Crichton) who are not
climate scientists and have not conducted independent tests into whether
human activity is increasing global temperatures. 7 The result is media
reporting that produces the appearance of uncertainty and balance, as if
both sides have equally valid positions, disguising the fact that there is no
serious debate over the reality of serious, human-caused global warming.
Oreskes concludes that "the vast majority of materials denying the reality of
global warming do not pass the most basic test for what it takes to be counted

51. Id. at 46.
52. Id. For an accessible popular description of demonstrable climate change, see THOMAS
L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED, ch. 5 (2008).

53. Oreskes, supranote 17, at 65-99. A much-cited earlier survey by Oreskes is Naomi
Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 So. 1686 (2004).

54.
55.
56.
57.

Oreskes, supranote 17, at 67-69.
Id. at 70-71.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 74-75.
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as scientific - namely, being published in a peer-reviewed journal."' This may
all change, of course, now that we have an administration in Washington that
takes global warming seriously.
Many other countries and groups have been ahead of the federal
government in treating global warming seriously. At the European Union's
spring 2008 summit, the 27 nations committed to adopting additional
regulations to reduce their GHG emissions by 20 percent below 1990 levels
by 2020.' 9Showing the restiveness with countries like the United States and
China, now the world's two largest sources of GHG emissions and two of
the countries that have refused to limit their emissions, France's President
Nicolas Sarkozy has begun pushing the idea of imposing tariffs on countries
that refuse to adopt GHG reduction rules, even though thus far he has not
found significant support.60 As the United Nations recently reported, most
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries have committed themselves to the Kyoto process, but "Australia
and the United States are the major exceptions." 61 Australia's new Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd signed a ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on
December 3, 2007, leaving the United States as the only major developed
country to refuse to sign this international legal program.
Within the United States, one sign of a major change in attitude (one
embodied in the outcome of the 2008 election) came when a group of
leading Southern Baptist leaders -a traditionally conservative group signed "A Southern Baptist Declaration on the Environment and Climate
Change." 62 This extraordinary document acknowledged that Southern

58. Id. at 75. To explain why the extraordinary consensus in scientific research has not
been better reflected in public debate, Oreskes argues that the fact that even the consensus on
climate change still is a consensus about uncertainty -for instance, about the degrees of
confidence on the causal forces behind climate change and the range of expected
outcomes- makes it more difficult to discuss in conventional terms, and that scientists thus
far have proven poorly equipped to hold their own in the overdetermined language of
politics. Id. at 76-78. On the distortion that can be perpetrated by press efforts to provide
"balance" in the climate-change story by giving two sides to each story, even if one side has
little or no support for its position, see CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE
266-68 (2005); seegenerallyJAMESFALLOWs, BREAKlNGTHENEWS: HOwTHE MEDIA UNDERMINE
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1996); Matthew Pawa & Benjamin Krass, Behind the Curve: The
National Media's Reporting on Global Warming, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 485,497-07 (2006).
59. Turning Pledges into Law: EU Commits to Year-End Climate Deadline,SPIEGEL ONLINE,
INT'L (Mar.14, 2008), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/europe/0,1518,541565,00.html.
For a listing of some of the goals adopted by countries within the European Union, see
2007/2008 HDR, supranote 22, at 113-15.
60. Turning Pledges into Law, supra note 59.
61. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 113.
62. S. Baptist Env't & Climate Initiative, A Southern Baptist Declaration on the
Environment and Climate Change, http://www.baptistcreationcare.org/node/1 (last visited
May 26, 2008).
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Baptists' "denominational engagement" on environmental and climate
change issues has "often been too timid," and that their "cautious response
to these issues in the face of mounting evidence may be seen by the world
as uncaring, reckless, and ill-informed." 6 The Declaration addresses the
issue of certainty by stating that it is prudent to address climate change
now; even though there may not be unanimity on the issue, there is
"general agreement among those engaged with this issue in the
scientific
community" 64 The Declaration advocates a "prudent," "proactive"
approach' -thus adopting the precautionary principle discussed below
that has been endorsed in emerging international standards.'
A report that is characteristic of the way most of the world views global
warming is the 2007/2008 Human Development Report (HDR) issued by
the U.N. Development Programme. The report is subtitled "Fighting
Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World."67 The United
Nations has issued annual human-development reports since 1990 in an
effort to provide a clearer description of global living standards than can be
gleaned from simple GDP statistics. 68 Each report emphasizes a theme
related to human development. The 2007/2008 report focuses on climate
change because human development, its primary concern, "is increasingly
going to be hindered by climate change." 69
The HDR describes climate change as "now an established fact," one
that is "already starting to affect some of the poorest and most vulnerable
communities around the world."7' The crisis is "the defining human
development issue of our generation." 71Continuing emissions are "running
up an unsustainable ecological debt that future generations will inherit. We
are drawing down the stock of environmental capital of our children."'
Today's energy investments are making matters worse by installing a long-

63. Id.
64. Id. "[E]ven in the absence of perfect knowledge or unanimity, we have to make
informed decisions about the future." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Statement 4 announces, "It Is Time for Individuals, Churches, Communities and
Governments to Act."
67. 2007/2008 HDR, supranote 22.
68. The 1990 Report explained that the reason to study more than just national
production figures is that "what is important is to study how this growth translates- or fails
to translate - into human development in various societies." U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990 Foreword, at iii (1990).
69. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, Summary, at 4.
70. Id. at 3. The Report notes that there is an inverse relationship "between responsibility
for climate change and vulnerability to its impacts." Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 7. The United Nations foresees that climate change "will undermine
international efforts to combat poverty." Id.
72. Id. at 9.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

term "carbon intensive energy infrastructure, with coal playing a dominant
role. " ' 3 Under these conditions, climate change "calls into question the
Enlightenment Principle that human progress will make the future look
better than the past."74
The HDR also portrays the differentiated responsibility of rich and poor
nations:
The distributional challenge [of distributing the costs of fixing
climate change] is made particularly difficult because those
who have largely caused the problem -the rich countries are not going to be those who suffer the most in the short
term. It is the poorest who did not and still are not
contributing significantly to green house gas emissions that
are the most vulnerable. In between, many middle income
countries are becoming significant emitters in aggregate
terms- but they do not have the carbon debt to the world that
the rich countries have accumulated and they are still low
emitters in per capita terms. 75
Even with rising emissions in middle-income developing countries, rich
developed countries with only 15 percent of the world's population still
account for half of world emissions. 76 The HDR rejects arguments based on
uncertainty because even a small risk of catastrophe warrants action.77 In
the HDR's well-founded estimation, failure to act will come from failures
of political will, not technological or economic constraints, and the failure
would be "a moral failure on a scale unparalleled in history." 78
Questioning the basic direction of current economic activity, the HDR
argues that progress no longer can be defined in terms of "wealth creation"

73. Id. at 15. Although this review focuses on the oil and gas industry, an even bigger
problem is coal, the dirtier fuel that exists in such abundance that it almost certainly will
become more widely used as oil and natural gas prices rise. Between 1970 and 2000, the
amount of coal used to generate domestic electricity in the United States tripled. JEFF
GOODELL, BIG COAL: THE DIRTY SECRET BEHIND AMERICA'S ENERGY FUTURE 99 (2006). The coal
industry is a source of particulate, mercury, and sulfur dioxide emissions and is one of the
largest sources of C02 emissions. See generally id. at 127-46. The industry has benefited hugely
from a loophole in EPA regulations that allows it to perpetuate depreciated -and therefore
inexpensive-but highly polluting older coal plants by allowing modifications that cost up
to 20 percent of plant cost without having to comply with the tighter standards for "New
Source" plants. Id. at 157-69. On the risk of a backslide into coal, particularly in this era of
high oil and gas prices, see 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 55,57,133 & fig. 3.3,148-51. For
added discussion of coal, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 375-77.
74. 2008/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 15.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id. at 8.

78.

Id.
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alone.79 "One of the hardest lessons taught by climate change is that the
economic model which drives growth, and the profligate consumption in
rich nations that goes with it, is ecologically unsustainable."'
With even ExxonMobil now beginning to treat climate change as a real
problem, it appears likely that the argument over uncertainty is largely
finished. Today no substantial body of scientific studies denies that the
climate is warming rapidly because of human action, that increased
temperatures are starting to damage the economies and lifestyles of many
nations, and that the full impact is going to be much worse. The next
question to arise, then, is how the world community will respond in the
framework of international law, and what kind of emissions reductions will
follow.
III. THE UNFOLDING GLOBAL-WARMING REGIME: THE
CERTAINTY OF FIRM, MANDATORY, ENFORCEABLE
REDUCTIONS IN GHG EMISSIONS
Guide to International Environmental Law. By Alexandre Kiss & Dinah
Shelton. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007. Pp. 305. $55
hardcover.
Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State
Responsibility. By Roda Verheyen. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2005. Pp. 406. $164 hardcover.
The American regime of environmental regulation, comprised mainly
of statutes against air and water pollution passed in the late 1960s and early
1970s and some later modifying legislation, largely arose from internal
pressures to clean up the environment. For a brief period, this domestic
legislation made the United States the world leader in environmental
protection.
Over the last four decades, however, the United States has fallen behind
most major developed countries even as the international scope of
traditional forms of air and water pollution, as well as the overarching
cumulative problem of global warming, have become clear. The United
States has been a follower, not a leader, in meeting this challenge. The
emissions of large polluting nations - and the United States historically has

79.

Id. at 27.

80.

Id.
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been the largest emitter of GHGs on a total and a per capita basis81 - are
causing worldwide damage. The era when a major environmental boundary
dispute involved one U.S. state or group of states against another-for
instance, Northeast states banding together to resist airborne pollution from
the industrial Midwest-looks like a quaint age of environmental
innocence.
The impetus for change within the United States shifted over those
years from domestic politics to pressures from abroad. One reason has been
that the American political system had proven incapable of acting on the
problem; many other countries, including some of our closest allies, support
much more aggressive measures than the voluntary initiatives that are the
closest thing the United States has to a national policy on global warming.
Because the United States refused to take a leadership position, it
increasingly found itself stuck in an international environmental regime that
was largely being shaped by other countries.
Even without American resistance to making any real sacrifices in order
to reduce emissions, the fact that most GHG emissions have come from
major industrial countries but that the effects are being felt worldwide
would ensure that the legal regime for responding to global warming will
be international. The recently issued Guide to International Environmental
Law,82 by the late Professor Alexandre Kiss, longtime President of the
European Council on Environmental Law, and George Washington
University Professor Dinah Shelton, describes the complex framework of

81. Roda Verheyen cites estimates of historical responsibility that show the United States
as responsible for slightly over 30 percent of all carbon emissions worldwide from 1900 to
1999, the period of greatest emissions. VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 40, tbl. II.4. Total U.S.
emissions were 77.320 billion tons of carbon over this period. As a sign of the rapidly
worsening world situation, China had already moved up to the fifth largest source of carbon
over this period, and India to twelfth. Id. For a chart displaying the outsize responsibility of
the United States for cumulative C02 emissions in the period from 1840 to 2004, see
2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 40, fig. 1.4. The Report displays current C02 emissions for
selected countries and regions in Figure 1.5 on page 41. See also the chart of the top 30 C02
emitters, and figures for various regions around the world, at 69, app. tbl. 1.1. For other
examples of the imbalance in emissions between the top emitters- almost all traditional
industrialized countries, with the conspicuous exception of China and in the near future most
likely India as well, see id. at 43 & fig. 1.6. The HDR points out that C02 emissions from
Texas, with a population of only 23 million people, are greater than the C02 emissions from
all of sub-Saharan Africa, an area with 700 million people. Id. New York's 19 million
inhabitants emit more carbon than the 766 million people living in the 50 least developed
countries. Id.
The historical emissions by developed countries can be viewed as high-powered
emissions because they have sharply reduced the earth's capacity to store carbon in its various
sinks, VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 36-37, thus removing the room for today's developing
countries to enjoy a similar period of relatively cost-free economic growth.
82. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2007).
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international law for reducing pollution. Understanding these standards
will be increasingly important for U.S. industries, including the oil and gas
industry given the high level of emissions resulting from its products.
International treaties ultimately will determine how much the United
States has to reduce overall GHG emissions. National legislation will have
to implement overall reductions by imposing limits on individual
companies and consumers. Binding international standards will drive
domestic reductions that trickle down from international requirements by
industry, by company, and by individual consumer. Moreover, the large
multinational energy companies based in the United States will have to
develop technological measures to limit emissions in their international
operations, where they already may face greater constraints than within the
United States.
A. The Role of Treaties in Environmental Regulation
The difference between international law and domestic law is that there
is no world legislative body of ultimate authority, no accepted world court
of last resort, no world supreme court." Kiss and Shelton remind readers
that state sovereignty - the primary barrier to effective international
regulation -is one of the bedrock principles of international law. 84 Most
international legal obligations accordingly result from treaties negotiated
between sovereign states that consensually limit individual-state powers
and provide an enforcement mechanism.8 Countries can contractually
impose limits on their rights, even if they cannot be forced to abandon
rights involuntarily. The failure to observe a treaty gives rise to a legal claim
and to a right to reparations. 86
At the same time, countries cannot avoid all obligations to other
countries simply by refusing to enter treaties. Enforceable international
legal obligations also arise from "customary international law" as found in
"widespread and consistent state practices" and from the "general
principles of law" that appear in most world legal systems."7 As a general

83. See HELMIJT BRErrMEIERErAL., ANALYZING INTERNATIONALENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES:
FROM CASE STUDY TO DATABASE 152 (2006) ("What makes international society unusual in this
connection is the absence of general arrangements (e.g., a system of courts) capable of
resolving such matters in a manner that interested parties will accept as authoritative and
legitimate.").
84. KISS & SHELTON, supra note 82, at 11-12.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id. at 7.
87. Id. at 8. Customary international law "is found in widespread and consistent state
practices, followed because the states believe the practices are legally required." Id. at 8.
General principles of law "are those concepts and rules found in major legal systems of the
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proposition, the longer the world fails to agree on an effective international
treaty on global warming, the greater the pressure on individual nations
and firms to create new remedies under general principles of international
law, as well as from extralegal sources of leverage including trade
pressures, tariffs, and fees.
Kiss and Shelton list four widely accepted general principles of
international law: state sovereignty, cooperation, protection of items of
"common concern of humanity," and protection of those involving the
"common heritage of mankind."8 Within the environmental area, they cite
four other broad principles: (1) the prevention of harm, (2) the precaution
principle, (3) the polluter pays principle, and (4) the principle of sustainable
development.89 While these principles are quite general, they explain much
of the existing structure for regulating global warming, including the
provisions adopted at the Rio Conference in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol
devised in 1997. The principles also embody much of the difference
between the approach to global warming in most of the world and the
federal approach over the last few decades in the United States.'
The polluter pays principle, for instance, is one rationale for imposing
specific carbon-reduction requirements on developed countries, which have
been polluting the environment with GHGs for decades, but only
aspirational goals on developing countries. The polluter-pays and
prevention-of-harm principles in combination support imposing the
heaviest responsibility on developed nations. The "precaution" principle,
which rejects the excuse of scientific uncertainty, would have removed the
primary excuse for not taking firm action in the last two decades within the
United States. The sustainable development principle creates tension with
emissions-reduction goals and is a reminder that world history
unfortunately could end up the story of a body of nations that understood
the environmental problems that threatened them but failed to act
decisively. Although sustainabledevelopment sounds like apro-conservation
standard that would direct development only to growth that does not
compromise resources for future generations, the World Summit on
Sustainable Development held a decade after the Rio conference ended up
focusing more on development than sustainability.In the words of Kiss and
Shelton, "The rules of the WTO were given a high political status, while

world and appropriate for application in international law." Id.
88. Id. at 13-16.
89. Id. at 90-98.
90. Roda Verheyen traces the listing of Annex I developed countries in the FCCC and its
carryover into the Kyoto Protocol to the fact that these countries were responsible for over 70
percent of the world's C02 emissions from 1900 to 1990 and in part to developing countries'
support for the polluter pays principle. VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 72.
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environmental law was relegated to second place." 91 Thus, the principle
embodies an unresolved tension between the need to protect world
resources and the need for development, a tension that has defeated the
reforms adopted to date.
The path of international law will be fixed by the interplay between
these general principles and the treaties negotiated to create standards for
climate change. The work done since the early 1970s suggests that globalwarming regulations ultimately will become embodied in a set of detailed
treaty provisions.
Kiss and Shelton note that customary legal principles have been called
"rules of indeterminate content" on the theory that it "is not possible to
deduce precise obligations from them with any degree of certainty."' Yet
these deeply rooted, widely accepted principles endorsed by many nations
will substantially define the kind of reforms most countries expect. In
general, one can predict that the sooner the United States becomes willing
to sign a multi-party treaty that has sufficient teeth to produce effective
remedial measures, the likelier it is to have at least some control over the
way these general pressures are manifested in treaties. Conversely, the
more the United States refuses to meet the rest of the world in a common
legal framework, the more it will find itself forced into a legal regime in
which it has little input or faces penalties from countries that are undertaking costly GHG reductions and are unwilling to let the United States free
ride on their efforts.
In the absence of a specific treaty, the ability of states and individuals
to punish polluting states or their inhabitants under general principles of
international law remains unresolved. Kiss and Shelton give as an example
of the problem the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, in which the Chernobyl
nuclear plant released a large radioactive cloud that spread over parts of
Europe. Because the Soviet Union had not signed the Vienna Convention
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and, therefore, had not voluntarily
bound itself to an international regime for nuclear damage, no affected state
ended up taking action.' One should not read too much into this
experience, however, because it involved a single, unexpected accident that
was followed by the plant's total closure.
In contrast, the damage from GHG emissions will be persistent,
measurable, and ongoing. Affected nations are unlikely to avoid seeking
remedies against those they deem responsible for global warming just
because the offenders have not signed an effective international treaty. As
the costs of global warming rise, the pressure to act will become irresistible.

91. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 82 at 44.
92. Id. at 89.
93. Id. at 24.
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To the extent that nations ultimately can find common ground, the most
common structure for an effective international agreement is a multi-party
treaty among states, with states the units of compliance, enforcement, and
remedy. These national units will then adopt internal regulations to achieve
the mandated reductions. In this model, which is the structure used in the
Kyoto Protocol, the United States would be bound by national reduction
limits and would be free to design internal requirements to achieve them.
When treaties contain specific goals, they can be highly effective at spurring
action even if only countries (and not companies and individuals) are
directly bound. Kiss and Shelton give the example of the Montreal Protocol
on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, which led signatory states to
move relatively quickly toward eradicating ozone-depleting substances.' 4
Some treaties create private rights of action for affected organizations
and individuals and thus provide the foundation for direct claims against
polluters, as has been the case for nuclear disasters under the Vienna
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and for marine oil
pollution under the Oil Pollution Convention and the 2001 International
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage. 95 For
remedies on global warming, however, the considerable effort that has gone
into the state-level framework that began in Rio De Janeiro in 1992,
proceeded through the Kyoto meeting in 1997, and is supposed to be
extended in a long-term agreement by the end of 2009 in Copenhagen,
coupled with the widespread acceptance of the underlying principles in
those standards (albeit over strong United States opposition), suggests that
this is the likeliest path for reforms to unfold.

94. Id. at 168-70. Kiss and Shelton also survey other legal structures that suggest different
ways of approaching global warming, including the global institutions that regulate nuclear
safety (International Atomic Energy Agency), aviation (International Civil Aviation
Organization), and some aspects of world trade (World Trade Organization), id.at 50-54, and
regional organizations like the Council of Europe and the Organization of American States,
id. at 55-62. Regional examples may be more relevant than one might expect for the short term
in the United States; in the absence of serious federal action against global warming by the
Bush administration, states increasingly created regional organizations to develop rules. (For
a survey of recent state regional efforts, see Robert McKinstry et al., Federal Climate Change
Legislation as if the States Matter, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 4-5 (2008); Mary Hogan,
CaliforniaClimate ChangeInitiativesLeading the West and the Nation,22 NAT. REsouRcEs& ENVT
14 (2008). On the innovative California program, see also 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at
115-16.). But the need for effective worldwide action and the damage that free-riding
countries can impose on the rest of the world mean that climate change regulation almost
certainly will end up being grounded on the broadest international basis, with nation states
the basic units of compliance.
95. Kiss & SHELTON, supranote 82, at 136-42.
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B. The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, the U.N.-Kyoto
Framework
The world has made considerable progress in building a legal
framework for global-warming regulation since the early 1970s. The goal of
these efforts is to enshrine binding, enforceable GHG reductions in
international agreements, with binding country-by-country obligations that
apply to developed countries first, and with restrictions on developing
countries to follow.
1. The 1972 Stockholm Conference and Declarationon the Human Environment
The roots of current international climate-change regulation lie in the
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations on the Human Environment,
which emerged from the World Conference on the Human Environment
held by the United Nations in Stockholm in 1972.96 Even this early
conference had a direct link to the oil and gas industry: a precipitating
factor was the wreck of the oil tanker Torrey Canyon in 1967 and the "black
tides" that bespoiled the coasts of England, France, and Belgium for some
time thereafter. 9'
The countries attending the Stockholm Conference accepted several key
principles in the Stockholm Declaration that have guided all subsequent
developments. First, and perhaps most important, was Principle 21.
Although it acknowledged countries' "sovereign right to exploit their own
resources," Principle 21 tied this right to their "responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction." 98 Kiss and Shelton describe Principle 21 as being "generally
recognized today as expressing a basic norm of customary international
environmental law." 99 This principle was followed by a mandatory
principle that countries "shall cooperate to develop further the international
law regarding liability and compensation for victims of pollution and other
environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control
of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction. " "°° The Declaration also
provided that" [ciooperation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements
or other appropriate means is essential" to combating "adverse

96. Id. at 34-37 (summarizing the path from Stockholm to Kyoto). For the Stockholm
Declaration itself, see United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
Sweden, June 16, 1972, Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration].
97. Kiss &SHELTON, supranote 82, at 34.
98. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 96, princ. 21.
99. Kiss &SHELTON, supra note 82, at 36.
100. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 96, princ. 22 (emphasis added).
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environmental effects. " "° The parties thus clearly envisioned the Stockholm
Declaration as but the beginning of a process leading to mandatory, binding
emissions limits and liability for violators.
Second, the Stockholm Declaration contains a variety of provisions that
create a privileged status for developing nations. It recites that most
environmental problems in those poorer countries are caused by "underdevelopment"; that "economic and social development" are essential parts
of a "favorable living and working environment"; that environmental
problems caused by under-development can"best be remedied' by financial
and technological assistance; that environmental policies "of all States"
should not hurt developing countries; and that resources "should be made
available" to improve the environment, "taking into account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries and any costs"
they might incur.' ° According to the Declaration, standards that "are valid
for the most advanced countries...may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries."" ° The last few decades seem to
have made it clear that the damage from global warming is going to fall
disproportionately on the world's poorest countries, another fact that
justifies differentiated responsibility in which developed countries have to
provide resources to poorer nations .) 4 (More than 25 years after Stockholm,
however, the lack of any standard imposed on developing countries has
been one reason that both Congress and President Bush have refused to
approve the Kyoto Protocol."' s)
Finally, reading the Stockholm Declaration today is a reminder of how
innocent the world was in 1972, just a few decades ago. Global warming is
not emphasized as a particular environmental problem. Instead, the
problem of "release of heat" is mixed with the discharge of toxic substances
in one principle, as part of a larger set of six general environmental
principles that include safeguarding natural resources, protecting wildlife,

101. Id. princ. 24.
102. See, respectively, id. princs. 4, 8, 9,11, 12.
103. Id. princ. 23.
104. See generally 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, ch. 2 ("Climate Shocks: risk and
vulnerability in an unequal world"); Gordon, supranote 15; supranote 45 and accompanying
text (citing the Stern Report). Gordon explores the ways in which three of the world's poorest
areas, Africa, the small island nations, and the Arctic, will be disproportionately damaged by
global warming. Gordon, supranote 15, at 1589-1600. She describes the highly differentiated
capacity of developing countries to meet this challenge and the way that the CDM mechanism
under the Kyoto Protocol, which is supposed to let developed countries earn credits for
funding emissions reductions in developing countries, has largely focused aid on the most
advanced developing countries. In this upper tier of poorer nations, investment is fairly secure
and emission reduction opportunities available, but such opportunities do not exist in the
world's poorest nations and the CDM almost entirely bypassed them. Id. at 1608-18.
105. See infra notes 147, 149 and accompanying text.
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and preventing pollution of the sea. °6 Twenty years later, however, by the
time of the U.N. conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, global warming had

emerged as the environmental problem of the age.
2. Two Examples of Successful Regulation: Ozone and the 1976 Montreal
Protocol, and the EPA's Cap-and-TradeSulfur Program

Not long after the Stockholm Conference, the world made real progress
in banning ozone-depleting chemicals. Because these efforts were
successful, their example continues to influence climate-change reforms."°7
The 1976 Montreal Protocol arose after scientists determined that the use of
certain chemicals common in household and industrial products was
rapidly destroying the ozone layer, which, among other things, blocks
ultraviolet radiation. When major industrial countries signed the Protocol,
it imposed a series of stepped-up reductions in the use of major ozonedepleting chemicals, with most emissions to be reduced to zero at varying
dates not all that far in the future.1 8 In 1993, after it had become clear that
the damage to the ozone lawyer was even more severe than understood in
1976, an amendment accelerated the reduction schedule.1°9 The Protocol
acknowledged the "special situation" of developing countries and
contained a funding mechanism to help them meet their transition costs. 10
The need for aid to developing countries became apparent after two
major developing-country producers, India and China, at first refused to
participate. Developed countries created funding to assist them in the
transition."' While this experience with a relatively limited-use product that
has substitutes is an easy case compared to the much more widespread
diverse nature of the activities that emit GHGs - indeed, some of the
reduction was into products that increase GHG emissions 1 2 - the ozone
history does show that an international protocol coupled with funding to
assist developing countries can reduce emissions significantly.

106. The Stockholm Declaration addresses the release of heat in Principle 6; the six
principles are 2-7. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 96.
107. For citation to the Montreal Protocol as an example of a successful international
emissions-reduction measure, see John Abatzoglou et al., Climate-Change Effects: Global and
Local Views, in CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 17, at 25-26; MEADOwS ET AL., infra note 430, at
141-60; 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 154 (calling the Montreal Protocol "[p]erhaps the
most successful of all international environmental treaties"); Paul Harris, CollectiveAction on
Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure,47 NAT. REsouRcEs J.195,207-09 (2007).
108. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer arts. 2-2G, Sept. 16,
1987,1522 U.N.T.S. 28 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
109. Id. Annex I; KISS & SHELTON, supra note 82, at 149.
110. Montreal Protocol, supra note 108, arts. 5, 10; VERHEYEN, supranote 13, at 93.
111.

BRErrMEIR ET AL., supra note 83, at 43.

112. See U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAs EMISsIONs AND
SINKs: 1990-2006, at ES-2 (2008) [hereinafter EPA GHG INVENTORY].
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Another frequently cited success is the EPA's cap-and-trade program
developed to lower sulfur emissions. The EPA developed these standards
under the first President Bush in response to the problem of acid rain. Again
dealing with a pollutant with highly visible effects that could be brought
under control by technology, the mechanism proved highly successful." 3
(This success contrasts with the EU's experiment with carbon trading
permits: it is widely recognized that the quantitative limits on which the
EU's program is based were far too lenient, so that there is an active trading
regime but it has not produced anything like the necessary reductions.')
3. The 1992 Rio Conference and the FCCC Principles
In 1992, the international community embarked on a much more
specific effort to force mandatory GHG reductions at the U.N. Conference
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The Conference
prepared the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), a
basic codification of the principles that should apply to any comprehensive
treaty. 1 The FCCC's objective is to achieve "stabilization of GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system."" 6 At the same time,
the FCCC "set[] no specific timetables and targets for limiting such
emissions....",1' The United States signed the FCCC.
Even though the FCCC does not contain specific timetables or targets,
it does build on the Stockholm Declaration and adds flesh to its bones. The
first major FCCC principle is that developed countries will have to lead the
reduction in world emissions by accepting a regime of mandatory
reductions. The FCCC Preamble recites that "the largest share of historical
and current global emissions of GHGs has originated in developed
countries" and "recogniz[es] also the need for developed countries to take
immediate action in a flexible manner on the basis of clear priorities, as a
first step toward comprehensive response strategies at the global, national,
and, where agreed, regional levels."" 8 Article 3.1 includes "common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" - general
language that refers to the different roles of developed and developing

113. See GOODELL, supranote 73, at 240. For added discussion, see Panel Discussion, EBA
Climate ChangePrimer: Cap and Trade, 29 ENERGY L.J. 173,176-77 (2008) (comments by Brian
McLean, Director, EPA Office of Atmospheric Programs); see also id. at 1770-79 (discussing
EPA's experience with nitrogen dioxide).
114. See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
115. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 24, 1994,1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter FCCC].
116. Id. art. 2.
117. KISS & SHELTON, supra note 82, at 172.
118. FCCC, supra note 115, pmbl.
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countries-as one of the FCCC's guiding principles. It recites the
signatories' agreement that "[a]ccordingly, the developed country Parties
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects
thereof." 119
A key part of the FCCC is Annex I, which lists the developed countries
that are supposed to take immediate action. 2 The section on
"Commitments" states that the countries in the Annex, which include the
United States, "shall adopt national policies and take corresponding
measures on the mitigation of climate change" to limit GHG emissions and
enhance gas sinks and reservoirs.121 Again showing the primacy accorded
to developed countries in bearing the costs of reducing GHG emissions, the
Commitments recite that "these policies and measures will demonstrate that
developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in
anthropogenic emissions."" z ' Annex I lists 35 developed countries and the
European Community.
A second key FCCC principle is that developing countries will not be
bound to specific reductions immediately. "[T]he share of global emissions
in developing countries.. .will grow to meet their social and development
needs. " 123 This application of common but differentiated standards
acknowledges that "standards applied by some countries may be
inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other
countries." 24 The FCCC therefore accepts "the specific needs and special
circumstances of the developing countries" and requires that these be given
"full consideration."" This provision reflects the judgment that the
developed countries responsible for most GHGs cannot tell developing
countries to sacrifice their rise out of poverty, at least not until developed
countries have taken significant first steps in addressing climate change.
Third, in an effort to deal with past responsibility and developing
countries' lack of resources, developed countries commit to providing "new
and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs" of developing countries' reporting requirements and the resources for a "Financial
Mechanism" to fund developing-country reductions. 26 This distinction

119. Id. art. 3.1.
120. Id. Annex 1.
121. Id. art. 4.2(a).
122. Id.
123. Id. pmbl.
124. Id.
125. Id. art. 3.2.
126. Id. art. 4.3. The FCCC permits developing countries' compliance to depend upon the
extent to which developed countries meet their duty to provide financial resources and
technology to aid developing countries. Id. art. 4.7. "The Parties shall take full account of the
specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries in their actions with
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between developed and developing country commitments reflects the
unstated reality that developing countries have no reason to suffer ongoing
environmental loss if the richest countries of the world intend to continue
to enjoy their vastly greater standard of living and the resource
consumption and emissions that go along with it.
A fourth key principle is the precautionary principle. The FCCC rejects
the skeptical conservative approach that has delayed action for years in the
United States. Instead, it refuses to let uncertainty about the precise scope
and causes of global warming serve as an excuse for not taking strong
action. The Parties agreed to take "precautionary measures to anticipate,
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse
effects."' 27 The FCCC refused to delay just because there might not be full
scientific certainty about global warming: "Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be
used as a reason for postponing such measures.""2 In effect, the FCCC
embodies an international agreement that the risk of global warming is so
great that the world has to err in favor of immediate remediation.
C. The Kyoto Protocol
The principles negotiated in Rio and enshrined in the FCCC were
implemented at the Conference of the Parties held in Kyoto, Japan in
December of 1997.129 The resulting Kyoto Protocol contains the first specific
reduction requirements for developed countries in Annex I, but still no
requirements for developing countries.13° Developed countries are to reduce
emissions of six GHGs - carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride - to an
average of five percent below 1990 levels by 2012."' Specific reductions
vary by country, with Annex B listing national targets - the United States,
for instance, a country that increased emissions between 1990 and 1997, is
to reduce its emissions to 92 percent of 1990 levels by 2012.132 In an effort to

regard to funding and transfer of technology." Id. art. 4.9.
127. Id. art. 3.3.
128. Id.

129. For a general discussion of the role of a Meeting or Conference of the Parties, and
whether they can have binding effect in the absence of subsequent ratification, including this
issue under the FCCC, see KISS & SHELTON, supra note 82, at 79-81.
130. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 16, art. 3.1-2; Annex I, at 173.
131. Id. at 174.
132. Id. Annex I.The percentage reductions required of Annex I countries in the FCCC are
listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Treaty.
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ensure that developed countries begin taking realistic steps quickly, Annex
I countries were to make "demonstrable progress" by 2 0 0 5 .'33
The Protocol follows the FCCC in containing a mechanism for
developed countries to aid their developing counterparts by creating a
"clean development mechanism" (CDM), under which Annex I Parties
can
gain credit for reducing emissions in developing countries 1 4 It also contains
added details on emissions reporting, including acceptance of IPCC
methodologies for estimating emissions sources and sinks."
Like the FCCC, the Kyoto Protocol encourages innovative market-based
trading of emissions rights, allowing emissions trading and letting Parties
agree to achieve reduction obligations jointly, an encouragement to interParty trading and an effort to facilitate regional arrangements by groups
like the European Community. 13 These provisions are in addition to the
CDM, which allows a form of trading between developed and developing
countries.
Unfortunately, the CDM is also an escape hatch for polluting nations.
It lets developed countries help developing countries, an admirable goal,
but also allows both groups of countries to avoid making net reductions.137
Annex I countries are authorized to use certified reductions resulting from
activities within the borders of developing countries to satisfy their own
(developed-country) emissions requirements."3 Because developing
countries do not have firm reduction limits under Kyoto, it is easily possible
that both developed and developing countries will continue to increase total
emissions under this framework. Developedcountries could claim to comply
with Kyoto if they fund sufficient reductions in developing countries to earn
large credits, even though both developing and developed country
emissions still could be increasing.
One example of the problem comes from China, which is receiving a
very large share of total CDM funding yet is rapidly increasing its

133. Id. art. 3.2.
134. Id. art. 12.
135. Id. art. 5.2.
136. Id. art. 4.1. For the observation that Kyoto actually has three mechanisms that
facilitate market-based responses-joint implementation, emissions trading, and the
CDM -see Anita Halvorssen, Common, But Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate
Change Regime -Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation
Fund, 18 COLO. J.INT'L ENVTL. L. &POL'Y 247, 256-57 (2007). Halvorssen urges creation of a
new category of "Annex C" countries; the category would encompass successful developing
countries that are major GHG emitters (like China and India) and that must receive binding
limits for the world to have a chance of bringing this problem under control.
137. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 16, art. 12.
138. Id. art. 12.3(b).
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emissions. 39 Countries can look virtuous individually but lose the overall
battle. The mechanism for developed countries to assist developing
countries could turn into a pact with the devil (actually, two devils) that
scuttles the larger project. Letting developed countries buy their way out of
meeting their own obligations only encourages the sense that the world will
not have to make any real lifestyle changes in order to achieve net emission
reductions. This problem does not mean that the world should scuttle the
CDM mechanism, but it does means that reduction levels will have to be
increased to accommodate rising emissions in the developing world so that
the same overall reductions are achieved.
The Kyoto Annex I Parties already are falling far short of their Kyoto
commitments.' 4° As Part IV shows, thus far there is no sign that they are
taking sufficient measures to meet even their initial emissions reduction
goals as a group.141
It was fairly obvious that the Kyoto Protocol's Annex B reductions,
which try to reduce developed country emissions to a level on average 5
percent below 1990 levels, will not be sufficient to halt the increase in global
warming. These were to be merely a relatively easy first step. 142 The hope
was that, with luck, developed countries would develop much more
effective technologies and incentive structures as they explored how to
make these relatively easy first-round reductions and so develop the knowhow to ease the deeper cuts that must follow.
Unfortunately, for the achievement of true emissions reductions and for
the U.S. position in future negotiations, the United States has been a
notorious opponent of the Kyoto standards. Its role is important to anyone
trying to predict the course of future treaty changes because U.S.
intransigence has eroded much of the good will that the United States could
have drawn on as an international political and economic leader. In Climate
Change, Joseph DiMento and Pamela Doughman compare the early
responses to the Kyoto Protocol by most major industrial nations with that
of the United States. 43 They describe the efforts by the European Union,
Japan, and the United Kingdom to treat climate change as a serious threat
and to take firm measures to reduce emissions.'" The authors find that,
even within the United States, many states, localities, and private firms have

139. China, along with two of the three other "BRIC" countries (Brazil and India) and
Mexico, has received three-fourths of all CDM projects. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 129.
140. See infra Part IV.
141. For a useful review of the varied efforts to implement funding for developing
countries, see VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 120-34.
142. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
143. Joseph DiMento & Pamela Doughman, Climate Change:How the World Is Responding,
in CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 17, at 111-34.
144. Id. at 111-14.
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treated the challenge the same way."4 But the federal government, the
entity most likely to be held accountable under international treaties and the
only entity with the power to force an effective nationalresponse, appears
as a bastion of inaction, resistance, and obfuscation. 146 Diamond presumably
would classify the United States on this record as a country that has
received information indicating that its very survival is in jeopardy but has
failed to adopt meaningful remedies because it is unwilling to bear the
short-term costs. It has acted as an indulgent country living only in the
present and unwilling to sacrifice for its future.
As an example of American intransigence, DiMento and Doughton
recap the Senate's astounding 95:0 vote in 1997 for the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution, which resolved that the Senate would not ratify the Kyoto
Protocol unless it included binding limits on developing countries and,
separately, the standards would not result in "serious economic harm" to
the United States.147 This blunt statement was tantamount to saying that the
United States will not respond to the looming disaster if it has to make any
sacrifices. With this writing on the wall, President Clinton did not dare send
the treaty to the Senate for ratification.
President Bush, responding to pressure from the oil and gas industry
(among others), further distanced the United States from most of the world,
including its traditional allies in Europe and Japan, when he formally
repudiated the Kyoto Protocol in early 2001.'4 Bush complained that the
Protocol "would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy" and would be
"unfair and ineffective." 49 Acting as if the world is free to whimsically
decide whether it wants to address global warming or can choose instead
to persist in current lifestyles, Bush claimed that "we must be very careful

145. Id. at 122-34.
146. See id. at 114-20.
147. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution claimed that exempting developing countries from
mandatory reductions "is inconsistent with the need for global action on climate change and
is environmentally flawed," and that the differences in requirements for Annex I countries
and developing countries "could result in serious harm to the United States economy." S. Res.
98,105th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 21, 1997). It then gave the "sense of the Senate" that the United
States should not sign any protocol or agreement related to the FCCC or Kyoto (or subsequent
measures) "unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce GHG emissions for Developing Country Parties within the
same compliance period," and even then should not do so unless the protocol or agreement
would not "result in serious harm to the economy of the United States." Id.
148. On Bush's breaking his campaign promise to set limits on C02 emissions, see
GOODELL, supra note 73, at 184-201.
149. Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts (Mar. 13,
2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/O3/20010314.html (last visited
June 21, 2008).
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not to take actions that could harm consumers."" s He also repeated the
tarnished industry theme that the science behind global warming is
"incomplete."' 5 '
As an alternative, in a decision that has cost the world years of progress,
the Bush administration adopted a voluntary initiative program (basically,
a policy of encouraging industry to fix a problem it created even though
market forces had not led firms to solve the problem voluntarily) through
its 2002 Global Climate Change Initiative (GCC).152 The Initiative, which is
entirely voluntary (even though it "challenge[s] American businesses to
make specific commitments"), set a goal of reducing GHG
"intensity" - emissions per unit of energy used - instead of requiring an
absolute reduction.'5 The rationalization for using this relative metric was
that it "accommodates economic growth" and that a "rapid reduction in
emissions would be costly and threaten economic growth," while
"[p]rosperity is what allows us to dedicate more resources to solving
environmental problems"; and "[h]istory shows that wealthier societies
demand

-

and can afford - more environmental protection. " "

Even with mounting evidence that the world may be approaching a
point of no return, President Bush continued to stress voluntary mandates
only and to articulate his belief that only new technology can solve this
problem. He refused to allow any plan that imposes significant costs on the
economy, touted reductions in energy intensity as a great victory even
though total U.S. emissions continue to rise rapidly, and committed only to
the totally inadequate goal of stopping emissions growth by 2025, with no
commitment to reducing emissions below current levels, much less 1990
levels.' Even though the Obama administration has begun changing the
nation's environmental direction, the perpetuation of failed efforts was the
centerpiece of U.S. efforts until Bush was out of office.

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The White House, Global Climate Change Policy Book, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html (Feb. 2002) (last visited Apr.
5,2008). On the Bush administration's Climate Change Initiative, see DiMento & Doughman,
supra note 143, at 119-20.
153. The White House, supra note 152, at 1.
154. Id. at 4-5. The Bush administration also argued that its energy-intensity approach
"should offer developing countries the incentive and means to join with us in tackling this
challenge together," id. at 1, presumably in part because an energy-intensity yardstick would
mean that they too could continue to grow. In fact, the difference between developed and
developing country requirements under the FCCC and Kyoto is based upon differences in
past emissions and current wealth. A plan under which developed countries escape binding
reduction requirements will reduce developing countries' incentives to support the program.
155. Press Release, White House, President Bush Discusses Climate Change (Apr. 16,
2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04 (last visited June 15, 2008).
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These get-rich-now, clean-up-later arguments are misplaced given the
scope of the problem, especially coming from one of the world's wealthiest
countries. If the United States cannot yet afford rigorous environmental
protection even though it enjoys the largest GDP in the world, there is no
chance that poorer countries or the world at large will make the sacrifices
needed to stabilize the climate. In essence, the Bush administration's GCC
Initiative was a statement of refusal to make difficult lifestyle changes to
reduce emissions. It seems a fair criticism to argue that this policy actually
accepted an increase in emissions in that the United States economy surely
will continue to grow in the long run, so a mere reduction in emissions
intensity will not translate into a reduction in total emissions.}
The blame for the years wasted extends beyond the executive branch.
In both 2003 and again in 2005, the Senate failed to pass a bill imposing caps
on GHGs that would have tried to roll back emissions to 2000 levels by
2010. Even that reduction would be far less than the reduction to 92 percent
of 1990 levels by between 2008 and 2012 that the Kyoto Protocol assigns to
the United States.1 57 Debate over the latest GHG bill showed that no
legislation was likely to pass until after the country changed its direction
under the new administration}5
Because the United States remains, or at least until recently remained,
the single largest source of GHG emissions, 159 it is important for American

156. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. This kind of policy justifies Thomas
Friedman's complaint that the United States has suffered a total failure of leadership, with the
nation facing a drastic crisis but the head of state "determined not to ask the American people
to do anything hard when it came to energy." FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 21.
157. Layzer, supra note 17, at 113-20.
158. John Broder, Senate Opens Debate on Politically Risky Bill Addressing Global
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/
washington/03climate.html (last visited June 28, 2008) (mentioning the poor prospects for
climate-change legislation while the Bush administration is in office).
159. For research suggesting that China has now, ahead of schedule, passed the United
States ft, carbon dioxide emissions to become the largest emitter of total carbon dioxide, see
Margret Kim & Robert Jones, China: Climate Change Superpower and the Clean Technology
Revolution, 22 NAT. RESOURCES &ENV'T 9,9 (2008). A 2007 study using provincial data, which
the authors claim contains "considerably more information relevant" to likely emissions than
the more common national models, found that China should surpass the United States in CO2
emissions by 2010, not the 2020 anticipated by the IPCC, and that the increase in Chinese
emissions by 2010 would be "several times larger" than the reductions currently in the Kyoto
Protocol, even if developed countries can meet their targets (which at present they are not on
track to do). Maxmimilian Auffhammer & Richard Carson, Forecastingthe Path of China'sC02
Emissions Using Province Level information, 1, 30 (discussion draft Aug. 7, 2007), http://
repositories.cdlib.org/are-ucb/971/ (last visited June 27, 2008). The authors claim that most
other forecasts of Chinese emissions use data almost a decade old and conclude that "China's
economic and technological growth has accelerated beyond anticipation" in the last decade.
Id. at 28-29.
In late October 2008, a Chinese government policy paper admitted that its GHG
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policymakers to understand how badly they have lost what should have
been their leadership role in the climate-change debate and how much
remains to be recovered. The FCCC is based on the understanding that
reducing GHG emissions will be costly and that developed countries have
to lead this process. As a practical matter, this is the only approach likely to
motivate developing countries to force their much more populous
inhabitants, with their rapidly industrializing economies, to accept
meaningful changes in the next round of negotiations. This dual structure
of developed-country leadership and developing-country following was
adopted in the Stockholm Declaration, accepted in the global-warming
context in the FCCC (which the United States signed), and used in the
Kyoto Protocol. Yet the United States rejected the Protocol after the Senate
resolved to reject any treaty that would "result in serious harm to the
economy of the United States."" 6 Not only is this position in violation of the
international structure accepted by most of the world community, but it
tells the world that its largest historical polluter, a country still responsible
for one-fifth of C02 emissions, refuses to make any real sacrifice to reduce
its outsize emissions. Developing countries are on their way to becoming
the largest source of GHG emissions, and the United States will regret its
great failure of leadership when it has to press them to make reductions.
The opportunity squandered by the refusal to join a binding
international network is not just a blow to national prestige and power.
Because the United States refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol, its companies
were blocked from participating in the cap-and-trade regimes allowed
under the Kyoto framework. As a result, European countries may end up
having years of early experience in operating these programs before their
U.S. competitors have a chance to catchup. They have already established
contracts and networks that U.S. firms may be unable to duplicate."'
When President Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol, he complained that
he could not support a framework in which 80 percent of the world's
countries did not face specific requirements. Yet the structure he was
criticizing is one the United States accepted in the FCCC. Developed

emissions had reached the level of U.S. emissions and that there was "little prospect" for
"early improvement." China Warns on Emissions Control, BBC NEWS, Oct. 10, 2008, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/nol/ukfs-news/hi/newsid_7690000/newsid_7697900/7697929.stm
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2008).
160. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
161. At a recent Energy Bar Association carbon-regulation panel, an employee of Credit
Suisse claimed that the London emissions trading market is five years ahead of the United
States, with American firms blocked because "we didn't ratify the Kyoto protocol." Panel
Discussion, supranote 113, at 189 (comments of Jeff King). The United States may have saved
money in the short run by refusing to participate in Kyoto, but it is squandering its chance to
lead what should be one of the major industries of the 21st century.
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countries have caused most past pollution and reaped most of its benefits.
The allocation of initial reductions to developed countries fits the
prevention-of-harm principle and the polluter-pays principle. The United
States will have virtually no leverage to tell newly developing countries that
they have to reduce their emissions if it, with its superior resource and
technological base, does not set an example.
The fact that Chinese emissions have or soon will surpass U.S.
emissions is an unwelcome reminder that curbing the behavior of other
countries should be more important to the United States than avoiding
restrictions on its own behavior.162 As the American focus shifts from
resistance against limiting its own emissions to how the United States can
persuade other, poorer countries to reduce theirs, the concern with the costs
imposed on the U.S. economy is likely to take second place to concerns
about the effect of global warming on the health and well-being of U.S.
citizens.
Much of the American debate has been derailed by business campaigns
arguing that the science behind climate change is still "uncertain," as
discussed in Part VI. Yet for at least the last 16 years, ever since the FCCC
adopted the precaution principle in 1992, the world community as a whole
has judged the problem of sufficient risk that uncertainty is not an
acceptable excuse for inaction. The foreseeable damage is so great that the
possibility that things might turn out better than feared is not a good reason
for avoiding action, nor does it justify waiting for more study, the preferred
remedy of those opposing real change. The persistence of business-funded
uncertainty arguments has only further marginalized the United States from
the rest of the world, leaving it in an extreme position that its fellow
countries have long since left behind.
D. State Responsibility Under Current International Law, Including
Under General Principles and the ILC Framework
While Kiss and Shelton provide a balanced overview of the general
framework of international environmental law, Roda Verheyen has written
a more detailed analysis of the extent to which remedies might already exist
under current general law and the FCCC. She is more aggressive than Kiss
and Shelton in arguing that these standards may provide a grounding for
liability by polluting nations. Her Climate Change Damage and International
Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility"6 addresses one of the most
important issues in the dawning international regime: to what extent do
enforceable duties already exist to prevent GHG emissions?

162. For a discussion of Chinese C02 emissions surpassing U.S. levels, see supra note 159.
163. VERHEYEN, supra note 13.
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Verheyen addresses this issue by focusing on the damages available
under current law. Her detailed analysis of remedies, an area where
international effort thus far has fallen far short, will be useful to any lawyer
trying to build arguments for current liability and to anyone in oil and gas
or other energy industries trying to estimate in advance just how persuasive
those arguments might be. Her book's exorbitant $164 price is unfortunate
because it means that very few U.S. policymakers or voters will encounter
her arguments. Yet Verheyen's approach is far closer to the mainstream
world community's than, say, the average congressional debate over global
warming or the policies of the Bush administration. Her analysis will play
well in developed countries that are undertaking more extensive GHGreduction measures than the United States, and in developing countries that
still have relatively fewer emissions but increasingly suffer the effects of
GHGs emitted from the developed world.
As an example of what she considers actionable international
obligations, Verheyen's review of the FCCC is undertaken "with the
understanding that any breach of these primary obligations might give rise
to a claim of state responsibility."" 6 She notes that some countries ("in
particular the USA") have taken the position that the FCCC's principles
only serve an "interpretive function," but that others believe these
principles have more direct force.165In addition, she notes that Article 38.1
of the International Court of Justice Statute treats "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" as one of the sources of applicable law.1"
In what is far and away the most interesting part of her book, a case
study arguing that the United States could be held responsible underexisting
internationallaw for its failure to curb GHG emissions, Verheyen describes
the breach of FCCC principles as actionable even without ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol. 67 She argues that liability could be based on these facts: (1)
U.S. GHG emissions grew faster after the FCCC took effect in 1994 than
before; (2) the United States has far exceeded the emissions it was projecting
in the early 1990s; (3) the United States has rejected the Kyoto Protocol "as

164. Id. at 54.
165. Id. at 67-68. See also the authors' discussion of this U.S. position in KISs & SHELTON,
supranote 82, at 107-08.
166. VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 68. In addition to the "general principles" language of
Article 38.1(c), the ICJ Statute also includes "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law" in Article 38.1(b). ICJ, Statute of the Court (1945), available at
http: //www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0.
167. VERHEYEN, supranote 13, at 282-88; see also id. at 81-83 (arguing that it is possible to
determine when general obligations like FCCC commitments are breached "even if the
content of the obligation cannot be established precisely in positive terms"). The purpose of
Verheyen's argument is to establish that "this duty to reverse long term emissions trends is
enforceable independently of the Kyoto Protocol." Id. at 83.
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well as participation in any other forum aimed at determining how Article
2 FCCC could be achieved"; and (4) the Bush administration's February
2002 "Global Climate Change Policy," which, Verheyen claims, "indicates
that the USA actually accepts a steady increasein total emissions in relation
" 168

to 1990.

Discussing the FCCC's precautionary principle, Verheyen concedes that
it "does not represent a concrete principle of conduct," but argues that it
nonetheless might reverse the burden of proof in environmental litigation,
shifting the burden to polluting countries.1 69She also argues that the FCCC's
provisions for a Global Environmental Fund (GEF) to help developing
countries reduce emissions, though not "require[ing] a specific level of
financial resources," are "mandatory,"17 suggesting that here too developed
countries that fail to take steps to meet their obligations may face legal
exposure even if they did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
Verheyen's discussion of the Kyoto negotiations from the perspective
of whether they provide actionable remedies will, like her discussion of the
FCCC, be useful to lawyers trying to frame legal arguments and to anyone
trying to determine the shape of likely liability in the next few decades. She
soberly reminds her readers that the missed Kyoto targets that have caused
so much controversy "only modify the global business-as-usual emission
trend by a small percentage, still allowing global emissions to grow
substantially until 2010.""' Moreover, even if the initial reduction targets
had been met, "it would have little or no effect on climate change in the
medium to long-term." 172 In comparison to Kyoto's relatively mild goal of
five percent reductions from 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012, the United Nations
most recent Human Development Report suggests that developed-country

168. Id. at 282-87. Verheyen calls the United States "one of the few countries in the world
that openly advocates net increases in emissions levels." Id. at 287. It certainly is correct to
note, as Cass Sunstein does, that " [i]n terms of legal mandates, the U.S. government has done
close to nothing to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases...... Cass Sunstein, On the
Divergent American Reactions to Terrorist and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 509
(2007).
169. VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 75-76, 78-79.
170. Id. at 92; see also id. at 105 ("Overall, the Annex does not provide a major guideline
for Parties to concretize levels of funding and contributions."). For Verheyen's general
discussion of the GEF, see id. at 91-106.
171. Id. at 111. Verheyen cites one estimate that reducing emissions by only five percent
below 1990 levels, the initial Kyoto goal, would only reduce 2050's increased temperatures
by one-twentieth degree Celsius. Id. at 27.
172. Id. Richard Pierce has called the likely effect of the Kyoto accord, by which he
presumably means the first-round reductions, "trivial" even if the United States participated
and all Annex I countries met their targets. Richard Pierce, Jr., Energy Independence and Global
Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 595, 599 (2007).
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reductions of 30 percent by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050 will be necessary
to stabilize temperatures.173
Kyoto's potential, of course, lay in the possibility that developed
countries would make great technological strides when they worked hard
to meet their initial reduction requirements, and the world then could use
this new intellectual capital to make much deeper emission reductions. Had
everything gone according to plan, the Kyoto Parties would have begun
negotiating deeper second-round reductions in 2005.174 The refusal of the
United States to participate in first-round reductions, however, threw that
timetable into disarray. The fact that the world community has not come
close to achieving its relatively easy first step in emissions control is, to say
the least, a disheartening commentary on the difficulty of arriving at
effective international measures. The level of research-and-development
investment that should have occurred to reach first-level Kyoto reductions
has not occurred. This failure suggests that much more radical, damaging
climate change will have been required before the world community takes
truly effective action, even if the United States commits to Kyoto under
President Obama.
Verheyen notes that because of their comprehensiveness, the Kyoto
Protocol's reduction targets - as increased in later rounds of negotiations might "prescribe[] the exclusive use of legal consequences" for contributing
to global warming and thereby exempt areas covered by the treaty from the
ordinary law of state responsibility."m This could mean that states would
not face demands for compensation outside the Kyoto framework, even if
they failed to meet their "quantitative obligations" under Kyoto. 76 As a
work in progress, Kyoto does not yet contain penalties for countries that fail
to meet their targets, although it badly needs an enforcement mechanism.
Verheyen traces the negotiations in which the parties ultimately had to
defer the precise nature of the "compliance regime" because of resistance
led by the United States.'" Thus, even though the Protocol contains specific
reduction targets for Annex I countries, it does not-yet-specify the
consequences of failing to meet those goals.

173. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 127. For world cuts of 50 percent by 2050, a fairly
centrist estimate of a sustainable level of cuts, developed countries would have to make cuts
of 30 percent by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050, while developing countries could let emissions
rise until 2020 but then make cuts to 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. Id. at 48. The
tremendous explosion in Chinese emissions indicates that cuts for at least some developing
countries will have to be much more aggressive than they currently concede in order to
maintain a "sustainable" level of emissions.
174. VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 111.
175. Id. at 116.

176. Id.
177. Id. at 116-20.
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The general conclusion one can draw from Verheyen's book is that a
country could make an arguable case for liability based on the FCCC alone.
The fact that the FCCC was supposed to be but a step in a process that later
would define more specific requirements and define sanctions, coupled
with the fact that this process has not yet been completed, makes such
claims less likely. Referring to the FCCC in Massachusettsv. EPA, its recent
decision on the EPA's authority to regulate C02, the U.S. Supreme Court
gave a sign of its orientation in describing the FCCC as a "nonbinding
agreement," language presumably reflecting the FCCC's lack of specific
requirements and sanctions."78
At the same time, arguments like Verheyen's will prove increasingly
attractive in other countries if the major polluting nations, first from Annex
I but given the rise in Chinese and Indian emissions soon major developing
countries as well, do not accept their responsibility to commit to a realistic
GHG-reduction framework.
The FCCC's general principles and the Kyoto Protocol's mandated cuts,
with the promise of additional cuts in the next round of negotiations, form
a detailed and interlocking scheme of environmental law that one could
argue will provide the exclusive remedy for GHG emissions. The more
detailed these provisions become, the stronger the argument that they
should preempt other law. Conversely, the longer the world waits for major
polluting countries to make significant reductions, the more other countries
are going to turn to general principles of international law. Because the
world does not have a single legal framework with a clear hierarchy of
authorities, the source of effective remedies is much more open to
extrajudicial pressures.
The day may soon come when the United States wishes it had ratified
the Kyoto Protocol quickly, not just because good-faith compliance would
have started the United States and the world down the path of true
reductions sooner, but also because the Protocol might stave off claims and
litigation far beyond the contours of Kyoto. There are arguments that, with
or without Kyoto in its arrested state of development, other states may have
claims against the United States as the world's largest polluting nation.
As Verheyen points out in an argument suggesting that the FCCC and
Kyoto are not detailed enough to preempt other bodies of law, neither
"contain[s] provisions that help to define climate change damage, prohibit
certain types of damages, concretize obligations with regard to adaptation,
or stipulate that damages should be compensated."" 9 At least in cases
where there is a clear, direct causal link between emissions and damage,
more general principles of law might provide a basis for recovery. For

178.
179.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,509 (2007).
VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 142.
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instance, consider an extreme hypothetical in which the United States
managed to concentrate all of its C02 emissions and funnel them over just
one country, Cuba. Surely, even though the United States might be in
compliance under Kyoto, Cuba would have some remedy for the health and
economic consequences of such tailored pollution. In the absence of a
detailed regime of remedies and enforcement mechanisms, the FCCC-Kyoto
Protocol may not occupy the field of general climate-change remedies.
Kiss and Shelton discuss the "prevention of harm" and the "polluter
pays" principles as two established general principles of international
environmental law.18° Verheyen cites the ICJ (International Court of Justice)
Statute, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, and Principle 21 of
the Stockholm Declaration as embodying the no-harm rule. 81 She also
provides a useful, detailed consideration of some of the questions that
would apply to claims based on these principles, including issues of the
standard of care (whether strict liability or not) and diligence (under which
she addresses "opportunity to cure," forseeability, and proportionality).'82
In addition to embedded general principles, following the Stockholm
Declaration the U.N. General Assembly asked the International Law
Commission (ILC) to develop standards of "international liability for
injurious liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not
prohibited by international law." 183 A clear standard based upon this
principle could have created liability for GHG emissions even in countries
that have not signed the Kyoto Protocol. A final, approved standard to
define and remedy injury has not emerged, however, and the initial
provisions in the ILC's draft articles have been watered down when
considered in relation to global warming.'s

180. KISS &SHELTON, supra note 82, at 90-97.
181. For Verheyen's detailed discussion of the no-harm rule, see VERHEYEN, supranote 13,
at 147-55.
182. Id. at 169-87.
183. Id. at 155.
184. The ILC's work ultimately resulted in draft articles on "Prevention of Transboundary
Harm from Hazardous Activities" in 2001, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/commentaries/9_7_2001.pdf, but, as Verheyen notes, the final Articles
excluded "activities causing harm in the normal course of their operation" as well as harm
arising from multiple sources or from cumulative action, see VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 158,
160, both seemingly key provisions for combating global warming.
Verheyen provides a useful discussion of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreements,
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, July
24-Aug. 4, 1995, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law ofthe Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management
of StraddlingFish Stocks and Highly MigratoryFish Stocks, A/CONF.164/37 (Sept. 8,1995); and
treaties on nature conservation and biodiversity as other laws that may support legal claims
against some of the particular effects of global warming. VERHEYEN, supranote 13, at 192-224.
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Separately from its project on injurious liability and consequences, in
1955 the ILC began a major project to define State responsibility generally.
Verheyen describes this project as one that "took 49 years and 32 major
reports to be concluded."" At first, the ILC's work concerned only a State's
responsibility for injuries caused to aliens within its borders, but it was
expanded to include responsibility beyond these territorial limits.1 6 In 2001,
the ILC finally adopted "Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts" (DASR).187 Verheyen sketches an argument
that states theoretically could use this statute to sue for breach of
environmental obligations, including FCCC obligations by countries that,
like the United States, had not ratified the Kyoto Protocol."
The likelihood that countries will end up with overall caps on emissions
or actionable GHG duties under general standards like the ILC's is small.
Sooner or later, assuming the world does eventually take effective action,
it is almost inevitable that all countries, including the United States, will
have to become bound by a specific treaty with very focused reductions.
Nonetheless, the ILC statute may be an available source of remedies for
countries that suffer particular injuries from particular emissions and one
way for a state to bring pressure on another outside the Kyoto framework
if it can demonstrate sufficiently concrete injury.
E. Direct Corporate Responsibility Under General Principles of
International Law, the Alien Tort Claims Act, Emerging International
Standards, and Domestic Law
There is always the possibility of direct responsibility for individuals
and corporations, including oil and gas companies, and not just for nations,
from activity that can be shown to make excessive contributions to global
warming. This might include claims by foreign states if domestic energy
operations have demonstrable adverse international effects. As a practical
matter, however, the diffuse and cumulative nature of the damage caused
by any single emissions point seems likely to prevent foreign states,
companies, and individuals from having specific remedies against
companies and individuals within another state in all but extreme cases. For
instance, even if high C02 emissions from the United States contribute to
global warming in Europe, how could France sue an oil refinery on the
Texas Gulf Coast for injury in France and prove cause and damage?

185.

VERHEYEN, supra

186.

Id. at 229-31.

note 13, at 229.

187. Id. at 231.
188. Id. at 235-38. For Verheyen's extended analysis, including issues of causation, see id.
at 238-78.
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Americans who are now suffering the general health consequences of
China's rapidly increasing GHG emissions might soon benefit if such
liability existed.
Verheyen advances an elaborate argument that the nature of global
warming ultimately will require liability to turn on "general" causation, not
particular causation in which a given injury is traced directly to a particular
source, and will have to include liability for concurrent causes on the lines
of joint tortfeasor liability, if the world is to devise effective international
remedies.189 She admits that at present "there is no clear international law
rule on how to apportion damage between multiple wrongdoers or causes
of/contributions to climate change."" 9 These problems are one indication
that the contours of liability are most likely to be established by specific
treaty obligations. The day when there is sufficient proof to authorize claims
for the general damage from GHG emissions (as opposed to claimants who
can prove unusual particular injury) seems unlikely to come before even the
United States accepts some form of preemptive Kyoto-like regulations.
Although it is much less likely to be a source of specific requirements
on corporations and individuals because of the generalized nature of most
global-warming damage than a state-to-state treaty that is effectuated
through domestic-law standards (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol), there are several
possible routes to corporate liability under international law. First, for many
years the United Nations attempted to reach agreement on a standard of
behavior for multinational corporations. Kiss and Shelton trace this process,
which began in 1974 with an effort under U.N. auspices to draft a general
code of corporate conduct. A draft code was finalized in 1990, but "after
informal consultations, it was concluded that no consensus [in the General
Assembly] was possible on the issue."' 1 ' Sooner or later, the severity of
damage from global warming may produce a climate that enables a code to
become law.
A second possible source of corporate responsibility under a common
international standard involves the Global Compact that the United Nations
issued in 1999.192 The Compact calls on companies to voluntarily "embrace,
support and enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values"
that includes three environmental principles: respecting the precautionary
principle, undertaking initiatives to promote environmental responsibility,
and developing and diffusing environmentally friendly technologies.193 But

189. Id. at 248-79.
190. Id. at 279.
191. KIss & SHELTON, supra note 82, at 67.
192. Id. at 68.
193. U.N. Global Compact, About the Global Compact Principles, http://www.
unglobalcompact.org/AbouttheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited July 3,2008).
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this voluntary pledge system is not likely to provide a direct basis for suit,
even if it may become some evidence of acceptable principles of
international law if the compact becomes sufficiently widespread.
In 2003, the U.N. Subcommission on the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights issued "Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights."1" Paragraph 14 addresses environmental issues by requiring
compliance with national laws in areas where multinational corporations
operate,"9s hardly an addition to existing legal standards.
Ironically, in each instance the best protection that multinational U.S.
corporations could have from arbitrary and inconsistent penalties imposed
abroad would be for the United States to embrace a detailed set of
international environmental regulations. The same rational desire for
consistent, preemptive regulations is one of the reasons that so many
American corporations have come to the conclusion that they should
endorse a Federal Tort Claims Act rather than be subject to the many forms
of state intervention.'%
Another potential source of direct liability for U.S. corporations, a
domestic source, is the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which provides for
liability in claims brought by "aliens" when suing over violations of a treaty
or of the "law of nations."1" Although Kiss and Shelton briefly mention a
recent Supreme Court decision on the ATCA, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, in a
discussion of "emerging customary law,"198 Sosa seems more likely to
remind lower courts that they should be reluctant to apply the ATCA in this
area. The Sosa majority defined the Act as extending federal jurisdiction
only to claims by injured aliens in three limited areas -violation of safe

194. KIss & SHELTON, supra note 82, at 68.
195. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub Comm'n on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights,
Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterpriseswith
Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/ (Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.
2.En.
196. For an argument that burgeoning state and regional programs may be creating just
enough uncertainty to give corporate interests an incentive to support federal legislation, see
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate
Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (2007). The economic uncertainty created when legal
obligations are in flux poses complications for corporate planning and disclosure responsibilities, another reason companies may prefer a clear standard, even if it is stronger than one
they would choose if they were writing the law, to continuing uncertainty. See generally Perry
Wallace, Global Climate Changeand the Challenge to Modern American CorporateGovernance, 55
S.M.U. L. REV. 493 (2002). For a general discussion, see Jeffrey Smith, The Implications of the
Kyoto Protocoland the Global Warming Debatefor Business Transactions,1 N.Y.U. J.L. &Bus. 511
(2005).
197. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
198. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 82, at 68.
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conduct, infringements of ambassadors' rights, and piracy-and to an
undefined but obviously very narrow category for other "norm[s] of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we
have recognized." 1 There can hardly be many rights that the Court would
think satisfy this narrow definition, and U.S. courts certainly are not likely
to treat rules against global warming as an international norm as long as the
United States continues to display such resistance to taking effective action
to counter this threat.
As the Supreme Court noted in Sosa, general norms of international law
can become so widely accepted that they give rise to direct liability. In
theory, as already discussed, such general principles of international law as
the prevention of harm and the polluter pays principle could be treated as
just such a source of liability for a U.S. corporation that inflicts damage
through its global-warming acts. In practice, the diffuse nature of much of
the damage from GHG emissions and the need for a binding international
regime that requires severe reductions in emissions levels make it unlikely
that such general principles will be the path of liability for generalized GHG
emissions. The Supreme Court's grudging skepticism in Sosa makes it hard
to imagine the court accepting this kind of general authority under the
ATCA. A possible exception will be when an individual company's
operations impose unusually direct damage on an individual or
corporation- for instance, a refinery emitting such high levels of pollution
that it causes severe, demonstrable health damage distinct from the general
impact of global warming.
There is also the possibility of direct liability for general globalwarming damage under existing tort principles of U.S. law. Efforts to
overcome the difficult problems of duty of care and causation are only
beginning. Eight states and New York City sued the five largest C02emitting electricity generators for their GHG emissions on a public nuisance
theory in 2005 in Connecticut v. American Electric Power, Inc.; the trial court
dismissed the case, but it was pending before the Second Circuit when it
settled. 2w The State of California, which contains the country's largest car

199. Sosa, 542 U S.at 2761-62.
200. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). For an
article exploring the hurdles that Connecticut v. American Electric Power was likely to
experience, written before the trial court dismissed the case, see Thomas Merrill, Global
Warming as a Public Nuisance,30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2005). For a review of argumentsfor
public-nuisance liability by a Deputy Attorney General for the State of California, see Ken
Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77
(2007). See also Pawa & Krass, supra note 58, at 485-96. The plaintiffs announced a settlement
with American Electric Power (AEP) on October 9, 2007. The settlement required AEP to
install $4.6 billion in pollution controls, among other things. Press Release, State of
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market, sued the "Big Six" automobile manufacturers on a public nuisance
theory because of the severe damage automobile emissions have imposed
on citizens of that state;2 ' that case has also been dismissed, but it too is
working its way through the appeal process. These cases are in process at
the same time that the EPA now has to determine how to respond to the
states' victory in their effort to force EPA to regulate automobile C02
emissions.
In another example of the kind of case that major emitters may face, the
Alaskan Village of Kivalina sued the major integrated oil companies, coal
producers, and electricity generators in the United States.2 " The first major
section of the complaint documents the massive emissions for which the
defendants are responsible; then, after a generalized discussion of damage
from global warming, the complaint spends 16 pages alleging that
defendants have participated in a conspiracy to conceal the effects of their
activities by operating a variety of "front groups" that attack the science
behind work like the IPCC's. 2°3 The lawsuit brings two nuisance claims, one
under "federal common law" and the other under state law, and two
conspiracy claims.04
It is a sign of the growing legal activity that one author recently
identified 18 major cases that in one way or another sought remedy for
some aspect of GHG emissions.2 °5 While it will take the courts time to sort
out these lawsuits, the prospect of individual cases like this may well make
major industry participants look with more favor on a single, unified global
arrangement that, they can argue, preempts all other remedies under local
law.
IV. THE FAILING RECORD TO DATE
One need not turn to the IPCC to understand that, thus far, countries
have fallen far short of complying with Kyoto's reduction goals. The U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA), for instance, the information arm
of the U.S. Department of Energy, publishes data on C02 emissions by

Connecticut Attorney General's Office, Attorney General Announces Landmark Settlement
with One of Nation's Largest Polluters (Oct. 9, 2007), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/
cwp/view.asp?A=2341&Q=397522 (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
201. People of the State of Cal. v. Gen. Motors, No. C06-05755, 2007 W.L. 2726871 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 20, 2006).
202. Complaint, Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. C 08-01138 SBA,
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 26,2008).
203. For the initial description of defendants, see id. §§ 18-122; for the very specific
allegations about front groups, see id. §§ 189-248.
204. Id. §§ 249-277.
205. Gary Bryner, The Rapid Evolution of Climate ChangeLaw, 20 UTAH BARJ. 22 (2007).
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country. Although a given amount of carbon dioxide does not have as much
global-warming impact as some other GHGs, including methane and
nitrous oxide, C02 emissions remain far and away the largest source of
United States' and world GHG emissions. '° The EIA has published data
through 2005, the year when the Kyoto Protocol required Annex I
developed countries to have made "measurable progress" in pushing
emissions below 1990 levels.
Some European countries have made measurable progress. The United
Kingdom and Germany, for instance, both reduced emissions between 1990
and 2005.' Indeed, the overall record for Europe as a whole is one of only
slight increase,2' even though this apparent success is heavily due to the
deindustrialization of the previously distorted economies in Eastern Europe
and Russia, and may be reversed as Russia grows increasingly wealthy.
The 2005 EIA report shows that the United States continued as the
world's largest C02 emitter, responsible for over a quarter of 1990
emissions and well over a fifth in 2005, even though by 2005 China was
rapidly moving into a position to overtake the United States (if it has not
already done so).2'9 These concentrated emissions are hardly surprising

206. See Abatzoglou et al., supra note 107, at 24-26. For a summary of the measured
increases in all six GHGs, not just C02, see VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 14, tbl. 11.1. For an
effective display of C02's dominant role in U.S. emissions, see John Dernbach & Seema
Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 ENERGY L.J. 1, 6 (2008). The EPA has most
recently estimated that C02 accounts for 79 percent of U.S. GHG emissions since 1990, with
the percentage rising from 77 percent in 1990 to 80 percent in 2000. EPA GHG INVENTORY,
supra note 112, at 2-1.
207. All country-level total emissions data in this section of text are taken from H.1 C02
World Carbon Dioxide Emissionsfrom the Consumption and Flaringof Fossil Fuels, 1980-2005, in
EIA, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ANNUAL 2005, availableat http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/ (last
visited Apr. 4, 2008) [hereinafter EIA Total C02 Emissions]. For a nuanced description of the
United Kingdom's reduction efforts, including the discouraging fact that all of its C02
reductions occurred before 1995 and that its national goal of reducing emissions by 20 percent
below 1990 levels by 2010 is unattainable, see 2007/2008 HDR, supranote 22, at 121.
208. Europe's 1990 C02 emissions were 4,514.54 million metric tons (mmt); its emissions
dropped below that number until 2003 and even now are not that much greater at 4,674.75
mmt. EIA Total C02 Emissions, supra note 207.
209. Treating the period from 1990 to 2002, Verheyen sums up the lack of progress on
controlling GHG emissions generally as follows:
While overall Annex I emissions (benefiting from the economic collapse of
many economies in transition in Central and Eastern Europe, including
Russia and the Ukraine) have declined by 6.3% in the period from
1990-2002, Annex II countries have increased their emissions by 8.4%. By
means of illustration, emissions have increased by over 10% between 1990
and 2002 in Australia, Canada, the USA, Japan, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and
Greece. Austria, Finland, Italy and Norway have increased their emissions
by 5-10%. In these countries, per capita GHG emissions have not declined
either.
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given that the U.S. economy remains the world's largest economy, the
United States is one of the wealthiest large nations, and the country has
avoided any binding commitment to GHG reductions. Although C02 is not
the only GHG, it is the largest source of greenhouse emissions.210 C02 does
not have the highest "global warming potential" (halocarbons have that
dubious honor2 1), but fossil fuels are so woven into the fabric of international economic development that C02 is the single largest contributor
to global warming and is likely to be the hardest GHG to bring under
control. Yet total C02 emissions from the United States rose from 5,001.73
million metric tons (mmt) in 1990 to 5,956.98 mnt in 2005, an increase of
almost 20 percent.2 12 The EPA has estimated that total U.S. GHG emissions
rose 14.7 percent between 1990 and 2006.213 Japan increased its C02
emissions in this period, with its releases rising from 1,009.06 mmt in 1990
to 1,230.36 mmt in 2005, more than 20 percent. 4
Discouragingly, even some of the most progressive developed countries
have failed to reduce emissions. Canada, a country that one would expect
to have great environmental sensitivity but that has had the great economic
boon of uncovering large natural gas and oil-shale reserves, so that it is
becoming one of the world's leading oil and gas producers, sharply
increased C02 emissions between 1990 and 2005 from 468.89 mmt to 631.26
mmt,an increase of almost 35 percent.215 Norway, another country with
sizable petroleum reserves, increased emissions from 33.80 mnt in 1990 to
21 6
52.35 mmt in 2005, an increase of over 50 percent.

VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 81. On whether China has already surpassed the United States

as the world's leading C02 polluter, see supra note 159.
210. For reproduction of an EIA chart of U.S. GHG emissions as of 2002, see Abatzoglou
et al., supranote 107, at 25 fig. 2.2.
211. For the relative contributions of different GHGs, see id. at 24; VERHEYEN, supra note
13,at 14, tbl. II.1;
EPAGHG INVENTORY, supra note 112, at ES-3. According to the U.N. Human
Development Programme, the expected increase in power-generating capacity in India and
China just to 2015 is equal to the total current capacity of Germany, Japan, and the United
Kingdom. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 148.
212. EIA Total C02 Emissions, supra note 207. One author using data from the World
Resources Institute has estimated that if taken as separate emitting jurisdictions, fully 35 states
in the United States would be on the list of the world's top 50 C02 emitters. David Hodas,
Imagining the Unimaginable:Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Forty Percent, 26 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 271,275 (2008). Texas would be seventh and California twelfth on the world list.

Id.
213. EPA GHG INVENTORY, supra note 112, at ES-4.
214. EIA Total C02 Emissions, supra note 207.
215. Id. On the conflict between pressures from Canada's increasing prominence as a
major fossil-fuel producing nation and its environmental goals, see 2007/2008 HDR, supra
note 22, at 119-20.
216. EA Total C02 Emissions, supra note 207.
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Still more discouraging, because of the implications for the future, are
the huge increases among the largest developing nations. According to the
EIA data, between 1990 and 2005, China's C02 emissions jumped by more
than 3,000 mmt to a total 5,322.69 mmt, a huge leap associated with its great
advance in industrial production.2 1 7 Just the increase in Chinese emissions,
which more than doubled its total emissions, is greater than the total
emissions of any other country except the United States.2 18 Some researchers
believe that China already has overtaken the United States in C02
emissions; it certainly seems likely that Chinese emissions will dramatically
alter the discussion on how to contain GHG emissions. 219 China's increased
emissions from new coal-fired plants - leaving out India, the Middle East,
and other areas that are rapidly increasing emissions - may end up at least
twice the reductions that should be achieved under current Kyoto
standards2 0 To put it bluntly, there is no chance that the world will bring
the climate change problem under control on the current trajectory.
India, which is only beginning to match China's expansion, doubled
C02 emissions to over 1,000 mmt. 221 South Korea, a successful Asian tiger,
more than doubled its emissions, as did Pakistan and Malaysia, while
Indonesia and Thailand almost tripled theirs.222 If these populous nations
begin to copy the more successful examples of China and India, there is no
reason to think that they will not greatly boost C02 and other GHG
emissions.
In the Middle East, oil-rich nations like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Quatar,
the United Arab Emirates, and Iran all doubled or tripled their emissions. 223
Even though they are starting from relatively lower levels because of their
smaller populations and lower level of industrialization, the oil-rich nations'
headlong rush into consumption, as well as their efforts to build an

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. One measure of the problem is that as
many as 1,000 new coal-fired plants are expected to be built by 2030, half of them in China.
GOODELL, supra note 73, at 205. Although there has been extensive research into cleaner
carbon-capture plants, neither the technology nor the funds for what thus far has been an
expensive technology is yet available. For a discussion of the status of IGCC (integrated
gasification combined cycle) coal-plant technology, see id. at 210-18.
220. GOODELL, supra note 73, at 230.
221. The Chinese figures were 2,241.19 mmt in 1990, 5,322.69 in 2005. For India, the
comparable figures were 574.556 in 1990,1,165.72 in 2005. EIA Total C02 Emissions,supra note
207. By 2005, China was the second largest source of C02, India the fourth (after the United
States, China, and Russia).

222. Id.
223. The respective figures are Saudi Arabia, 207.77 mmt in 1990,412.35 in 2005; Kuwait,
27.30 mmt in 1990, 76.69 in 2005; Quatar, 18.60 mmt in 1990, 53.45 in 2005; UAE, 78.59 mmt
in 1990, 137.82 in 2005. Id.
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industrial and commercial infrastructure, ensures further rapid emission
increases.
As industrial production shifts to lower-cost developing nations,
including but by no means limited to China, developed countries may
receive an apparent boost in their efforts to reduce emissions. But the reality
will be that they have outsourced some of the most emissions-intensive
production needed to support their lifestyles and shifted pollution to
developing nations that do not yet have a firm Kyoto reduction
requirement. Developed-country consumption will continue to require
rising emission levels, and climate change will continue to worsen.
Conversely, some large countries that appear to have good records,
particularly Russia, have reduced emissions for reasons having nothing to
do with virtue or successful regulation. 224 Russia and most Eastern
European countries have sharply reduced emissions because of falling
population and industrial activity.225 This may explain in large part why
Russia decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, providing the last vote needed
to put its international standards into effect. Unfortunately, at least in
Russia, rapidly increasing wealth and the concurrent increase in
consumption brought by high oil and gas prices surely will lead to an
emissions surge for the same reasons that rising oil wealth is rapidly
increasing emissions in many Middle Eastern countries.
The role of developing countries in performing dirty manufacturing
work for developed countries can be seen in other ways in the EIA data.
Beyond the general shift in manufacturing from the developed to the
developing world symbolized by the rise of China (and on its heels, India)
as an emissions power, even in oil refining advanced industrial countries
pay developing countries to do some of their dirty work-from an
emissions perspective. Saudi Arabia is a major source of refined oil shipped
to the United States and Europe, one of the factors that explains its near
doubling of C02 emissions between 1990 and 2005. So is Singapore, where
emissions more than doubled between 1990 and 2005.26 A series of
Caribbean islands that refine oil for the U.S. market have the highest per

224. In 1992, the first year for which the EIA included a separate listing for Russia instead
of an overall listing for the U.S.S.R., Russia's emissions were 2,044.33 mmnt; in 2005, just
1,696.00 mmnt. Id. But Russian emissions actually hit bottom at 1,482.00 in 1997 and have been
on a gradual increase since then.
225. See generally VERHEYEN, supra note 13, at 111; 2007/2008 HDR, supranote 22, at 124.
226. The 1990 carbon dioxide emissions in Singapore were 57.74 mmt in 1990,133.88 in
2005. EIA Total C02 Emissions, supranote 207.
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capita emissions in the world -the Netherlands Antilles, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Trinidad, and Tobago. 27
The EIA's per-capita emissions figures for C02 tell another troubling
story. Among major industrial countries, the United States still has the
highest per-capita emissions, not surprisingly given its high standard of
living.2 For instance, even though China was just pulling even with the
United States in total C02 emissions in the EIA's 2005 figures, China's
reported 4.07 metric tons per-capita emissions were only one-fifth the United
States' 20.14 tons. 229 India's per-capita C02 emissions were much less than
China's, just 1.07 tons. 23° It is inconceivable that global warming will be
brought under control if per-capita emissions in these countries rise to U.S.
levels as they increase their consumption levels. Total emissions from China
alone are several times larger than the currently mandated Kyoto
reductions from developed countries."
To a substantial degree, these per-capita differences reflect differences
in standards of living, with higher standards positively associated with
increased emissions. 2 When the United States tries to tell China that it has
to reduce its own emissions, China will respond that it is far more virtuous
in its relatively low per-capita emissions and will demand the right to
increase emissions in order to raise its standard of living. The United States
can respond that Chinese living standards would be higher had it not
allowed massive, irresponsible population growth, and that it should not
be rewarded for overpopulating its territory. The problem is that the world
needs restraint in total emissions output, in emissions intensity, and in
population.233 This unproductive debate is unlikely to be resolved until the
developed countries take the lead in cutting their emissions. Without such

227. For the per capita figures, see H.l c C02 World Per CapitaCarbonDioxide Emissionsfrom
the Consumptionand FlaringofFossil Fuels, 1980-2005 [hereinafter EIA PerCapita Emissions], in
EIA, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ANNUAL 2005, supra note 207. The quite high U.S. per-capita
C02 flaring level was 20.14 metric tons per capita in 2005; by contrast, the Netherlands
Antilles was 50.20 tons, Trinidad and Tobago 35.51 tons, and U.S. Virgin Islands 147.68 tons.
Gibraltar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Quatar, and the United Arab Emirates were the only other
countries to cross the 30-ton per capita threshold. By way of contrast, the per-capita average
emissions for Europe as a whole were 7.93 tons. Id.
228. See id.
229. Id. For a bar chart comparing China and India's per capita emissions to various other
countries and the world average using 2003 data, see GOODELL, supra note 73, at 234.
230. EIA Total C02 Emissions, supra note 207.
231. See supra note 159.
232. This connection not only is obvious, but it has been taken as fact in the environmental
movement for decades. See MEADOWS ET AL., infra note 425, discussed in notes 426-29 and
accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 425-37 and accompanying text (authors of The Limits to Growth and its
sequels arguing that the world has to stabilize both resource consumption and population to
have a chance of avoiding ecological catastrophe).
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an example, poorer countries that are simply trying to achieve a more
decent standard of living have no incentive to limit their growth. If Annex
I countries demonstrate significant progress, however, they then can press
the rest of the world for its own cuts.
The United Nation's 2007/2008 Report contained its own scorecard on
progress toward Kyoto, and it too gave the world a failing grade. The
Report found that C02 emissions "have increased sharply since 1990, the
reference years for the reductions agreed under the Kyoto Protocol."' Most
of the developed countries that ratified the Protocol "are off track for
achieving their commitments. " 23s The United States, for example, was to
have reduced emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2010, but its
emissions had increasedby 16 percent instead.' This occurred even though
emissions intensity, the flawed metric of the Bush environmental program,
had fallen by 21 percent.2 7 Across the world, total GHG emissions have
increased by one-fifth since 1990.2
Developed countries have not been funding the CDM intended to assist
developing countries, either. They have provided only $26 million thus far
and committed to only $279 million over several years, the latter an amount
that the Report's authors point out "is less than one-half of what the
German state of Baden-Wurtemberg will allocate to the strengthening of
flood defenses. " 2 9 Compare this to the $25 to $50 billion annually that the
HDR estimates is needed to fund developing countries' transition to lower
emissions. On overall cost, the lEA's most recent prediction is that bringing
emissions to half their current levels by 2050 will require spending 100 to
200 billion dollars a year for the next decade, and one to two trillion dollars

234. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 8. Annex I countries had reduced emissions by
three percent below 1990 levels by 2004, but overall emissions had been rising since 1999, and
much of the total decline was due to the deindustrialization of Russia and East European
countries. Id. at 53. This unrelated and almost certainly temporary reduction in emissions
masked the dismal fact that emissions in "nontransition" Annex I countries had increased by
11 percent over 1990 levels by 2004. Id. For a chart of various Annex I countries versus their
Kyoto commitments, see id., fig. 1.14.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 54.
237. Id. For one measure of the U.S. failure, see id. at 56, tbl. 1.15, a line graph displaying
emissions by China, the United States, the European Union, India, the Russian Federation,
and Japan. Even the EPA reports that U.S. GHG emissions rose 14.7 percent between 1990 and
2006. EPA GHG INVENTORY, supranote 112, at ES-4. The GDP rose 59 percent in this period,
suggesting a significant reduction in emissions intensity, id., but also serving as a reminder
that the U.S. insistence on economic growth almost inevitably means accepting very
damaging levels of emissions increases under current technology.
238. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 33.
239. Id. at 14.
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a year in the following decades. 24° It will take extraordinary international
leadership to muster the kind of income transfer from rich to poor nations
and the internal investment shift represented by these estimates; thus far,
leadership has been almost entirely lacking on this issue.
With trends like these, it is little surprise that the Report concluded that
if these trends continue-" [iIf the next 15 years of emissions follows the
linear trend of the past 15 years, dangerous climate change will be unavoidable." 241 According to the Report, emissions are running at twice the level
needed to achieve a sustainable position, and the "carbon budget for the
entire 21st Century could expire as early as 2021. "242 Far from having the
luxury of continuing to encourage economic growth in the happy belief that
some day, in some way, growth will enable a painless investment in
reduction technology [this the wishful-thinking assumption of the Bush
approach], "[t]he window of opportunity for successful mitigation is
closing."243 Current programs have been marred by "[ilnsufficien t ambition,"
"[i]naccurate indicators," "[ilnadequate sectoral coverage," and "[ilnsufficient
urgency."244 Unhappily, on current "business-as-usual" trajectories, the
world will see "large-scale reversals in human development, undermining
livelihoods and causing mass displacement. " '
V. FLEXIBILITY OF REMEDIES AND
MEASUREMENT OF RESULTS
The New Environmental Regulation.By Daniel J. Fiorino. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 2006. Pp. 290. $23 paperback.
Reality Check: The Nature and Performance of Voluntary Environmental
Programs in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Edited by Richard D.
Morgenstern & William A. Pizer. Washington, DC: RFF Press, 2007. Pp. 185.
$38.95 paperback.
Analyzing InternationalEnvironmentalRegimes: From Case Study to Database.
By Helmut Breitmeier, Oran R. Young & Michael Zurn. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 2006. Pp. 321. $27 paperback.

240. James Kantner, InternationalAgency Urges the Start of an "Energy Revolution", N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2008, at B4.
241. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 8.
242. Id. at 7.
243. Id. at 22.
244. Id. at 118-19.
245. Id. at 7.
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There are easily as many disputes over the form that "regulation"
should take, including the structure of emissions caps, as there have been
in the past about whether global warming is occurring at all and, if it is,
what factors cause it. Indeed, the latest position of many who used to
oppose any regulation to forestall climate change has been to try to water
down the inevitable regulation by arguing that voluntary measures are
better than traditional regulation. This was the Bush administration's
approach. For years, the pursuit of voluntary standards sufficed in
American politics to stave off firm reduction requirements - at least at the
national level.
It has become almost tautological to say, at least in the United States
with its great zeal for markets, that voluntary programs based upon capand-trade markets for energy permits are much preferred over traditional,
bureaucratic command-and-control regulations. Firms presumably know
more about their activities than regulators. In theory, they ought to be able
to devise more effective measures to reduce emissions as long as they have a
proper incentive to do so. At the same time, the sharply rising volume of U.S.
GHG emissions over the last few decades indicates that firms are not
reducing emissions just because some customers like green products; that
the pressure to increase profits by lowering costs is always a deterrent to
voluntary environmental investments; and that firm, government-imposed
standards will be needed if the world is to have a chance of reaching a
sustainable position. Put another way, regulations that leave most decisions
to private industry are preferable only as long as they work. Under any
regime, the federal government will have to be able to effectively measure
compliance and enforce the standards needed to lower emissions
dramatically over the coming decades.
Two kinds of testing are most pertinent to finding new remedies for
global warming. First, the world needs an accepted measure for identifying
the basic problem: the actual level of emissions and how far emissions need
to be reduced to keep climate roughly in the current range (i.e., the world
will have to continue refining its knowledge of the relationship between
emission levels and climate). Second, the world will need effective ways to
measure emissions by source (and emission reductions for "sinks") in order
to devise appropriate limits, monitor compliance, and impose measured
sanctions on violators.
The FCCC and Kyoto Protocol contain a variety of provisions designed
to build an internationally accepted scientific basis for reductions. The
Protocol's designation of the IPCC's methods as "those accepted" for
estimating most GHG emissions2' reflects consensus that the IPCC should
establish the world standard for this information.

246.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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The difficulty in even beginning aggregate national emissions
reductions suggests the urgency with which the world needs effective
programs for measuring how well different environmental regimes work.
One thoughtful discussion of the way in which traditional regulation may
be modified to increase its efficiency, based on American experiences, is
Daniel Fiorino's The New EnvironmentalRegulation.247 Fiorino is the Director

of the Performance Track Division within the EPA. He assesses the EPA's
experience in promoting voluntary reductions; his book analyzes several
decades of experience with the traditional, top-down command-and-control
regulation that the United States adopted in its first wave of major
environmental regulation and the experimental EPA programs that have
tried to go beyond the older regulatory forms. Not surprisingly, given his
position, Fiorino makes an impassioned argument that regulatory agencies
have to aggressively identify new structures that will enlist business in a
partnership to find lower-emission options.
Fiorino presents himself as generally appreciative of traditional
regulation. He argues, for instance, that the measurable advances in cleaner
air and water over the last few decades would not have occurred without
these regulations
- markets would not have achieved the reductions
"naturally." 24 At the same time, however, Fiorino claims that the older
regulatory model has proven cumbersome. He believes that the EPA's
experimental programs suggest a more efficient, market-based route to
effective controls.
According to Fiorino, time has revealed traditional regulation as overly
rigid and legalistic in ways that discourage innovation, impose unnecessary
costs, prevent a true partnership with industry, overlook some important
environmental problems (and so make traditional regulation
underinclusive), and at the same time spawn such a complex set of detailed
requirements that they cannot be satisfied (and thus are overinclusive).
Fiorino believes firms would be better motivated by having clear
performance requirements but being left to pick the best means to achieve
their performance ends.24 9 As one basis for believing in a new regulatory
model, he cites signs that some firms have embraced green power as part

247. DANIEL FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2006).
248. Positioning himself as generally supportive of environmental regulation, Fiorino
claims that "[tlhe air, water, and land are much better off than they would have been without
the extensive system of environmental controls this country has put into place since 1970."
Id. at ix. See also id.at 61-67 (discussing improvements due to traditional regulation). Even in
his concluding chapters, Fiorino concedes that the advances of the last few decades in air and
water pollution control would not have been achieved without traditional regulation, id. at
190-91, and that any effective regulatory model will require government to continue to set
firm, enforceable emissions standards, id. at 191.
249. Id. at 71-85.
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of their corporate mission, although Fiorino admits that "there are reasons
to question the scope and durability of this trend."'
The problem, of course, is that even if some firms adopt environmentfriendly strategies, this may do little to stem the overall increase in GHG
emissions unless all firms do so. The bottom-line pressure on firms that
adopt more costly measures can be immense unless customers really begin
basing purchasing decisions on environmental characteristics.
In one of the most useful parts of his book, Fiorino describes the EPA's
voluntary initiatives. The experiments have involved the development of
emissions trading under the Clean Air Act; ' the EPA's decision to release
plant-specific emissions data; 2 2 the "Common Sense Initiative" program
that tried to cooperatively develop better policies in six key industries,
including petroleum refining;, the EPA's "Voluntary Challenge" program,
which recognized companies that made major contributions to reducing
certain listed chemicals; 2s 4 Project XL, which was based on a positive
experience reducing emissions in cooperation with Amoco at a refinery in
Virginia and had the EPA working with industry to lower emissions;25 and,
finally, the "Performance Track" program designed to reduce regulatory6
burdens and requirements on firms that demonstrate superior reductions.25
Fiorino is enough of a realist to concede that these new efforts have as
yet made limited progress. Voluntary programs are not likely to be effective
without stringent incentives (sticks or carrots). As the United Nations
concluded in its most recent Human Development Report, any program
will need stringent restrictions to be successful, even if some of the
implementation occurs through voluntary mechanisms. 27 The actual results
of the EPA's voluntary Common Sense Initiative, for instance, were
"limited," and participation in its voluntary challenge programs has been
limited too.' Nonetheless, Fiorino argues that firms have real incentives to
cooperate with regulatory programs that leave a greater share of decisions
in their hands: (1) they can receive recognition from the government, which

250. Id. at 88. For a general discussion of voluntary industry action, see id. ch. 4. As part
of his review of evidence and arguments for industry greening, Fiorino discusses extensively
the 1995 article by Michael Porter and Claas van der Linde, Green and Competitive:Ending the
Stalemate, 73 HARV. BUS. REV. 1920 (1995).
251. FIORINO, supra note 247, at 45.
252. Id. at 49.
253. Id. at 130. Tellingly, Fiorino observes that while some industries benefited under the
Common Sense program, "[ t]he petroleum refining group in particular foundered on the deep
distrust that existed among industry and environmentalists." Id.
254. Id. at 133-39.
255. Id. at 139-44.
256. Id. at 144-49.
257. See infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
258. See FIORINO, supranote 247, at, respectively, 126, 130-32, 135-36.
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can have market value with environmentally minded customers; (2) they
can build trust with regulators, which can lead to less costly regulations; (3)
their participation can yield useful technological information; and (4) their
participation can help "change agents" within firms find support and
allies. 9
To argue that the kind of "reflexive-law" cooperative model that he
advocates can replace traditional top-down regulation, Fiorino reviews
three other experimental programs: cooperative programs developed by the
states; what he calls "civic environmentalism," or the development of
community-based civil-society groups that try to turn into effective environmental coordinators; and the cooperative model that the Netherlands
adopted in the 1980s after growing frustrated with traditional bureaucratic
regulation. 2 Again his record is inconclusive. His section on state
innovation does not cite any performance outcomes; he admits that civic
groups have had limited effects thus far and that the Netherlands made real
progress in some areas but less in others.261
The problem of devising effective energy-reducing strategies should not
obscure the significance of the question posed by Fiorino's book. The world
desperately needs new, more efficient emissions-reduction strategies. The
biggest environmental victories - for instance, the success in banning ozonedepleting substances, a limited group of pollutants that could be readily
substituted away, and the steps taken against acid rain262 - were relatively
simple compared to today's challenge. Traditional air-and-water pollution
standards involve pollutants less far-reaching and pervasive than the many
sources of GHGs. Fiorino is correct that achieving large GHG reductions
through traditional means would require a great proliferation of top-down
restrictions. The challenge is so great that any significant gains that can be
achieved by setting standards and then letting business apply its expertise
to devising the best means of achievement should be encouraged. Yet the
world cannot afford to experiment with voluntary company programs only
to have industry fail-as happened in the United States during the eight
years of the Bush administration, in which voluntary initiative was an
excuse for no effective action at all.
The think-tank Resources for the Future, which bills itself as
"independent" and "nonpartisan" and was established in 1952 based on
recommendations from a federal commission, has published a cross-cultural

259. Id. at 137-38.
260. Id. at 165-86.
261. Id. Fiorino admits that regulators would face an uphill battle if they tried to adapt a
cooperative Dutch model to the adversarial culture and complex political system of the
United States. Id. at 186.
262. See supranotes 107-13 and accompanying text.
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analysis of voluntary emission reduction programs. 6 Titled Reality Check:
The Natureand Performanceof Voluntary EnvironmentalProgramsin the United
States, Europe, andJapan,its contributors are generally more pessimistic than
Fiorino. The book conveys the unmistakable message that programs leaving
discretion to industry have to be accompanied by measurable reduction
goals, effective monitoring, and credible penalties or they are likely to fail.
The first program in Reality Check is an EPA program to reduce
emissions of 17 highly toxic chemicals by 33 percent by the end of 1992 and
50 percent by 1995, compared to 1988 levels. This "33/50" program more
than met its goals, with a 55-percent reduction by 1995.26' Nonetheless, the
author surveys "divergent" studies on the program's overall
effectiveness. 265 One problem is the accuracy of reported reductions,
because, as the General Accounting Office mentioned in questioning the
outcomes, firms were allowed to report their own emissions.28 Another is
that most of the reduction occurred between 1988 and 1991, before the
program went into effect in 1991, so firms only met their targets because of
reductions they had achieved before program inception. 267 If two ozonedepleting chemicals that were subject to mandatory reduction under the
Montreal Protocol were excluded, then overall reductions among the other
chemicals was only 40 percent compared to 1990 levels (not the target 50
percent) .268

The 33/50 program dealt with toxic chemicals, not GHGs. As Reality
Check's editors note, reductions in toxic-chemical releases should be easier
to secure than overall GHG reductions because toxic chemicals have more
direct, traceable local and regional effects and a more direct effect on health
(so that it is easier to justify strong controls and arouse support). Moreover,
individual toxics often can be reduced without an overall reduction in
energy use. 269 In contrast, GHGs are much more deeply interwoven in a

wide range of activities and have a more diffuse effect, and their reduction
poses a much greater threat to living standards.

263. REALITY CHECK: THE NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN (Richard Morgenstern & William Pizer
eds., 2007).

264. Madhu Khanna, The U.S. 33/50 Voluntary Program: Its Design and Effectiveness, in
supra note 263, at 15,16.

REALITY CHECK,

265. Id. at 33-38.
266. Id. at 33. See generally GEN. AccOuNTINGOFF., GAO/RCED-94-93, ToxIc SUBSTANCES:
EPA NEEDS MORE RELIABLE SOURCE REDUCTION DATA AND PROGRESS MEASURES (1994).
267. Khanna, supranote 264, at 26-27.
268. Id. at 27. Khanna also found that the production of toxic waste in the 33/50 chemicals
program did not decrease, even though increased recycling and on-site treatment reduced
emissions levels. Id. at 28.
269. Richard Morgenstern & William Pizer, Concluding Observations: What Can We Learn
from the Case Studies?, in REALITY CHECK, supra note 263, at 178.
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Another voluntary program, the EPA's Climate Wise program initiated
in 1993 to reduce GHG emissions, emphasized C02 emissions but left
participants free to submit plans on other GHGs as well.270 Firms were
required to select a baseline year and submit an action plan for reducing
emissions. 271 Using the cost of fuel as a proxy for energy use, the authors
found at most a temporary effect that vanished after three years and was
countered by an increase in electricity use.272 In spite of uncertainty over
whether fuel cost accurately reflected energy use, they summed up that "as
a best guess we would conclude that the program had a temporary,
negative 3% effect on fuel use - that had to be offset by increased electricity
use."2
Reality Check also contains a report on the German cement industry's
voluntary program. In 1996, German cement makers committed to reducing
fuel consumption by 20 percent by 2005, compared to 1987 levels, and
carbon dioxide by 28 percent by 2012, compared to 1990 levels. 274 As the
authors reviewing this program point out, voluntary commitments may
really be designed "to avoid, or at least delay, costly mandatory policy
interventions to secure business-as-usual profits." 275 Using fuel consumption as a proxy for emissions because of the limits of available data, they
were unable to distinguish any effect of the voluntary program distinct
from historical trends.276
In contrast to purely voluntary programs, the programs in Reality Check
that used enforceable mandates, usually coupled with both sticks and
carrots as incentives, were more effective. The United Kingdom has
adopted the goal of reducing GHG emissions below Kyoto levels. The
climate change program it adopted in November 2000 committed to
bringing C02 emissions to 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2010 and 60
percent below those levels by 2050 (the latter still less than the level
proposed in the 2007/2008 HDR).277 The program imposed real incentives
to achieve the reduction through a Climate Change Levy, a national tax on
energy usage, with taxes refunded to companies that adopted energy

270. Richard Morgenstern et al., Evaluating Voluntary U.S. Climate Programs:The Case of
Climate Wise, in REALITY CHECK, supra note 263, at 120-22.
271. Id. at 121.
272. Id. at 132-33.
273. Id. at 134.
274. Christoph Bohringer & Manuel Frondel, Assessing Voluntary Commitments in the
German Cement Industry: The Importance of Baselines, in REALITY CHECK, supranote 263, at 107.
275. Id. at 109.
276. Id. at 113-15.
277. Matthieu Glachant & Gildas de Muizon, Climate Change Agreements in the United
Kingdom: A Successful Policy Experience?, in REALITY CHECK, supranote 263, at 65.
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efficiency schemes.m Reform was implemented through Climate Change
Agreements that the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
entered with 48 different industrial groupings; the Department also signed
an agreement with each affected company. These measures may largely
explain why the United Kingdom has been able to demonstrate real GHG
reductions compared to a 1990 benchmark. 279
The Danes adopted a firm reduction program based on a carbon tax
and reduction agreements in 1993, with companies able to secure tax
reimbursement if they took auditing, reporting, and standards action.2
Concerns about the effect on Danish competitiveness led to a compromise
Green Tax Package that included reimbursements for energy efficiency,
lower tax rates for energy-intensive companies facing foreign competition,
and agreements to reduce emissions. 281 The goals included a 21-percent
reduction in C02 emissions below 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012.22 EIA data
show Denmark's C02 emissions falling below 1990 levels in 2000 and well
below those levels by 2005; so Denmark, too, has made real progress.'
A large number of Japanese firms participate in a plan that looks
voluntary on the surface but operates with more binding force within
Japan's consensual culture. In 1997, the Keidanren business association,
whose members are responsible for 45 percent of the country's GHG
emissions and 82 percent of its industry and energy use, issued a Voluntary
Action Plan on the Environment that committed to stabilize emissions level
at 1990 levels by 2010.' (That such a large segment of Japanese business
would enter a voluntary agreement is one sign of how far U.S. firms have
fallen behind in this world movement; it is inconceivable that a large
segment of U.S. companies would have offered to make voluntary
reductions in 1997.) Firms were allowed to select absolute targets for
reductions in emissions or energy use, or relative targets based on energy

278. Id. at 66. Reform was implemented through Climate Change Agreements that the
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs entered with 48 different industrial
groupings; the Department also signed an agreement with each company. Id. at 68-70.
279. But see supranote 207 and accompanying text (Most of the U.K. reductions came early
and the goal of a twenty-percent reduction below 1990 levels by 2010 seems unattainable at
the present pace.).
280. Signe Krarup & Katrin Millock, Evaluation of the Danish Agreements on Industrial
Energy Efficiency, in REALITY CHEcK, supra note 263, at 87-89.
281. Id. at 88-89.
282. Id. at 87.
283. EIA Total C02 Emissions, supranote 207.
284. Masayo Wakabayashi & Taishi Sugiyama, Japan'sKeidanren Voluntary Action Plan on
the Environment, in REALrrY CHEcK, supra note 263, at 45-47.
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intensity. 28 The results have been mixed.' Moreover, even though
Japanese industry has the highest energy efficiency rating of major
producing countries, EIA data shows a substantial increase in total Japanese
C02 emissions."
The studies in Reality Check suggest certain lessons. The EPA 33/50
program is a reminder that the government needs to retain control over
measurement and compliance, rather than leaving compliance to the very
companies that have an economic incentive to keep emitting GHGs. It is a
conflict of interest to have emissions sources serve as the sole source of
information on their progress.
Second, while Reality Check repeatedly discusses the problem of setting
a fair baseline to distinguish the independent effect of reduction programs
from trends that might have occurred in any eventm it may never be
possible to separate the many "independent" factors that might contribute
to emissions reductions. But as long as companies make the reductions
mandated by government agencies, the possibility that there may be
multiple causes for compliance, some independent of the program, should
not divert attention from success in achieving targeted reduction levels.
Target levels always may set a ceiling on the reductions firms are willing to
achieve voluntarily; nonetheless, the achievement of targets is worth
rewarding.
Third, programs that provide real economic incentives -both taxes to
deter emissions and reimbursements as rewards to companies that achieve
reductions-have more promise than purely voluntary programs. The
British and Danish programs create true incentives to take meaningful
steps, unlike the voluntary programs in the EPA's Climate Wise or the
German cement-industry agreements. 2 9 This experience fits with the
conclusion in the U.N.'s Human Development Programme that "[sletting
credible targets linked to global mitigation goals is the starting point for the
transition to a sustainable emissions pathway." 29° The policies will have to

285. Id. at 47-48.
286. The iron and steel sector's C02 emissions fell by 4.4 percent below 1990 levels, but
the power sector, which had a target of a 20-percent reduction by 2010, was on track to reach
only a 15-percent reduction. Id. at 54-56.
287. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
288. Morgenstern & Pizer, supra note 269, at 179-81.
289. Morgenstern and Pizer claim that it is hard to reject the "hypothesis" that the various
programs, voluntary and less voluntary, have statistically insignificant differences, yet even
they admit that the programs with the strongest incentives had the strongest effect. Id. at 183.
Taken as a whole, the studies suggest the hypothesis that programs that combine real targets
with flexibility in the means of achieving them, and financial incentives to do so, are more
likely to get results than voluntary programs without mandated reduction requirements.
290. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 10.
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set an adequate price upon carbon usage, whether through taxes or
quantitative limits within a cap-and-trade regime.2 '
The challenge facing the world is so great that any structure that holds
the promise of unveiling new efficiencies begs for serious consideration. The
EPA's Director for Atmospheric Programs, for instance, estimates that the
EPA's acid-rain cap-and-trade program to eliminate sulfur dioxide, which
was expected to cost seven to eight billion dollars a year, ended up costing
much less - between one to two billion dollars.292 He estimates the total cost
of the sulfur and nitrous dioxide programs at about eight billion dollars a
year, compared to an expected annual benefit of 350 billion dollars.' If a
cap-and-trade regime, the likely favorite of most industries, is chosen,
however, caps have to be set sufficiently low to achieve real reductions.
Voluntary efforts may have a place, but recent experience, particularly as
demonstrated by the United States and Australia, shows that "voluntary
action is not enough."294 The European Union's reduction program is an
ideal example of an ambitious policy that set caps far too high and will need
to be adjusted if it is to reach its reduction goals.295
Finally, a more optimistic perspective comes through in Analyzing
International Environmental Regimes, a 136-variable study of 23 major
environmental regimes that addresses how to structure effective environmental "regimes" (by which the authors mean the "rules of the game" used
to address a given environmental issue, regardless of whether the issuing
"regime" is a government or private entity).296 The authors studied
compliance measures, internal decision rules, and "programmatic" efforts
to determine the impact of regimes. They tried to test models based on
traditional incentives (regulatory rules, taxes, and subsidies) against "social
practice" ideas in which acts of participation themselves become
independent factors altering the participants' behavior. Some of the results
question the assumption that traditional measures always work best.
A section on compliance notes that the traditional approach assumes
that an effective organization needs coercive powers through a well-funded

291. For a discussion of taxation versus a cap-and-trade approach, see id. at 9-10, 111-12,
125-29. A good rehearsal of the arguments for each approach, with the author coming down
in favor of taxes, is Christina Harper, Climate Change and Tax Policy, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.

REV. 411, 454-57 (2007) (presenting a case for controls based on permit trading), 145-59
(arguing for carbon taxation), 460 (stating preference for taxes).
292. Panel Discusion (McLean comments), supra note 113, at 177.
293. Id. at 179.
294. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 120-25. The EPA's McLean claims as "necessary"
elements for a successful program (1) coverage in full economic sectors, to avoid "leakage";
(2) a firm cap; and (3) monitoring. Panel Discussion (McLean comments), supra note 113, at
179.
295. See 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 11, 123, 129-32.
296.

BRE1TMEIER et al., supra note 83, at 4.
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central organization, an argument often raised against the loose and
decentralized structure of many international environmental regimes.297
Strong verification procedures that included sanctions turned out to be
more effective than "soft" verification procedures.29 Compliance declined
when "important" states did not participate (a finding suggesting that the
U.S. resistance to Kyoto is likely to increase other countries' noncompliance,
as one would expect); 299 increased when nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) participated; and fell when rules "differentiated among members,"
allowed transition periods for some members, or focused on measures to
improve country capacity building rather than featuring sanctions. These
last findings suggest that dual standards for developed and developing
countries and emphasis on building compliance capabilities in the
developing world are, in the abstract, not the most efficient way of
designing emission reductions. The catch, of course, is that legitimacy
matters, as Analyzing EnvironmentalRegimes also demonstrates; developing

countries have little reason to support any global-warming regime unless
they are allowed to raise their standards of living closer to developedcountry levels. Otherwise, environmental regulation would become a
mechanism for freezing today's inequality in the distribution of resources
and income into a fixed pattern for the future.
Turning to decision rules, the authors concluded that most international
environmental regimes have consensual rules (structures allowing action
when no one party feels so strongly that it publicly opposes a measure), and
almost as many require unanimity as require one or another form of
majority voting.30 Moreover, even regimes that on paper do not require
consensus often do so in practice, making consensus the actual decision rule
in more than half of all cases.' While theoretically costs should increase as
voting rules edge closer to unanimity, a majority rule may be difficult or
impossible to implement in an international community lacking a single

297. Id. at 63.
298. Id. at 64, 72-79.
299. Id. at 96, 104-05. The lower compliance with differentiated rules, transition periods,
and emphasis on capacity building, all aspects of Kyoto, may seem to suggest that the
developed/developing country differentiation in Kyoto may reduce compliance, a possibility
that has to be conditioned by the question, "Compared to what?" The differentiated status of
developing countries may be the only way to secure their participation in any environmental
regime.
300. Id. at 126-27. The most common decision rule is unanimity, required in 27.11 percent
of the cases; there are almost as many entries for consensual decision making (20.19 percent)
as for both weighted and simple majority voting (25.40 percent combined). Id. For the
definitions of unanimity and consensus, see id. at 114-15.
301. Id. at 125, 187.
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accepted authority structure.? 2 In practice, regimes having unanimity,
consensual, and majority voting structures all achieved their goals a very
high percentage of the time;3 3 when the authors tried to control for the
causal influence of the voting regime, consensual and majority regimes both
ranked well, but unanimity procedures were not as effective.'
International environmental regimes displayed a pronounced
preference for "management" compliance procedures based upon
interactions with member states over "enforcement" regimes that look more
like traditional regulation.3 Although the authors provide a somewhat
wandering description of which approaches work best, overall they could
not find "overwhelming support" for either enforcement or management
approaches.3' The fact that enforcement approaches did not dominate the
good outcomes may be a hopeful sign in a world that lacks an international
structure to support enforcement-based policies. The perhaps-surprising
effectiveness of management approaches may be explained in part by the
fact that both legalization and legitimacy, two "often overlooked" factors,
"account for a sizable proportion of conformance on the part of regime
members." 7
Finally, the authors studied whether "programmatic activity,"
organized efforts to monitor projects and support their operation,
contributed to achieving environmental goals. They contrasted rationalchoice models that tend to view interests and choices as static with
knowledge-based approaches that focus on the role of behavior and
implementation in forming "epistemological communities" that end up
having a stake in success in the regime's operations. 3°8 Using measures of
nine programmatic activities, the authors found a positive connection
between knowledge of environmental problems
and remediation, even
39
though the causal linkage was not clear.W
The most important finding in Analyzing International Environmental
Regimes may be the relatively small role played by traditional majorityvoting rules, and the fact that even regimes that on paper are not based on
consensus often use consensus rules in practice. This reflects the reality that,
at a time when the world as a single organism is facing a life-threatening

302. See id. at 119 (theoretical prediction of increased costs from seeking unanimity), 120
(discussion of capacity to implement voting systems in international community).
303. Id. at 125-30.
304. Id. at 130.
305. Regimes used a management approach in 94.1 percent of cases dealing with goal
attainment and 89.4 percent of cases dealing with problem change. Id. at 189.
306. Id. at 232.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 199-200.
309. See id. at 221-24.
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environmental problem, it lacks a decision apparatus for taking concerted
action. Though it may appear to be a case of making the most of harsh facts,
the findings that social practices matter, that participation can foster
legitimacy and legalization, and that knowledge may itself play a
transformative role suggest that the Kyoto framework may have a greater
possibility of success than it might seem at the outset. It is also a reminder
that the world may have little practical choice except to make this
framework work.
VI. THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY, PARTICULARLY THE ENERGY
INDUSTRY, IN THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE
Business and EnvironmentalPolicy: CorporateInterestsin the American Political
System. Edited by Michael Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 2007. Pp. 358. $25 paperback.
With the world falling so far behind its unprecedented challenge, one
all the more daunting because it brings out every unresolved distributional
issue dividing developed (rich, North) and developing (poor, South)
countries, there is far too much to do to be casting around for blame.31 °
Nonetheless, because the U.S. energy industry, including oil and gas
companies and their brethren in coal and electricity, is so intimately
involved with the fossil fuels responsible for so much emissions output, it
is worth considering how the role of industry will appear years from now
if the world fails to meet this challenge.
Daniel Fiorino provides one framework for thinking about the way that
industry has influenced environmental policy in The New Environmental
Regulation.Even though the EPA has refused to regulate C02 and under the
Bush administration fought a destructive delaying action against any
mandatory GHG restrictions,31 in the hands of an able, committed
administrator the EPA logically is the federal agency that would spearhead
a national campaign to reduce GHGs. Fiorino describes the EPA regime

310. It will be a massive challenge to implement needed measures when the world has
looked so heavily to the market to build international connections, with far too little energy given
to nonmarket ties. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund are not the kind of
institutions to fix this problem. The recent failure to achieve significant progress at an emergency
conference on food shortages - shortages caused in large part by the spiraling price of energy and
rich countries' efforts to grow supplemental fuels - illustrates the lack of central direction within
the world order. See Andrew Martin & Elisabeth Rosenthal, Leaders Speak of Their Own Issues at
a Conference Addressing Food Shortages, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 2008, at A6.
311. For the most recent resistance, see the EPA's decision that the Clean Air Act does not
authorize it to regulate C02 emissions and that it would refuse to do so even if it had
discretionary authority to issue such regulations, a position rejected by the Supreme Court.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510-14 (2007).
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from the late 1960s into the early 1980s -until the Reagan administration
- as the era that established modem environmental regulation.3 1 2 This was
the period of traditional, command-and-control regulation. After the first
two years under Ronald Reagan that he describes as the "worst in EPA's
history, in terms of accomplishments, reputation, staff morale, leadership,
and most other measures," Fiorino treats the years from 1983 to 1993 as a
"mixed" era. The return of William Ruckelshaus to head the agency sparked
"a decade of efforts to innovate within the policy stream," but these efforts
were largely stymied by "high levels of conflict in the political stream. "313
The Clinton administration's eight years were a time of internal "reinvention," but progress again was blocked in the same "political stream"
because "the Republican assault largely killed chances for cooperative
reform efforts."314 Fiorino describes the years beginning in 2001 somewhat
tactfully (as befits someone who held a position within the EPA when The
New Environmental Regulation was published in 2006) as ones when "the
reinvention era was over and nothing else had emerged to replace it." 315 His
history basically breaks down to an initial period of accomplishment,
followed by several decades in which the EPA amassed better in-house
expertise but progress was impeded politically.
The MIT Press recently issued a collection of essays addressing the role
of corporate interests in environmental policy. In an introductory chapter
to Business and Environmental Policy: Corporate Interests in the American
PoliticalSystem,316 editors Michael Kraft and Sheldon Kamieniecki divide the
history of U.S. environmental regulations into an initial phase of federal
command-and-control legislation that began with clean air and water
legislation and ran through the Superfund legislation in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,317 and
a second, defensive period defined by a "vigorous and persistent campaign
over the next twenty years to reform the regulatory process." They describe
the latter as motivated by a desire to "reduce the burdens and costs

FIORINO, supra note 247, at 42-46.
313. Id. at 46-51.
314. Id. at 51-54.
315. Id. at 54-56.
316. Michael Kraft &Sheldon Kamieniecki, Analyzing the Role of Business in Environmental

312.

Policy, in BusiNEss AND ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY,

supra note 17, ch. 1. For other descriptions

of the business campaign against effective global-warming measures, see MOONEY, supranote
58, at 54-64, 78-103, 238-49; GOODELL, supra note 73, at 173-201 (with a detailed focus on the
role of the coal industry). For another description of aggressive industry efforts to undercut
the growing realization that global warming is a major international crisis, see the allegations
in the Village of Kivalina's recent lawsuit. Native Village of Kivalina Complaint, supra note
202, §§ 189-248.
317. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901 et seq. (2000).
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imposed on industry by these new laws" (although this desire was based
on business opposition to many of the laws).318 This classification parallels
Fiorino's, even though he adds details for variations in internal EPA
strategy.
Kraft and Kamieniecki review theoretical reasons why concentrated
business interests can have an easier time securing benefits from government than diffuse public-interest groups, 319 and they cite research
suggesting that business groups indeed continue to "get[] what they want
from policymakers." 32 ° This possibility is consistent with general capture
theory and the theory as it applies to administrative processes.32' Yet they
note the complexity of measuring business influence and that access to
policymakers does not necessarily equate to control. They also cite the
unresolved debate over whether new, market-based approaches like those
Fiorino advocates are likely to be effective or instead are simply a
sophisticated way for business to avoid the burden of cleaning our air and
water. 322
Some of the essays in Business and Environmental Policy are quite
theoretical. Others, however, contain compelling information. One author
analyzes business and environmental contributions to environmental
committees in Congress. He cites findings from the Center for Responsive
Politics that "in the last two election cycles, electric utility, oil and gas,
mining, and forestry interests have contributed more than $12.75 million to
members of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee,
compared to just $235,000 from environmental donors." 323 Looking more

318. Kraft & Kamieniecki, supra note 316, at 11.
319. Id. at 13-14 (discussing Mancur Olson's THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1994)).

320. Id. at 6.
321. On the general theory, see CHARLES LINDBLOM, THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS (1968);
THEODORE LoWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969). On the much bruited-about agency capture
theory, see George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.ECON. & MGM'T SC. 3
(1971); Gary Becker, A Theory of CompetitionAmong PressureGroupsfor PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q.
J.ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,19 J.L. & ECON.
211 (1976). This economist version of capture theory has antecedents in an earlier political
theory. For a description, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 24 nn.1-5,
56 (1985).
322. Kraft & Kamieniecki, supra note 316, at 11.
323. Robert Duffy, Business, Elections, and the Environment, in BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 17, at 72. In table 3.3, Duffy reproduces similar information for
four environmental committees, the House Resources Committee, the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, and the Senate
Environmental and Public Works Committee. Contributions are broken down for six
industries (oil and gas, mining, electric utilities, forestry, automotive, and chemical) and
"environmental groups." Id. at 73. The contributions from the six industry groups are over $34
million; total environmental group contributions are less than a million dollars. Id.
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widely at contributions by six major industry groups to four House and
Senate environmental committees, he reports that the oil and gas industry
was the largest contributor, with electric utilities not far beyond. These two
industries provided over 70 percent of the six industry-sector contributions. 324 Business spending dwarfed the efforts by environmental groups.
Another student of business influence on agency decision making
concluded in past research that, not surprisingly, "economic organizations
such as trade associations and businesses participated in more rulemakings
than the other organizational types. " 32
s Using Lobby Disclosure Reports for
1996, his article in Business and Environmental Policy finds a massive
imbalance between business groups and trade associations, which
accounted for 94.2 percent of lobbyists, and the 0.5 percent of union
32
lobbyists and 3.1 percent working for environmental groups.
Most pertinent to this discussion is a chapter on business influence in
the global warming debate by Judith Layzer, an assistant professor in the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. In a chapter titled "Deep Freeze," she charts industry efforts
to prevent global-warming legislation. The oil and gas industry is,
predictably, at the heart of the opposition. Layzer argues that business has
used a "three-pronged" strategy to respond to environmentalists: (1) "they
discredit the science that underpins environmentalists' claims by portraying
it as highly uncertain"; (2) "they portray environmentalists as elite,
misanthropic extremists"; and (3) "they draw attention to the economic
costs of addressing the problem, particularly the impact of regulation on
jobs and consumer prices." 327 It is, of course, fair to bring attention to the
costs of emission-reduction rules; but it is problematic when that attention
is used to divert attention from the seriousness of the crisis and the benefits
that reductions would bring. No one can conduct a fair cost-benefit analysis
by looking only at costs.

324. The oil and gas industry listed contributions of $13,594,248 to the four committees
during the 2002-04 election cycle, electric utilities $11,729,226; by contrast, the total for
environmental groups was $861,898. Id. Duffy notes that companies not only invest
substantial funds to influence policymakers; they also wield considerable influence by
organizing pressure from employees and shareholders. "One of the most notable
developments in recent years has been a dramatic increase in internal communications from
business associations to both members and employees." Id. at 82.
For another example of business's power to bring overwhelming financial resources
to bear on political issues, see Thomas Friedman's account of the flood of oil and gas money
that defeated California's Proposition 87, which would have imposed a tax on oil production
in order to fund alternative energies. FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 377-78.
325. Scott Furlong, Business and the Environment: Influencing Agency Policymaking,in
BusINEss AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supranote 17, at 173.
326. Id. at 175.
327. Layzer, supranote 17, at 95.
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Layzer notes that the issue of global warming rose to the national policy
agenda in the United States after James Hansen, a National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) scientist, testified before the Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Committee in 1988. 32 In those days of relative
innocence, even President George H.W. Bush, running for reelection,
promised to take action on the greenhouse problem. 329 But affected
American industries quickly began mobilizing against regulatory action.
The National Association of Manufacturers organized the Global
Climate Coalition (GCC), a group of industry and trade association
members that included "electric utilities, automobile manufacturers, and oil
and coal producers." 330 The GCC quickly began attacking global-warming
science as "uncertain" and playing up the costs of regulatory action. The
release of the IPCC's First Assessment Report in 1990 presented the energy
industries with an enormous problem because it stressed that "oil and coal
are the main sources of C02."33' In 1991, the year after the IPCC issued its
first report, the Western Fuels Association joined with the National Coal
Association and the Edison Electric Institute to create the Information
Council on the Environment, another group dedicated to discrediting
mainstream climate scientists.332 The Western Fuels Association distributed
a video titled "The Greening of Planet Earth," which perversely argued that
warming would benefit the United States.333 (This suggests a bizarre and
disappointing new category for Jared Diamond: societies that disappear
because they tout their environmental threat as a benefit!) President Bush
then announced that he did not believe that science justified major new
environmental proposals. In 1992, although he signed the FCCC under
heavy pressure, he did so after having threatened to boycott the Rio de
3
Janeiro conference if it tried to impose "any specific goals or deadlines. 1
American energy firms waged a long lobbying campaign against the
IPCC's various reports and the Kyoto Protocol. Layzer describes the
industry's success in ensuring that the U.S. press repeatedly gave

328. Id. at 98. It is sobering that in a recent interview, Hansen described himself as
"surprised and disappointed at the lack of substantial action" on climate change and at the
number of people "in the pocket" of special interests. He argued that the climate is already
at the "tipping point," that the question now is whether it will reach the "point of no return"
when climatic interactions move beyond human control, and that mankind has to reduce
GHG to 350 ppm. Hansen calls acceptance of a 20 C increase, a goal of many major groups,
a "guarantee of global disasters." Worldwatch Inst., James Hansen Talks About Climate Change,
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5775.
329. Layzer, supra note 17, at 98.
330. Id. at 98-99.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 99.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 100.
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prominent space to business-funded critics of global warming science,3'
even though the vast majority of the scientific community then and now has
stood behind the IPCC's work. Resistance increased after the IPCC issued
its Second Assessment Report in 1995, with the auto industry creating "The
Coalition for Vehicle Choice" and the coal industry creating "The Center for
Energy and Economic Development" to fund opposition to these international consensus reports.336 American businesses devoted tremendous
resources to opposing the Kyoto process, with the GCC alone spending $13
million to stir up fear of the cost of "strict reductions."337 Layzer cites poll
data showing the success of these efforts: the American public continued to
believe that the scientific community remains divided on global warming,
even though that is not the case.' She argues that "[m]uddled public
opinion, in turn, allowed conservative Republicans to express their
skepticism about the Kyoto Protocol without fear of political repercussions
339
and inhibited moderate Republicans and Democrats."
Layzer devotes a separate section to industry's actions after Kyoto.
Even as the science behind the IPCC's findings became more certain, many
business leaders continued to campaign on uncertainty, tout benefits from
warming, and do all they could to avoid affirmative measures. They tried
to focus the debate away from the results of inaction and overemphasized
the cost of reform.' "Virtually all executives from the industries whose
profitability was threatened by the Kyoto Protocol initially were outspoken
in their opposition to its ratification. " 341 Strong opposition came from the
American Petroleum Institute (API), the Edison Electric Institute, the
notorious "Global Science Communications Action Plan" designed under
API auspices with support from Chevron and Exxon as well as large electric
utilities, and efforts by the Western Fuels Association. 342 These efforts
culminated in President George W. Bush abandoning his campaign pledge
to regulate C02 emissions and rejecting the Kyoto Protocol.' 4 The EPA

335. Id. at 100-101.
336. Id. at 101.
337. Id. at 103.
338. Id. at 104.
339. Id.The United States almost certainly would have moved more quickly against global
warming if Congress still maintained its Office of Technology Assessment. But this office was
one casualty of the Republican majority installed in the 1994 mid-term congressional
elections. See MOONEY, supra note 58, 49-54.
340. See Layzer, supra note 17, at 104.
341. Id. at 105.
342. Id. at 105-06.
343. In a March 13, 2001, letter, President Bush explained that he opposed Kyoto "because
it exempts 80 percent of the world.. from compliance" -thus rejecting the differentiated
responsibility of developed and developing countries that almost all other countries
accept-and because it "would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy." Letter from
President Bush, supra note 149.
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under Bush used uncertainty as an excuse to avoid action.3 4 As an
alternative to serious reform, Bush announced a "voluntary" plan that, in
Layzer's words, "made it clear that economic growth was his primary
concern, and that he believed a thrivineconomy would provide the
resources to invest in clean technologies.
By the late 1990s, even with such well-funded business opposition, the
increasing certainty in IPCC and other reports was leading many business
leaders to accept that the world faces an unprecedented crisis and that their
industries would have to change. While Exxon's Lee Raymond was still
aggressively denying that science justified mandatory reductions like
Kyoto's as late as 2002, BP (British Petroleum) withdrew from the GCC in
1997 and embarked upon its own green program.346 Some electric utilities
began taking steps to curb emissions. Ford became a leader among
automakers in discussing global warming as a serious threat (with
questions remaining about how far it is greening its offerings)." 7 In 2003,
American Electric Power, Ford, and other companies created the Chicago
Climate Exchange with commitments to reduce their emissions.3 "
Yet business opposition continued to defeat serious action. The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the largest U.S. business interest group, remains
willing to gamble the world's environmental future against short-term
economic interest and continues to fight against any regulation that would
impose costs on the U.S. economy." 9 The Chamber of Commerce acts as if
the world can wait until new technologies are developed, even though it
admits that the technologies needed to reduce emissions without curbing
growth do not yet exist.s The Senate failed to pass bills with real emissions

344. The Bush administration used uncertainty as one of the EPA's excuses for refusing
to regulate carbon dioxide from automobiles, in spite of a seemingly clear statutory mandate
to regulate any airborne pollutant that might "reasonably be anticipated to endanger" public
health or welfare (the latter being defined to include climate). 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
The administration refused to take action before losing a lawsuit in the Supreme Court
because the link between increasing GHGs and increased temperatures "cannot be
unequivocally established," Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 513 (2007) (citing EPA
position); see also id. at 534, and it has delayed issuing regulations on GHGs since losing that
case.
345. Layzer, supranote 17, at 107. For discussion of President Bush's GCC Initiative, see
supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
346. Layzer, supra note 17, at 110.
347. Id. at 111-12.
348. Id. at 112.
349. See Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Lieberman-Warner-Boxer Bill a
Misguided Plan to Curbing Carbon Emission (June 2, 2008), http://www.uschamber.com/
press/releases/2008/june/08-141.htm (last visited July 9, 2008).
350. See id.
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reductions in 2003 or 2005, and debate on a 2008 plan ended up frozen." 1
The API and Edison Electric Institute remained leaders in the opposition.
Increasing numbers of individual corporations initiated green investments
and projects, but even though the business coalition seemed to be "breaking
up," 352 progress came with a price: "business will only support the
approaches that offer the regulatory certainty and flexibility it desires."3
The self-interested, partisan manner in which U.S. business has approached
global warming is a major reason the United States has lagged behind other
major developed countries in developing realistic responses to this dire
crisis. The 2008 election appears likely to finally boost efforts to put the
United States back in a leadership role on climate change.
VII. WHAT GLOBAL WARMING REGULATION IS LIKELY TO
MEAN FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
Degrees That Matter:Climate Changeand the University.By Ann Rappaport &
Sarah Hammond Creighton. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007. Pp. 376.
$24.95 paperback.
If the United States is to make a meaningful contribution to the effort
against global warming, which it must as the world's leading GHG emitter,
each major GHG-emitting sector of the U.S. economy will need to receive
firm caps (not just voluntary goals or intensity reduction requirements) to
reduce emissions to an internationally set base amount determined by the
needs of the world climatic system. Firms within each sector will need
constraints that limit their emissions, measure their output, and impose
financial penalties if they exceed their limits. The limits need to be
sufficiently stringent that emissions are reduced sharply, most likely at least
to the recent HDR estimate of 50 percent below 1990 levels.
Whatever changes are adopted - and changes are indeed coming - they
will affect producers of fossil fuels. These fuels account for 83 percent of
U.S. GHG emissions. 3 4 On an activity basis, with electricity treated as a
separate activity rather than allocated to its end use, the EPA estimates that
electricity generation accounts for the largest single source of emissions, at
34 percent of GHG emissions in 2006; transportation was a close second at

351. Layzer, supra note 17, at 113-20. On the 2008 plan, see David Herszenhorn, More
Talking Than Listening in the Senate Debate About Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2008, at
A19.
352. Layzer writes that "environmentalists succeeded in breaking up the business
coalition," Layzer, supranote 17, at 120, but this seems somewhat exaggerated. A substantial
business coalition remains opposed to binding emissions-reduction regulation.
353. Id.
354. EPA GHG INVENTORY, supra note 112, at 2-7.
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28 percent; while industry followed with a share that has declined to 19
percent, reflecting the decline of the U.S. manufacturing sector." 5 While the
direct emissions from the traditional activities of oil and gas companies in
production and transportation and processing and refining thus are not the
largest source of GHG emissions, the industry's products are responsible for
most emissions. Not only will its customers be sharply affected by new
regulations, putting pressure on their demand and encouraging lower
consumption and fuel substitution, but oil and gas companies are uniquely
situated to participate in the cures because of the importance that carbon
storage is likely to have in any successful program.
The fact that firm caps overall are needed does not dictate the structure
of reforms. There is a major division between those supporting tax-based
systems and those favoring regulatory ceilings with cap-and-trade rights.3" 6
Tax systems have the advantage of generating a large fund that can be used
to support research and development, subsidize transition costs, or add to
general tax revenues. A cap-and-trade system could also generate revenue
by auctioning emission rights. Assuming a cap-and-trade regime is
adopted, as long as the caps are sufficient to cause the necessary reductions,
the market may be able to determine which industries and firms actually
make the reductions and which technologies they use to do so. But all major
sources of GHG emissions will receive caps or taxes under any rational
program, so that each emitting activity will reflect the cost it imposes on the
environment. Because trading can occur across industries and economic
levels, and because changes will be more feasible in some industries and
companies than in others, the changes may end up concentrated in just
select portions of the economy. Consumers will see prices that better reflect
the costs of their behavior - changing their decisions on how much to drive,
heat, build, and consume. Ultimately, each emission-producing entity will
need its own plan, even if for some the "plan" is primarily to buy tradable
credits.
The kind of detail needed to reduce emissions for a large corporation
is shown by Degrees That Matter: Climate Change and the University, a 2007
publication describing Tufts University's strategy that attempts to spell out
in concrete terms the changes universities will have to make to reduce their
environmental footprint. 35 7 Degrees That Matter is based upon the initiative
Tufts undertook in frustration at the refusal of the United States to ratify the

355.
356.

Id. at E-16, 2-16-17.

357.

DEGREEs THAT MATrER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNIVERSITY (Ann Rappaport &

See supranote 291 and accompanying text.

Hammond Creighton eds., 2007).
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Kyoto Protocol.3" The book charts Tufts' plan to reduce GHG emissions in
four main areas: (1) increasing efficiency, (2) switching to alternative fuels,
(3) switching from one conventional fuel to another, and (4) reducing
demand through behavior changes. 35 9
Although concerning a very different industry than oil and gas, Degrees
That Matter includes some stark facts for any large institution- including
an oil company - that sets out to reduce emissions. It notes that not only are
emissions per capita positively associated with GDP, but emissions per
college and university similarly are associated with endowment per
student.' This correlation is not surprising; wealthier schools on average
have more facilities, and more building space on average means more GHG
emissions.361 In general, emissions increase with the scale and sophistication
of activity. Another discouraging fact is that in spite of Tufts' significant
efforts at reducing emissions, for instance by changing electricity suppliers,
its total emissions increased from 1990 to 2005 because of the rising use of
personal computers and other electrical equipment. 32 Independent change
in individual behavior overwhelmed Tufts' institutional success in reducing
emissions intensity. Another sign of the complexity of changing a large
institution's direction is that planning had to include detailed changes in the
way students and staff used transportation to get to school, a rethinking far
beyond the direct emissions by the university's own buildings and oncampus activities.
Turning to the situation facing the oil and gas industry today, three
facts stand out: (1) aggressive opposition to regulation has dominated past
industry efforts, with the opposition successfully delaying U.S.

358. Id. at 3-4. The rationale for the Tufts Initiative was that if the national government
was not going to lead, then change would have to come from the ground up.
359. See generally id. at 75-77, 112-19. Although switching wherever possible to green
power sounds abstractly like a desirable goal if reduced emissions are the primary guide, the
constraint facing Tufts was that "[a]t present, green power almost always costs more than
conventional power." Id. at 184.
360. Id. at 23, fig. 2.1; at 27, fig. 2.2.
361. Id. at 26-27,31-32. In this vein, the authors note that the "greenest building you can
build is one that you do not build." Id.at 127. Ideally, the pressing demands of climate change
will force a rethinking of some of the most basic patterns. In the area of building, Richard
Moe, President of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, claims that even the most
green, energy-efficient new office building would take on average 65 years to recover the
energy lost in demolishing a similarly sized older building, even assuming that 40 percent of
the materials are recycled. Richard Moe, Sustainable Stewardship: Historic Preservation's
Essential Role in Fighting Climate Change, Speech at First Church of Christ, Berkeley, CA
(Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://berkeley.heritage.com/speeches/richardmoe.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2008).
362. DEGREES THAT MAT-ER, supranote 357, at 37. The Tufts Initiative used 1990 emissions
as a benchmark because this was the Kyoto benchmark, with Tufts' goal to reduce GHG
emissions to seven percent below 1990 levels by 2012. Id. at 4647.
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development of meaningful global-warming policies and increasing the cost
and invasiveness of the regulations ultimately adopted; (2) many parts of
the industry seem to be focusing largely on the new revenue opportunity
in emissions reduction, cap-and-trade, and carbon storage; and (3) new
opportunities should not obscure the industry's need to sharply reduce
GHG emissions in its traditional operations.
A. Resistance Has Dominated Past Industry Responses
The first point is obvious from the discussion in Part VI. The most
powerful, concentrated forces in the oil and gas industry, as well as their
brethren in coal, electricity, and such major fossil-fuel dependent industries
as the automobile industry, have spent massive amounts of money denying
that global warming is a serious threat. They have done everything possible
to discredit mainstream environmental science and to subvert moves
toward regulation. For years, they created the appearance of uncertainty,
in the United States at least, on environmental risks that mainstream
scientists had come to believe pose a grave threat to mankind. This period
of delayed action over the last 15 to 20 years, during which global emissions
rose sharply, will mean much greater cost and sacrifice in the future.
The fact that some major oil companies now admit that global warming
is a real threat does not mean that they will play a constructive role in
meeting the challenge. But it does mean that the industry has a wonderful
opportunity to become the most important force helping the world make
the necessary adjustment. The industry will not meet this challenge if
"acceptance" of the problem simply means shifting to a more sophisticated
do-nothing approach, for instance, professing to accept the crisis but
opposing controls because they would be too costly or the distribution of
costs would fall too heavily on developed countries - the bases upon which
the United States has resisted Kyoto until now -or fighting to shift the
burden from the oil and gas sector to other economic sectors. If that is how
this crisis plays out, the industry's role will be no more constructive than the
out-and-out resistance of past years. In other words, the jury remains out
on whether the industry's net contribution will be positive, mixed, or
calamitously negative.
B. Global Warming May Be the Industry's Biggest Opportunity
Presently, there are no federal restrictions on C02 emissions and, at
most, limited state restrictions on venting methane. But the Supreme Court
has now held, in Massachusettsv. EPA, that GHG is a pollutant under EPA
jurisdiction, making action likelier under a post-Bush administration.
Furthermore, states and regional bodies have already begun moving toward
enforceable GHG restrictions given the federal government's dismal record
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of failure. Severe emissions limitations will come if the United States makes
any serious effort to reduce global emissions.
Against this background, the fact that even a company like Exxon today
acknowledges global warming as a problem 363 is part of a wide shift in
attitudes within the U.S. oil and gas industry. Past industry reaction was
largely defensive, but continued study, driven no doubt by a sea change in
public opinion, seems to have persuaded many producers that they will be
a net beneficiary of global-warming regulations. Companies may be shifting
their positions primarily because they have read the writing on the wall and
are trying to adapt to their environment; but several self-interested factors
are also propelling a rapid turnaround in industry perspective.
Perhaps most significantly, the many companies with substantial
natural-gas reserves have realized that they own an energy source far
cleaner than coal, the national standby, and with lower emissions intensity
than oil as well.' The natural gas industry therefore is quite bullish on the
future. The American Gas Association (AGA) touts natural gas as the clean
fuel of the future; the Natural Gas Council predicts that climate change will
produce an increase in demand for natural gas of at least 23 percent after
2030.' A large-scale example of the kind of substitution possible comes
from the United Kingdom, which reduced its emissions before 2000 in large

363. See supranote 12.
364. In one example of natural-gas's favored position, Joni Hersch and Kip Viscusi
estimated the externality cost as a percentage of a fuel's price for various fuels, including
natural gas, gasoline, diesel, heating oil, and coal. The lower the percentage, the closer the fuel
is to being adequately priced because the lower the unrecouped negative externality. Natural
gas's "externality cost estimate as a percent of price" was a remarkably low 1.11 percent,
gasoline 16.74 percent, while coal in this world before significant carbon capture was 528.01
percent. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibilityfor the FailureofGlobalWarming
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1657, 1661 (2007).
365. The American Gas Association touts natural gas as emitting "45 percent less C02
than coal and 30 percent less C02 than oil on an energy equivalent basis." Am. Gas Ass'n,
Climate Issues, http://www.aga.org/Legislative/issuesummaries/Climatelssues.htm (last
visited July 18, 2008). For an overview of the Natural Gas Council estimate, see NAT. GAS
COUNCIL, CARBON REDUCrION REQUIRES NATURAL GAS (2008), availableat http://www.ngsa.
org/factsLstudies/Docs/NGCGHG_Initiatives_FINAL_021308.pdf. The overall NGC report
is NAT. GAS CouNcIL, GREENHOUSE GAS INmATIVEs ANALYSIS USING THE NATIONAL ENERGY
MODELING SYSTEM (Oct. 2007) [hereinafter NGC REPORT]. Planning by the Northwest Power
and Conservation Council, one of the country's more progressive power-planning agencies,
assumes that older generating sources will be replaced by natural-gas combined cycle plants
and peaking capacity by single-cycle gas plants. Nw. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNcIL, 200715, CARBON DIOXIDE FOOTPRINT OF THE NORTHWEST POWER SYSTEM (2007), available at
http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/2007/2007-15.htm (lastvisited July 8,2008). It expects
that by 2024, seven percent of existing sources will be replaced by natural gas, on top of the
current nine percent. Id. at 8.
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part by substituting natural gas for coal (a trend that has reversed as high
oil prices push usage back toward coal)?"
It is a significant shift in thought that producers, whether they
concentrate on oil or natural gas, have realized that once emissions are
thrown into the cost equation, natural gas's potential exceeds that for oil,
coal, or nuclear power (under current technology). The focus of exploration
and development in North America has undergone a striking shift from oil
to natural gas over the past 20 years. According to a Baker Hughes rig
count, in the late 1980s, 50 to 60 percent of all new wells were drilled for oil;
by the late 1990s the percentage had fallen below 20 percent (so that four
out of five new wells were intended to penetrate natural gas reservoirs),
and in some months the percentage-oil dropped almost as low as ten
percent.367 Increased shifting from coal and to some extent oil into natural
gas is likely to be essential over the next few decades in any strategy to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.3
The shift to natural gas may be larger than these estimates suggest
because industry modeling tends to focus on the potential for substitution
in electricity generation and largely ignores the benefit of substitution to
natural gas in direct home use. The consolidation of a substantial part of the
utility business into combined electricity-natural gas companies may
explain this overemphasis on generation. The fact that generation is so
capital intensive, and that large returns can be made if capital investments
at that level are incorporated into the rate base, may also explain why
increases in direct home use of natural gas have not received appropriate
emphasis. Yet the AGA has concluded that "[a] house using natural gas for
water and space heating, cooking and clothes drying creates, on average, 30
percent fewer greenhouse gas emissions than a home using electric
appliances for these same activities." 369 In addition, the AGA claims that
"[a]bout 90 percent of the natural gas produced is delivered to customers
as useable energy. In contrast, only about 27 percent of the energy
converted to electricity reaches customers."3 7 While the AGA is an

366. The United Kingdom had passed its Kyoto first-round 12-percent reduction target
largely by shifting from coal to natural gas, 2007/2008 HDR Report, supra note 22, at 54, but
since 2000 it has imperiled its ability to achieve its national target of a 20-percent reduction
by 2010 by once more increasing its reliance upon coal. Id. at 121. The HDR believes that
target is now "unobtainable." Id.
367. Baker-Hughes North American Rotary Rig Count (copy on file with Mr. Harper).
368. In one largely ignored potential application of natural gas, T. Boone Pickens has
urged shifting to wind for electricity generation in order to free up more natural gas to be
used as a transportation fuel. T. Boone Pickens, My Plan to Escapethe Grip of Foreign Oil, WALL
ST. J., July 9, 2008, at A15, col. 4. It is only fair to add that Pickens is investing heavily in wind
power through his company Mesa Power, so he is hardly a disinterested observer.
369. Am. Gas Ass'n, supra note 365.
370. Id.
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interested source, a serious environmental program is likely to push
increased use of natural gas in the home.
While there is a strong expected substitution effect that is boosting
demand for natural gas, the shift to renewable energy sources should
depress demand for all fossil fuels, even if this pressure is unlikely to
outweigh the overall demand increase for natural gas over the next several
decades.3" Natural gas is likely to remain in high demand for now because
stand-by power generation is mandatory when utilizing "renewable"
energy forms (i.e., wind power), and natural gas still should have an
expanded role to play as the cleanest backup fuel source. Wind is a rapidly
growing percentage of baseload power in many regions, with recent
modeling projecting that it may rise to 20 percent of U.S. energy supplies by
2030, 372 but it still needs support during periods of peak requirements and
remains dependent upon weather patterns. High-pressure weather systems
produce extreme cold in the winter and extraordinary heat in the summer
and, most importantly, calm winds. Wind farms must be matched to
substitute fuel sources during these periods. Until a much larger electricity
grid that can smooth over regional variations in wind, hydro, and solar
patterns is in place, natural gas will be the most environmentally desirable
backup fuel.
The relative advantage of natural gas is unlikely to disappear in the
next few decades. Nuclear energy is the only fuel that competes effectively
with natural gas on emissions. But it has a comparative advantage only if
one ignores the risks from spills and storage problems. Nuclear power
continues to face major, very real economic hurdles. The likely damage
from a serious accident or successful terrorist attack is so great that the
industry could not finance plants at all unless government limits its liability,

371. While the EIA has estimated that adoption of the McCain-Lieberman Climate
Security Act would have produced such a shift to alternative fuels, including a huge increase
in nuclear power, natural gas consumption would fall. But this assumes an extraordinarily
rapid shift to nuclear power, a source whose risks remain totally unresolved. See NGC
REPORT, supranote 365, at 7, 9,15-16 (criticizing EIA for the very aggressive assumption that
145 new nuclear units will be built by 2030). Recent changes have led to a shift from coal to
natural gas. EPA GHG INVENTORY, supra note 112, at 2-2 (recent decrease in electricity
emissions due to 1.3 percent decrease in coal usage and 6.4 percent increase in natural gas).
The Natural Gas Council estimates that nuclear power cannot be developed that quickly, and
that climate-change legislation is likely to increase natural gas demand by 23 percent by 2030
(5.9 tcf) over 2007 levels. Natural Gas Supply Ass'n, Carbon Reduction Requires Natural Gas,
http://www.ngsa.org/facts..studies/Docs/NGCGHGInitiativesFINAL_021308.pdf (last
visited July 18, 2008). The EIA's assumption of a huge shift to nuclear power assumes yet
another Faustian pact in which the United States would trade some of the environmental risks
from its high fossil-fuel-intensity lifestyle for much higher reliance upon nuclear power before
the safety and storage issues surrounding that fuel are resolved.
372. See infra note 443 and accompanying text.
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as the federal government does today. 373 Today's processing technology
produces nondegradable, highly radioactive wastes, an independent reason
that nuclear power would be uneconomic unless the federal government
pays for thousands of years of storage. Nor has the industry solved
problems of how to guard and preserve radioactive plants after they have
surpassed their useful life. Plants have not been built in recent decades
because the market has accurately signaled that nuclear power production
remains far too risky to be economically justified when compared with
alternative fuels. For those who believe in markets, the fact that nuclear
plants would not find financing without government handouts is an
indication that nuclear power would not be a viable competitor of natural
gas on its own.
If the country adopts almost any type of cap-and-trade program, with
credit for creation of carbon sinks, it will open a new area for development.
Companies that pioneer innovative technologies for carbon capture, and
those large enough to own significant underground storage space that can
safely store carbon, will have a large new area for profit-taking.
Both oil and natural-gas producers will find opportunities in this
growing field. Waste C02 produced from electricity generation and other
industrial processes can be stored in depleted oil and gas fields and other
subsurface geologic structures. Even in 2005, when the API published a
progress report on the "Climate Challenge," it included two pages
describing efforts by major oil companies to invest in carbon storage,
primarily underground storage, but also, in the case of Chevron, a
forestation project in Brazil and Louisiana that expanded carbon sinks.374
While underground formations can be suitable for permanently storing
C02, the formations need to be nonpermeable and generally quite large to
justify the cost of building facilities to transport and maintain the C02. The
efficient size will decrease as technology improves and certain areas come
to be served by C02 pipelines, bringing carbon from areas of emission to
the storage area.3 Carbon capture and storage are not only about physical
storage. This burgeoning market will put a premium on developing
technologies for capture and safe storage.

373. For a review of current arguments for and against nuclear power, including the extent
of the federal subsidy needed to make the industry a viable player in the market, see Michael
Totty, The Case For and Against Nuclear Power, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2008, at R1; for the limits
on liability, see id. at R3, cols. 2-3; for the storage issues, see id. cols. 3-5.
374. AM. PETROLEUM INST., CLIMATE CHALLENGE: A PROGRESS REPORT 8-9 (2005), available
at http://w-ww.api.org/ehs/climate/upload/ClimateChallengePage.pdf.
375. Industry companies already have considerable expertise transporting CO2 hundreds
of miles from fields that produce C02 to oil fields in areas that benefit from tertiary
stimulation, as in the Permian Basin.
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There is also growing commercial demand for C02 in certain mature
oil producing provinces such as the Permian Basin, where supercompressed C02 is reinjected into oil bearing strata to enhance ultimate
recoveries of crude oil. In 2006, a study prepared for the Department of
Energy estimated that C02-based enhanced oil recovery could permit
production of 100 billion barrels out of an estimated 374 billion barrels
"stranded" in already discovered fields.376
Cap-and-trade programs, which are likely to be part of any large-scale
federal emission program, may end up providing the most significant new
opportunity for major oil and natural-gas companies and large, well-run
independents. American producers remain technological leaders in an
extraordinarily sophisticated industry. As long as the next Kyoto-based
agreement includes cap-and-trade programs, be they internal, among
developed countries only, or encompassing the CDM mechanism as well,
and as long as the United States finally agrees to come into the Kyoto system
so that U.S. companies can participate in the trading market, these
programs will offer large opportunities for the energy industry. Major
companies and large independents are ideally situated to earn these credits,
which they can apply against their reduction targets or sell in a domestic
cap-and-trade market. The most sophisticated U.S. companies could end up
seeing emissions mitigation as one of their largest new sources of revenues
and profits.
One reason for industry companies' growing optimism may be that it
has become clearer that their customers' ability to substitute away from
fossil fuels in the short run is quite limited. For that reason, even if
government imposes expensive requirements on oil and gas companies,
they are likely to be able to pass through most or all of the resulting costs.
Some customers will be able to shift away from fossil fuels quickly, but
economic and population growth will maintain demand, and the price of
oil and natural gas will continue to be pushed by the world market.
C. Industry May Underestimate the Likely Mandatory Reductions
The industry's new enthusiasm for this emerging environmental world
in the easy areas of natural-gas production and carbon capture may mislead
it into thinking that it need not focus all that much on emissions reduction.
As discussed in Part IV, the idea that business as usual can continue, with
at most some extra cost for everyday activities, is one of the illusions that
seems to have prevented the largest developed countries from coming

376. ADVANCED RESOURCES INT'L, UNDEVELOPED DOMESTC OIL RESOURCES: THE
FOUNDATION FOR INCREASING OIL PRODUCTION AND A VIABLE DOMESTIc OIL INDUSTRY 1-4
(prepared for DOE 2006).
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anywhere near their initial, supposedly easy Kyoto goals. To be in a
position to capitalize on the opportunities just described, however, as well
as to help the world make necessary reductions in GHG emissions, all major
industry players will need to make large capital investments to reduce their
own footprints. Reducing energy intensity is not enough; the IPCC's
mainstream estimate is that total developed-country emissions must be
reduced by 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050 or the world will be in
severe trouble. The reduction required will increase as total GHGs
accumulate and the more the world fails to take even initial steps.
The adoption of Kyoto-type requirements in the United States is likely
to impose reduction requirements on all segments of the oil and gas
industry, including production, transportation, processing, refining, and
distribution. One can imagine a program that only taxes end-use of fossil
fuels, bypassing the traditional operations of oil and gas companies, but it
makes little sense to leave any major emissions source free of pressure to
reduce pollution. Considerations of fairness as well as efficiency should
make it far easier to gain support for a broad-based national program in
which all emitters share, rather than one limited to particular levels of the
economic chain.
As an example of the restrictions, there will be direct effects on the midstream and downstream segments of the industry. In natural gas, for
instance, the pipeline segment (i.e., high-pressure transmission) is not
generally considered a significant source of methane escapement, which is
a major problem for low-pressure local distribution company (LDC)
networks. Natural gas pipelines maintain pressures in the range of 1,000 psi
or higher, using compression produced by extremely large and energyintensive units located along their various systems. Many industry
companies expect existing compressors to be "grandfathered" in any
domestic legislation.3" Yet grandfathering existing emission sources is
inconsistent with developed-countries' need to reduce emissions by 80 or
even 50 percent by 2050, so it is quite likely that these facilities will not be
immunized from changes required in other parts of the economy.
Replacements and retrofits will have to be included in pipeline rate
bases and approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
for interstate lines and by state regulators on regulated intrastate systems.
As long as regulators accept such capital expenditures as reasonable - and
it is hard to imagine a national global warming policy that could work if the
FERC or state regulatory commissions refuse to allow a return on the
expensive outlays that will be required - pipelines should earn a substantial
return on their investment, with costs passed through to customers and end
users.

377.

For a description of the grandfathering of old electricity plants, see supra note 73.
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Natural-gas local distribution companies share the same exposure to
compressor emissions because they receive high-pressure natural gas from
transmission pipelines and step the pressure down for low-pressure
deliveries to homes, businesses, and industry. LDCs are also a significant
direct source of methane emissions. Many distribution systems were begun
in the mid to late 1800s (some local gas distribution systems still use
pre-Civil War facilities!) and use cast-iron pipe. Corrosion, failing
couplings, and other infrastructure shortcomings result in significant
leakage. Natural gas "lost and unaccounted for" is built into the rates
charged to consumers. Tighter restrictions will no doubt result in expensive
remediation and replacement.
Industry companies will have to conduct similar review at every other
stage of their operations: in oil pipelines, oil and gas exploration and
production, gas processing, and oil refining. Shell, for instance, has taken
aggressive steps to end natural-gas flaring in its field operations
worldwide. 378 Two-thirds of Shell's emissions come from production sites,
refineries, and chemical plants. Unfortunately, in spite of significant
investment and effort, Shell's energy intensity has gotten 30 percent worse
since 2000 because "we, like our competitors need more energy to produce
from aging fields and more difficult oil and gas." 37 9 Not only is the price of
oil and gas rising, but the push into production from oil shale and fields
requiring aggressive secondary and tertiary recovery methods will increase
emissions per unit of fossil fuel produced.
As rational entities, producers have an incentive to avoid investments
and changes in operating parameters prior to implementation of new GHG
regulations. They need to know how deep the cuts will be, and they hope
that offsets and subsidies will be available to lower the cost of the needed
capital investments. Debates over national global-warming legislation also
are certain to include bitter sectoral battles, with oil and natural gas
companies trying to shift the burden of compliance to electricity generators,
coal producers, and other functional segments of the economy-for
instance, auto manufacturing. At the end of the day, however, it is hard to
envision any workable emissions reduction program that does not require

378.

Shell, Managing Our GHG Emissions, http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2006/

servicepages/search.php?pageID=18303&q=emitted (last visited July 12, 2008).
379. Id. While fossil-fuel production releases GHG emissions, most of the pollution comes
from end users. See Shell, Carbon Footprint of Our Products, http:// www.shell.com/home/
content/ responsible-energy/ environment/ climate-change/ carbon -footprint-products/c

arbon_footprints-products.html ("Our customers emit six to seven times more C02 using our
products than we do making them.") (last visited July 6,2008). Any rational GHG reduction
policy will require producers to cap emissions in the field and in refining, processing, and
transportation activities but will also impose limits on electricity generation, transportation,
and every other major source of GHG emissions.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

cutbacks from both oil and natural gas companies given their pivotal role
in U.S. emission levels.
That the industry may be underestimating the extent of needed
reductions and the difficulty of making them is amply shown by the
problems unearthed in a recent study of the Northwest Power Planning
Council, one of the most aggressive government entities for setting strong
renewable energy and conservation standards. Congress created the
Council to plan the electricity generated in the Columbia River Basin for the
four affected states: Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana. In
November 2007, the Council issued a report on its C02 "footprint." 38° Its
findings were unexpected and disturbing. The Council concluded that even
assuming that the Northwest achieves its current renewable portfolio goals,
and also eliminates all summer dam spills (spills mandated by the courts to
protect endangered fish populations), the region still will only reduce the
growth in C02 emissions by 75 percent, with emissions still increasing by 18
percent between 2005 and 2024.81 These findings graphically illustrate the
profound difficulty in reducing C02 production to levels needed for climate
stabilization. The Council concluded that currently planned programs "are
likely to be insufficient to maintain current levels of C02 production, much
less to reduce C02 production to levels sought by greenhouse gas control
policies." 2
Some major oil companies are facing up to the challenge, at least in
words. Shell issued a challenge to the G8 leaders before their July 2008
meeting in Japan. It asserted that "[t]he world's ecosystems and climate
have reached a saturation point." 383 As a sign of just how much things have
changed at some companies, Shell cited the industry's traditional bCte noire,
the IPCC, for the proposition that "we have 10-20 years at best to stabilize
greenhouse gas emissions then reduce them sharply to prevent climate
change shocks." 384 Another Shell webpage calls the scientific evidence "now

380. Nw. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, supra note 365.
381. Id. at 2-3, 7. In a reminder of how difficult the science of climate estimation remains
and how fragile are patterns that we take for granted, the Report noted that Northwest C02
emissions increased a whopping 29 percent in 2005 over 1990 levels just because 2005 was an
unusually dry year. Id. at 2. The Northwest generally has low per-capita emissions because
of its access to hydroelectric power.
382. Id. at 14. The Report does assume that natural gas will play an increasingly important
role in meeting targets. It notes that even with aggressive conservation and expanded
renewable sources, lower-carbon fossil fuels (i.e., natural gas) may be the most effective source
of baseload power. Id. at 16.
383. Shell, A Climate Plan for the G8 Leaders, http://www.shell.com/static/responsibleenergy/downloads/environment/climate-change/climateplan-g8_01072008.pdf
(last
visited July 9, 2008).

384. Id.
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overwhelming" that climate change "is a serious global threat."' Even
though a large part of Shell's position is devoted to a pitch for public
funding on carbon-storage programs, an area in which Shell has invested
heavily, its statement is light years ahead of the industry's traditional
stance.
BP was another very public (and controversial) early leader in the
greening of the oil business. It is presumably no accident that the first two
majors to publicly announce strong support for alternative energy were BP
and Shell, companies headquartered outside the United States. On its
company website, BP cites the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report and notes
that the panel was established to provide a "balanced view of the issue."'
In language freighted with meaning in the IPCC framework, BP endorses
"precautionary action to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.. .even
though aspects of the science are still the subject of expert debate." 3 7 BP
supports caps within a trading regime. 38
American companies have begun making large shifts in their positions.
Chevron, for instance, cites the IPCC Fourth Assessment report in the
introduction to its "7 Principles for Addressing Climate Change." 389 It cites
the IPCC on a page listing "Chevron's view on Climate Change" and makes
a very interesting comment missing from most of the debate, namely, that
because emissions are highly concentrated in a handful of countries, Kyoto
might be better served focusing on the "10-12 critical emitting countries"
rather than signing up a majority of all countries.3 '
Several centuries of intensive fossil-fuel production have brought
extraordinary economic benefits to the world, but they also have caused
extraordinary damage. The industry's traditional posture of opposing any
limits on its ability to produce has cast many of its largest companies- not

385. Shell, A Serious Global Threat, available at http://www.shell.com/home/content/
responsible-energy/environment/climate-change/global/global-threat.html (last visited
July 9,2008). The data on C02 increase on the cited webpage are all taken from the IPCC. Id.
386. BP, Climate Change in Context, available at http://www.bp.com/
sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryd=9021743&contentId=7042289 (last visited July 10, 2008).
387. BP, BP's Point of View on Climate Change, available athttp://www.bp.com/
sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryd=9021744&contentId=7042291 (last visited July 10, 2008).
388. Id. BP claims to have reduced emissions from 1990 levels by 10 percent between 1998
and 2001, although it also claims to measure energy efficiency by carbon intensity, id., leaving
some ambiguity about whether it is referring to a total reduction or to a cut in energy intensity
that may mask an overall increase.
389. Chevron, Climate Change, 7 Principles for Addressing Climate Change, availableat
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/climatechange/sevenprinciples/ (last visited July
12, 2008).
390. Chevron, Frequently Asked Questions, What Is Chevron's Position on The Kyoto
Protocol?, available at http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/climatechange/faq/ (last
visited July 12, 2008).
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just oil and gas companies, but also coal producers and electricity
generators-in a negative role on environmental issues throughout this
period. The unprecedented challenge of global warming offers a chance to
reverse this antagonistic position at the same time that it holds out the
prospect for substantial new profit sources.
The U.S. energy industry has been coasting because of the record prices
for oil and gas, but this macroeconomic change should not disguise the
erosion of its competitive position. Other companies already have deeper
experience participating in the European cap-and-trade market; foreign
producers, including national oil companies, are becoming sophisticated
players capable of gaining first-mover advantages in new technologies that
should have fallen to large established U.S. companies; venture capitalists
in Silicon Valley and elsewhere have begun staking huge bets on alternative
energies that might have stayed the province of major oil companies had
they invested their short-run excess profits from higher prices in renewable
energy sources over the last decade. Time is fleeting, and this race will
indeed be won by the swift.
VIII. THE PROBLEM OF SCARCITY AND CURRENT RESPONSES
TO GLOBAL WARMING
Beyond Territory and Scarcity: Exploring Conflicts over Natural Resource
Management. Edited by Quentin Gausset, Michael Whyte & Torben BirchThomsen. Stockholm, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2005. Pp. 218. $35
paperback.
Access to Environmental Justice: A Comparative Study. Edited by Andrew
Harding. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007. Pp. 378. $162
hardcover.
Thus far, the world has treated the climate change crisis as if it can be
resolved without reducing anyone's standard of living. The insistence upon
sustainable development; the structure under which developing countries
are allowed to pursue growth without any emissions reductions
requirements; the casual establishment of round one Kyoto Protocol
standards at levels unlikely to have any real impact on warming; the
permission for developed countries to buy their way out of the effects of
their warming activities by buying rights from developing countries that are
not limited on their emissions increases; the unsavory bargain in which
formerly bucolic areas like the U.S. Virgin Islands refine gasoline for the
United States and large developing countries substitute their dirty
manufacturing industries for those disappearing from the "developed"
world-all these aspects of the current world system betoken the
assumption that somehow, somewhere the world will stumble upon easy
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technological fixes that will counter the effects of GHGs without any effect
on current lifestyles. Indeed, the assumption is worse. Because the world
community has committed to development for developing countries, it has
assumed that the challenge of global warming can be met while allowing
large increases in emissions in the most populous part of the world. The
formal statements in the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol of course envision
reductions, but actions speak louder than words. The world community
continues to allow development first and foremost in developing countries,
while doing relatively little to reduce emissions in developed countries
either.
What is missing is any sense that the pristine atmosphere and clean
oceans that are among the choicest gifts inherited by mankind are truly
scarce resources. Far more than vanishing oil, gas, coal, or other individual
resources, air and water are the stuff of life itself. Yet they increasingly are
at risk. If the world continues on its current course, clean air and water will
become increasingly scarce, almost certainly at an increasing, nonlinear rate.
The development of a market for bottled water will be followed by one for
oxygen. The change will not be slow and comfortable, permitting
adaptation. It is likely to be dramatic and harsh and cost hundreds of
millions of lives. It will impose trillions of dollars in adaptation costs. There
is significant risk that the world will find itself in the final, tragic phase of
Jared Diamond's vanished civilizations.
Beyond Territory and Scarcity: Exploring Conflicts over Natural Resource
Management,391a collection of essays on micro-level adaptations in some of
the world's poorest countries, is a reminder of just how difficult life
becomes when daily existence is a struggle to eke subsistence from parched
earth and limited water. The book is hopeful because it traces the success
of various cooperative programs in sub-Saharan Africa and because it
establishes that "scarcity" is not a monolithic, fixed constraint, but a relative
condition that can vary flexibly with resource management policies.392In the

391. BEYOND TERRITORY AND SCARCITY: EXPLORING CONFLICrS OVER NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT (Quentin Gausset et al. eds., 2005).
392. BEYOND TERRITORY AND SCARCITY includes chapters on resource management
programs in Lesotho, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Senegal, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and
Congo. The theory that poverty is substantially a question of resource management and social
decisions was championed by Amartya Sen in POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON
ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION (1981); for a detailed recent argument that poverty can be
ended if the world develops the will to reallocate resources, see JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF
POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME (2005). Of course, just as the domestic failure
to respond to poverty can be explained by distributional structures and the functioning of the
political system, so this is even more true on an international scale; wealthier nations could,
in theory, end starvation if they treated it as a sufficiently serious crisis. If the world proves
as inept, or unwilling, to make some sacrifices to combat global warming as it has been to at
least bring about a floor on world poverty, it will fail in its central environmental challenge.
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context of global warming, however, the story is much more troubling. It
remains a book about incremental changes in desperately poor societies. If
air and water become scarce for a much larger swath of the earth, these
painful negotiations and incremental adjustments over matters that most
developed-country citizens take for granted may become facts of daily
existence for far more of the earth's inhabitants.
Another recent publication, Access to Environmental Justice: A
Comparative Study,' helps reveal the extraordinary challenge the world
faces in actually implementing effective GHG limits. Even assuming that
developed countries do take the lead in reducing emissions and are willing
to fund a substantial program to assist developing countries, the challenge
of implementing developing-country reductions will be immense. Published
in order to circulate the results of studies on citizen access to environmental
decision making in 11 countries and regions,394 the book paints a grim
picture. The editor describes the researchers' reactions to the prior work out
of which the book grew as "mixed," with "overwhelming depression at the
sheer size of the problems and the ineffectiveness of standard legal
solutions" juxtaposed against "excitement and optimism at the creative
ways in which communities had achieved some sort of environmental
justice or had coped heroically." Two examples - one from Pakistan, which
shows the difficulty of enforcing rules in unstable countries, and the other
from China, the world's most populous nation-display the hurdles to
achieving basic emission regulation.
The chapter on Pakistan discusses efforts to achieve environmental
justice in Karachi, one of the world's most populous cites.395 With an
estimated 12 million inhabitants, Karachi is "one of the poorest and most
polluted cities on earth."' A formal legal system, with the kind of rules (be
they traditional command-and-control or creative voluntary measures) used
to spur environmental cleanup in the United States, is largely irrelevant in
this setting." Karachi's growth has been driven by "informal" housing
developments; property rights are at risk from "land grabbers" and "land
mafias"; there is little sanitation, clean water, or even basic mass
transportation.' Efforts to develop a stable legal regime, and within it an

393. ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Andrew Harding ed.,
2007).
394. ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE contains chapters on Ghana, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, China, the Southwest Pacific, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and

the United States.
395. Martin Lau, Access to EnvironmentalJustice:Karachi'sUrban Poorandthe Law, in ACCESS
TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supranote 393, ch. 7.
396. Id. at 178.
397. Id. at 183-84.
398. Id. at 183-83,189,198-99.
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effective body of environmental law, were delayed by the partition of
Bangladesh in 1972 and more recently by the coup d'tat by General
Musharraf in 1999. 399 Overall, " [c] orruption, inefficiency and weakness have
been associated so very closely with the legal system that there has been no
serious attempt to use law as a catalyst for change."'
Even though Karachi has seen some middle-class environmental
litigation and grass-roots efforts to control unrestrained development, the
explosion of building to house the ever-expanding population has
overwhelmed these efforts.'0 It will be very hard to impose emissions
constraints in a legal system with the following characteristics:
The reasons for the absence of law are easily identified:
rampant corruption, a web of political patronage which is
complex, pervasive and seemingly impenetrable, weak legal
institutions, scarcity of resources, civil strife, and overwhelming poverty are all factors which in Karachi render
legal gateways to environmental justice meaningless to the
vast majority of its citizens.4°2
In Pakistan, even if the central government were to adopt binding
reduction levels in a Kyoto-type framework, it is going to be very difficult
to enforce those limits against the burgeoning, but largely unregulated,
population on which government structures rest.
China presents a different picture. The emission threat posed by China
is even more severe, but in China the central government has a much
greater degree of control. Thus far, central control has not translated into
effective environmental limits. Although China was not open to
environmental legislation under Mao Zedong, who stressed economic
development, the country introduced an Environmental Protection Law in
1979 and substantially revised it in 1989. 403 It established a national State
Environmental Protection Administration, but much of the administration
occurs at provincial and local (village) levels by bodies that are heavily
dependent upon local funding, a built-in conflict that makes vigorous
enforcement difficult.' In addition, enforcement is often channeled into
negotiation, mediation, and informal administrative decision making,
factors that weaken regulation and encourage fatal compromises between

399. Id. at 190-91, 193.
400. Id. at 204.
401. Id. at 197-99.
402. Id. at 203.
403. Michael Palmer, TowardsaGreenerChina?Accessing Environmental Justicein the People's
Republic of China, in ACCESS TO EN IRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 393, at 205-11.
404. Id. at 211-15.
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growth and environmental compliance.' Systems built on compromise will
not be adequate in a world that needs to sharply reduce overall GHG
emissions. According to the researcher, China's judiciary is hampered by a
lack of independence, limited jurisdiction, and limited remedial abilities.'
Jared Diamond's Collapse also describes the effects of China's rapid
industrialization on air quality and land and water resources.' If the
Chinese government adopts rigorous emissions limits, its efforts to enforce
them will be the biggest test of whether government can regulate buoyant
market systems effectively. Many of those who advocated deregulation in
the United States in recent years as a matter of ideology may find
themselves rethinking their position when they experience the effects of
China's unbridled growth on air and water in the United States. Diamond
experienced the same combination of despair and hope as the researchers
in Reality Check, and his comments can be taken metaphorically to represent
the problem posed by the developing world generally:
Like the rest of the world, China is lurching between
accelerating environmental damage and accelerating
environmental protection. China's large population and large
growing economy, and its current and historic centralization,
means that China's lurches involve more momentum than
those of any other country.... 1 found my own feelings
lurching between despair at the mind-numbing litany of
depressing details, and hope inspired by the drastic and
rapidly implemented measures of environmental protection
that China has already adopted.'
IX. QUO VADIS?
This book review began by framing the climate change debate within
the approach of Jared Diamond's Collapse. Another way to measure the
progress to date and to consider the challenge ahead is to put global
warming and the scarcity issues it raises into a framework suggested in the
early years of the environmental movement by Paul Ehrlich in The
PopulationBomb.4 9 Ehrlich's book, published in 1968, came during the first
great rush of environmental legislation in the United States. His basic
argument was that population growth is outstripping the earth's
resources-we are exceeding the carrying capacity of our planet. He

405. Id. at 218-23.
406. Id. at 226-31.
407. DiAMOND, supra note 1, ch. 12.
408. Id. at 377. For another recent discussion of China that bears a similar mixture of
despair and hope, see FRIEDMAN, supranote 52, chs. 3, 15.
409. PAuL EiRLuoI, THE POPULATION BOMB 4 (1968).
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pointed out that from 8,000 B.C. to 1650 A.D., global population doubled
only every thousand years, increasing from five million to 500 million. It
then doubled in 200 years, to a billion in 1850, and in the next 80 years, to
two billion in 1930. Ehrlich projected that the U.S. population might rise to
between 270 to 285 million by 2000. He argued that the world had "a
chance" of achieving a sustainable position if the population stabilized at
four or five billion people.41 ° In fact, the world population has far surpassed
that level, reaching 6.5 billion by 2005, and the United Nations estimates
that it will rise to 7.3 billion by 2015; the U.S. population reached 300 million
by 2005 and the U.N. projects it to reach 329 million by 2015. 4 "
Because of The Population Bomb's title and its detailed discussion of
population issues, it is easy to forget that a substantial part of Ehrlich's
argument concerned the environmental catastrophe - the effect on natural
resources - that he saw arising out of the surging number of human beings.
The PopulationBomb is very much an environmental tract. In his first page,
Ehrlich announced that "[wie are today involved in the events leading to
famine and ecocatastrophe."4 2 In a section titled "A Dying Planet" and
another on "Protecting Our Environment," he traced the way that intensive
irrigation techniques were exhausting soil and water, and the use of toxic
chemicals was spreading pollution.41 3 Ehrlich predicted that one of the most
hopeful advances of the time, the Green Revolution that was producing
new high-yield grains, would require increased use of water and chemicals
and that the world still would be forced to expand production into marginal
land as population increased, leading to further need for polluting
agricultural inputs.414 Ehrlich also argued that even much more intensive
fishery management could not keep up with rising population growth.4 15
Ehrlich viewed the possibility of the world actually taking effective
action as "small.. .probably infinitesimal." 416 His influence has been muted
because world population has expanded beyond levels that he predicted
would bring direct ecological disaster, and it is a fair summary that the
world has not witnessed the level of visible famine that Ehrlich predicted.

410. Id. at 157.
411. For the world population figures, see 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 246, tbl. 5; for
the U.S. population figures, see id. at 243.
412. EHRLICH, supra note 409, at xi.
413. Id. at 26-44, 102-26.
414. Id. at 91-94, 97-101.
415. Id. at 94-97.
416. Id. at 158. Ehrlich warned that the United States, consuming one-third of the world's
resources with just one-fifteenth of its population, could not "remain affluent and isolated,"
id. at 129, which is basically the position the country has continued to choose by opposing the
Kyoto framework. Discussing whether the United States would take the measures he
proposed to reign in its resource consumption, he wrote, "Americans will do none of these
things, you say. Well, I'm inclined to agree." Id. at 145.
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This was vividly underlined when Ehrlich lost a bet with economist Julian
Simon on the price of five metals (tin, nickel, tungsten, chromium, and
copper) .417 Technology has expanded mankind's ability to extract food, heat,
and power from the earth's resources, as it so often has in the past.
Before we grow cavalier and simply assume that Ehrlich was wrong,
however, and that technology will save us again because it has in the past,
an assumption explicit in the Bush administration's Global Climate Change
Initiative, we should remember that many of the problems described by
Ehrlich-depleted forests, exhausted fisheries, shrinking water supplies,
food production pushed into marginal land - were deferred by technology
but not solved. These problems are with us still and rising population is
giving them increased intensity.
Standing above all these individual problems, of course, is the threat on
a scale not understood at the time of The Population Bomb: rising
temperatures will have dramatic, nonlinear effects that reduce the ability of
the air, land surface, and oceans to support life at anything remotely like the
standards to which we have grown accustomed. Even if technology
improves - as it surely will - there is no guarantee that it will achieve such
great leaps forward that it catches the rapidly worsening global-warming
problem in time to keep it manageable. This is the old Malthusian
problem; 418 technology has generally kept production ahead of population
growth, albeit with starvation continuing to be a major problem for much
of the world. The problem now, however, operates through scarcity of basic
resources needed for many technical processes - air and water. As the rate
of exploitation accelerates, it is by no means clear that there will be
sufficient technical fixes to solve the problem.
Moreover, though it may seem as if a new burst of environmental
consciousness is upon us, with signs like the popularity of Al Gore's An
Inconvenient Truth,419 it is sobering to remember that a similar era seemed to
have dawned in the 1960s and early 1970s, reflected in such books as Rachel
Carson's Silent Spring,'2 Ehrlich's The PopulationBomb, the MIT team's The
Limits to Growth, E.F. Schumacher's Small Is Beautiful,421 Stuart Udall's The

417. Kenneth Gilpin, Julian Simon, 65, OptimisticEconomist, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,1998,
availableathttp://query.nytimes.com/gst/fulipage.html?res=950DEODD153CF931A25751C
0A96E958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=l. The debate over Ehrlich's five metals is very
similar to the ongoing disputes about peak oil; the world is producing more oil than many
thought possible a few decades ago, yet we are once more confronting arguments that
production has peaked and will decline from now on.
418. THOMAS MALTHUS, ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (1970) (1798).
419.

AL GORE, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH: THE PLANETARY EMERGENCY OF GLOBAL

WARMING AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2006).
420. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
421. E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATrERED (1973).
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Quiet Crisis,' Jane Jacobs' The Death and Life of GreatAmerican Cities,23 and
a deep body of related academic work.424 Yet the years since the 1970s have
seen the highest level of GHG emissions in U.S. history. Intellectual advance
and raised consciousness have not led to progress. It is hard not to ask
exactly how much warning the world needs before it will take remedial
steps commensurate with the size of the problem.
The stress on population also characterized the detailed modeling in
The Limits to Growth in 1972. 4 The authors used systems theory to model
the interaction of five major variables - population, arable land, agricultural
capital, industrial capital, and pollution. They set the stage by pointing out
that in early industrialization population, output, energy consumption, and
waste tend to increase exponentially (a bad fact when one thinks about how
much of the developing world is in a stage of early industrialization, and
how far even Chinese emissions would rise if energy intensity grows to
developed-country levels).' The increasing rate of consumption, coupled
with lags in the interaction between these variables, explains why
consumption can increase up to a point and then collapse. In a highly
controversial chapter, the authors argued that technology could not solve
this problem because it would only expand the period for population
increase and increased capital use. They concluded that "[t]he basic
behavior mode of the world system is exponential growth of population
and capital, followed by collapse."' Technological advances could delay
collapse, but would not alter the pattern; the world could reach a balanced
equilibrium only if population and capital growth were both halted.'
The first version of The Limits to Growth did not take a position on
whether the world had yet "overshot" a sustainable point, even though the
model predicted that the world would do so.' But a 20-year review in 1992
and a 30-year follow-up in 2004 addressed this question. In the 20-year
update, the same authors concluded that the world was already "beyond
it limits" and the "present way of doing things is unsustainable."' They

422.

STUART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS (1963).

423.
424.

JANE JAcOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERIcAN CmEs (1961).
For a brief survey of these and other intellectual antecedents to the modem

environmental movement, see J.E. DE STEIGUER, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL

THOUGHT (2006).
425.

DONELLA MEADOWS Er AL., THE LIMIS TO GROWTH (1972).

426.

See, e.g., figures for these variables, id. at 33,38,40,70,72 (showing an increasing rate

of C02 concentrations since 1860).
427. Id. at 142.
428. Id. at 161,171.
429. Id. at 191 ("considering the world as a whole, the critical point in population is
approaching, if it has not already been reached").
430.

DONELLA MEADOWS ET AL, BEYOND THE LIMIS: CONFRONTING GLOBAL COLLAPSE,

ENVISIONING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, at xv (1992).
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found that the use of "many essential resources and generation of many
kinds of pollutants have already surpassed rates that are physically
sustainable."4 3' In a table comparing 1970 figures with those for 1990- thus
using a base year that witnessed events like Earth Day and after which one
would have expected a rise in serious environmental reforms - they showed
that population had risen from 3.6 billion to 5.3 billion in this short two
decades, registered automobiles more than doubled from 250 million to 560
million (and this, of course, before the explosive rise of sales in China and
India); and oil consumption had risen from 17 billion barrels to 25 billion
and natural gas from 31 trillion cubic feet to 70 trillion.432 The world's
electricity generating capacity, that key source of greenhouse gases, had
more than doubled from 1.1 billion to 2.6 billion kilowatts.433 The authors
continued to find that technology would not prevent overshooting and
collapse, even if it might delay the point of insustainability. 434 Moreover,
discussing the idea that market signals should lead to the best resource
allocation in the context of the oil and gas industry, they noted:
Market signals such as oil price are too noisy, too delayed, too
amplified by speculation, and too manipulated by private and
public interest groups to give the world clear signals about
oncoming physical limits. The market is blind to the long term
and pays no attention to ultimate sources and sinks, until they
are nearly exhausted, when it is too late to act.43
In Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update,reviewing another decade of lost
time through the data in their model, the authors indicated that they were
"much more pessimistic about the global future than we were in 1972. It is
a sad fact that humanity has largely squandered the past 30 years in futile
debates and well-intentioned, but halfhearted responses to the global
ecological challenge." 436 Per capita grain production seemed to have peaked
in the mid-1980s, there was no chance for significantly increased fish
harvests, conflict was growing over fossil fuels and fresh water, and "[tihere
are already persistent economic declines in many localities and regions." 43'
It is necessary to include population in the discussion because it is the
area in which developing countries, with their higher birth rates, have been
grossly irresponsible. If the developed world has egg on its face because of
its indulgent, addictive increase in emissions to further a consumer lifestyle,

431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id. at xv-xvi.
Id. at 7.
Id.
See id. at 161-89.
Id. at 184.
DONELLA MEADOWS ET AL., LIMrms TO GROWTH: THE 30-YEAR UPDATE, at xvi (2004).
Id. at xiv.
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developing countries owe the world an apology for their headlong rush into
population expansion without any provision of the resources needed to
support the added population. Both China and India, for example, more
than doubled their population in just 25 years between 1965 and 1990; the
more than 600 million people added by China, and 500 million people
added by India, are each more than the total population of any other
nation.438
The mixed responsibility for the crisis, although heavily tilted toward
developed nations, is ultimately never going to yield a precise set of data on
comparative fault that will allow an objective basis for allocating reduction
burdens. Although the developed countries have indeed contributed most
of the world's historical emissions, and thus in a sense are responsible for
having gotten the world into this mess, such high emissions are, as Kofi
Annan once pointed out, in good part because they were producing most
of the world's goods.439 Many of those goods were sold in other countries
and improved their standard of living. Similarly, before one points the
finger of blame at China and India for their rapidly increasing emissions,
one has to remember that their economic growth has been largely fueled to
date by demand in other countries for low-priced Chinese imports.
There is no accepted metric to compare the increased pressure from
population growth to that from increasing emission-producing activity. The
picture is even more complicated by the fact that, traditionally, the
developed world's emissions included the manufacture of industrial
products used by developing countries, a pattern that is being reversed as
China, India, and other low-wage economies take over production activities
for much of the world. Developed and developing countries have joint
responsibility and cannot solve this problem without joint action.
What does remain true is that the dire threat poses one of the most
interesting challenges the oil and gas industry has ever faced. The industry
is almost uniquely situated to find solutions for global warming. It is one of
the world's most technologically sophisticated industries. Its companies are
filled with scientists and other technicians who have the skills to minimize
the damage from the world's energy activities. And the companies are
necessary partners in any transition to alternative energies. The energy
sector as a whole is almost certain to require a larger share of world GDP,
and the industry's practical know-how and scientific skills will be an
essential ingredient in this challenge. Those companies that prove capable

438. 1 IMMANuEL NEss & JAMES CmnENT,THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL POPULATION AND
DEMOGRAPI'cs 274,436 (1999).
439. See Kofi Annan, ContainingClimate Change:A Global Challenge,25 FLETCHERF. WORLD
AFF. 5,

6 (2001) ("The United States, as you probably know, is the world's leading emitter of
greenhouse gases, largely because it is the world's largest and most successful economy.").
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of rapid adjustment, shifting from old markets to new and adept at keeping
pace with customer tastes, are likely to thrive. Those that respond the way
the Big Three of the U.S. auto industry have met import threats over the last
several decades -by clinging to the most profitable segments of their old
business and fighting regulation as hard as they can but failing to adopt
new approaches for the future - will fail and be displaced.
In a mass of discouraging data, it should be noted that there are areas
where progress should be relatively easy, with low-lying fruit just waiting
to be picked. The HDR estimates that 20 percent of the "global carbon
footprint" comes from deforestation, a process that the world could stop at
a fraction of the cost of reducing emissions elsewhere." As a sign of the
misplaced incentives that exist in many developing countries in the absence
of an effective world transfer price, it notes that Indonesian oil palm
plantations that generated $114 per hectare could impose a cost of $10,000
to $15,000 per hectare if the trees are burned to allow development. 441 In its
estimate, even commercial logging of these forests only nets one tenth the
value of the carbon removed from the atmosphere by leaving the trees in
place. 2
Investments in wind, solar, and hydro power that include the cost of
foregone emissions as a benefit (and that factor in the damage to the U.S.
economy from having to purchase oil overseas) suggest that capital
investments in these areas are smart ways of hedging for the future. A
recent Department of Energy report claims that the United States, which has
ample wind power, could supply 20 percent of its energy from wind by
2030.443 Given the stakes, the country should be pursuing this possibility
with the utmost speed.
Transportation is another area that should offer easy pickings in the
United States. In the 1970s, this country chose not to pursue Jimmy Carter's
challenge to pursue energy sufficiency and instead put its faith in the
market rather than a firm national plan. Competition through market forces
has proven a dismal failure as an excuse for a true national policy on
environment and resource use. Market forces have destroyed a substantial
portion of the dollar's value and are in the process of doing the same to the
Big Three automobile manufacturers. The country is on course, as T. Boone

440. 2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 157.
441. Id. at 158.
442. Id. Indeed, Thomas Friedman claims that deforestation has made Indonesia the third
worst GHG emitter after the United States and China, and Brazil is number four on this
undesirable list. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 299.
443. News Release, Dep't of Energy, Wind Energy Could Produce 20 Percent of U.S.
Electricity by 2030 (May 12, 2008), available at http://www.doe.gov/news/6253.htm (last
visited July 12, 2008).
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Pickens recently complained in an essay in the Wall Street Journal,44 to
transfer trillions of dollars to oil-producing nations over the next decade.
U.S. fuel-economy standards have been moribund even as such less
developed competitors as China have signed on to much more stringent
requirements. The U.S. fuel-economy standards are the lowest in the
industrial world. 44 With transportation accounting for 28 percent of U.S.
emissions, the country can make easy progress by shifting to smaller,
lighter, more efficient cars and trucks. If the world's leading technological
nation cannot match the regulations of an emerging economy like China
because it does not have the willpower, it will find little sympathy when it
is lapped by competitor nations that were more willing to make sacrifices
to improve their transportation fleets.
Success will be a question of will, not technology. The localized protests
by truck drivers and fishermen in Europe are a reminder that higher prices
and lower emissions will cause large-scale, sometimes unforeseeable
changes in the way of life in all countries. If the debate over which measures
to adopt is diverted into battles over who should bear the costs, the world
will never arrive at a viable policy and the climate will be damaged
irreparably.
There are reasons to hope. The venture-capital community recently has
begun to troll the marketplace for profits from new technologies to reduce
GHG emissions. The world has yet to require serious reductions and is
waiting to see what a truly international cap-and-trade market motivated
by enforceable requirements can do. Capitalism's ingenuity in finding
solutions has not been unleashed against the problem of global warming
largely because too many governments have been unwilling to intervene in
the marketplace and impose firm requirements on polluting sources. A
recent article in the New York Times describes congressmen as "furious with
Detroit for fighting so hard and for so long, against higher fuel-efficiency
standards."" 6 This fury is as nothing compared to the anger that will be
leveled at traditional energy companies - in oil and gas, coal, and electricity
generation - if the world fails to bring temperature increases under control

444. Pickens, supra note 368, col. 2.
445. For the dismal American record on fuel economy in the last few decades, see
2007/2008 HDR, supra note 22, at 138-39; Nelson Schwartz, Asleep at the Spigot: A Thirstfor
Oil Comes Back to Haunta Nation of Gas Guzzlers, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY, July 6, 2008, Bus. 1, col.
4. The tragedy of these problems, of course, is that the opportunity foregone by the resistance
of American business is a true lost opportunity. As is obvious from comparing Japan's auto
manufacturers to the Big Three in the United States, companies (and countries) that view
global warming as a challenge will come out ahead in the world economic pecking order. For
an impassioned argument on precisely this point, see generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, ch.
8.
446. Schwartz, supra note 445, at 6, col. 1.
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and the climate spirals out of control in a series of increasingly costly
changes.
Today, population continues to increase. Billions of citizens in
developing countries are hoping to buy cars, expand their diets, and build
their own homes - all activities that would increase GHG emissions. With
U.S. per-capita emissions intensity still many times that of China and other
developing countries, it can hardly tell developing countries they need to
sacrifice. Thus far the world has approached this crisis full of complacency,
with the United States heavily to blame for the lack of action. The next few
years need to see much more forceful action or the world will lose any
chance of controlling the upward temperature spiral.
Some commentators have approached climate change as a question of
psychology; they argue that the world has been so sluggish in responding
to this crisis because citizens in developed countries may view climate
change as such a limited short-term problem that they are unwilling to pay
for remedies, and may discount future generations at such a high rate that
they choose to avoid seeking remedies today altogether." 7 Thus, while there
may be reason to hope, there is also reason for the greatest concern. Nothing
is inevitable; the outcome depends upon choices yet to be made.
The world has been debating the meaning of climate change for well
over 30 years. It has been actively engaged in trying to impose emission
reductions since at least 1992, when focused negotiations began at the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Yet economic desires continue to overwhelm
environmental necessity. We are on a course to dramatically increase GHG
emissions because of the refusal of major developed nations -the United
States foremost among them- to accept their past responsibility and make
the initial changes, and because of the developing world's failure to accept
responsibility for its growing impact on the problem. Even if developed
countries do commit to real reductions, it is going to be an extraordinary
challenge to create institutions for detection and enforcement in the

447. See especially Jeffrey Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL.
L. REv. 299 (discussing various psychological tendencies that Rachlinski claims will tend to
reduce response to the climate-change problem); Sunstein, supra note 168 (discussing
"bounded rationality" reasons that Americans might resist costly measures to respond to
climate change). Sunstein cites survey evidence that Americans feel they have "relatively
little" to gain from combating climate-change efforts, in contrast to the benefits from measures
against terrorism. Id. at 524-26. After comparing the litigation response to cigarettes and
climate change, Joni Hersch and Kip Viscusi have argued that ignorance and a tendency to
heavily discount costs on future generations will undercut support for regulatory measures;
their testing found, inter alia, that older people tend to be less supportive of costly measures.
See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 364, at 1672-84; see also id. at 1684-92 (discussing theories
concerning uncertainty and discounting).
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developing world. 8 There is almost no chance, however, that developing
countries will bring emissions under control if developed countries refuse
to lead.
The world is in much the same position as it likely was for Diamond's
Easter Islanders when it must have dawned on them that the disappearance
of their forests would totally undermine their traditional way of life, or for
the Ancestral Puebloans, or Anasazi, when their sophisticated watercollection measures finally seemed unable to keep pace with population and
climate. Our technological capability and organizational potential is vastly
superior to those earlier civilizations, but the key question remains: will the
world act as a community and transcend its differences to implement a
coherent plan that will reduce emissions?

448. Richard Pierce, Jr., a well-known author on oil and gas issues, has stated with no real
exaggeration that the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA "marked the beginning of a legal
struggle that will match the U.S. civil rights struggle of the sixties in its importance and
intensity." Pierce, supranote 172, at 602.

